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# **Bases for a settlement of the Viet Nam problem**

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of the Viet Nam Problem**

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*Feb. 7, 1965: By successive waves, US planes attacked North Viet Nam's territory. The US air war, of which the August 5, 1964 raids were a prelude, started against the DRVN in accordance with plans laid down as early as the beginning of 1964 by the National Security Council in Washington.*

*March 8, 1965: US marine units landed at Da Nang' first contingents of an American expeditionary corps which was to swell to more than half-a-million; the "limited war" supplanted the "special war" in South Viet Nam.*

*April 7, 1965: at Baltimore, Johnson tried to justify his war acts by the myth of an aggression of South Viet Nam by the North, invoked US commitments to the puppet government in Saigon and offered "unconditional discussions".*

*Washington let it be understood that resistance to US designs would mean the merciless destruction of all major constructions in the DRVN. Johnson's negotiation offer, put forward at the very moment when he hurled US armed forces against both North and South Viet Nam, was*

nothing short of a demand for capitulation. Washington thought that brandishing the threat of extermination would be enough to bring the Vietnamese people to their knees: it simply failed to recognize their will to live in independence and freedom.

As early as March 22, 1965, the National Front for Liberation in a five-point statement affirmed the resolve of South Viet Nam's people and armed forces to "fulfil their sacred duty, which is to drive out the US imperialists, so as to liberate the South and defend the North." And a goal was defined for this gigantic effort: "To build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral South Viet Nam and ultimately achieve national reunification".

On April 8, 1965, from the rostrum of the National Assembly in Hanoi, Premier Pham Van Dong proclaimed the four-point position of the DRVN Government for the settlement of the Viet Nam issue.

The first two points recalled the essential principles of the Geneva Agreements, namely the recognition of the Vietnamese people's basic national rights: independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. All violations by the United States of those principles and of the status of military neutrality of the two zones of Viet Nam pending national reunification must be terminated: this meant withdrawal of all US troops, cessation of the US policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet Nam and of all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRVN. The realization of these points would create, on the international plane, conditions for the application of the third point on the South Vietnamese people's right to

self-determination, and of the fourth point on Viet Nam's peaceful reunification.

This was a text of prime importance. The four-point position reflected the resolve of an entire people to fight to the end for the attainment of their sacred national objectives, and at the same time their good will in envisaging a political settlement.

For its part, Washington was to continue for several years the same game: escalation of military operations to bring pressure to bear on the Vietnamese people and lift the morale of the puppets, together with "peace" campaigns aimed at placating US and world opinion. The politico-military means it resorted to, however, failed to yield the expected results: the Vietnamese people were standing firm both in the North and in the South while in Saigon the puppet administration was plunged into an endless crisis.

Towards the end of 1965, Washington stepped up its "peace" campaign: a 37-day bombing halt was declared with threat to resume the air raids in case the Yankee diktat was not heeded. In dozens of countries White House envoys made a noisy propaganda about a US fourteen-point "peace" program (Jan. 7, 1966). Meanwhile a big counter-offensive was launched by the US command in South Viet Nam in the hope of "searching out and destroying" the NLF regular units, backbone of the South Vietnamese resistance. As the 1965-1966 armed offensive and the parallel "peace" offensive both failed, Washington rapidly strengthened its expeditionary corps, intensified the bombing against the DRVN and, towards the end of 1966, mounted a new armed offensive against

the NFL while demanding concessions from the DRVN in return for an eventual bombing cessation.

However, to the Pentagon's demands for "reciprocity" the Foreign Minister of the DRVN, Nguyen Duy Trinh, on January 28, 1967 gave a clear-cut answer which he renewed on December 29 of the same year: talks between the DRVN and the USA would take place only after the unconditional cessation of all bombings and other war acts against the DRVN. Any self-respecting government would have to adopt the same stand, otherwise it would find itself in a position of some one facing an enemy who pointed his gun at him and dictated to him his terms.

Nearly two years went by, during which 3,000 airplanes were downed in North Viet Nam, two dry-season counter-offensives were thwarted with heavy losses in the South and increasing economic and political difficulties swooped on the United States, before the American rulers, confronted moreover with an election campaign, came to their senses: they had to accept a total and unconditional cessation of the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRVN as from Nov. 1, 1968, making possible the holding in Paris of a quadripartite conference on Viet Nam with the participation of the NFL on an equal footing.

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However, for Nixon, the new president of the United States, although the trend towards de-escalation in the fighting was irresistible and demanded by the American nation as a whole, negotiations were but a "byproduct" of his policy of "Vietnamizing" the war. What was sought was not peace but a military victory by other ways and means.

On May 14, 1969 he put forward his first "plan for peace": withdrawal of all "non-Southvietnamese troops" in two stages, and holding of elections in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon, it being understood that those elections would be organized by the Nguyen Van Thieu clique, dubbed the "constitutional and legal government" of South Viet Nam; the members of the NFL would have to lay down their weapons, renounce the use of force and come back to the "national community".

While insisting on the principle of "mutual troop withdrawal", Nixon nevertheless could not turn a deaf ear to the unanimous demands in the world and the United States for an early repatriation of the GIs, hence his decisions, taken within the framework of "Vietnamization", to reduce piecemeal the American expeditionary corps, this reduction to be compensated for by an intensive use of ultra-modern engines of death and barbarous methods of "pacification". The US airforce and land and sea artillery intensified their raids and poundings of all areas in South Viet Nam to compel the population to regroup in cities controlled by US and puppet troops. With an eye to a military victory, Nixon stepped up the war in Laos and in May 1970 started an overt aggression against Cambodia. The Paris Conference was brought to a standstill, pending any result to come out of this "maximum military pressure". Nixon's neo-colonialist ambitions were not limited to Viet Nam; they covered the whole of Indochina.

In face of an opinion roused by the prolongation of the war in Viet Nam and its expansion to other Indochinese

countries, Nixon tried to justify his refusal to fix a date for total troop withdrawal from South Viet Nam, by orchestrating a huge propaganda campaign about "prisoners of war". "We will be there as long as they have any (American) prisoners in North Viet Nam," he again repeated on April 29, 1971.

The "POWs" whose "immediate and unconditional" release was demanded by Nixon, loomed large in the US president's five-point, second "peace plan" of Oct. 7, 1970, next to a "cease-fire-in-place", an Indochina "peace conference", a search for political settlement in South Viet Nam in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon, and, of course, the refrain on "mutual troop withdrawal".

The Nixon "peace plans", aimed at camouflaging war continuation, reflected the neo-colonialist ambitions of the Washington die-hards who, in spite of setbacks, endeavoured to cling by all means to South Viet Nam through a puppet administration swearing allegiance to the US and supported by a strong US military presence.

They offered a striking contrast with the programs for political settlement put forward by the genuine representatives of the Vietnamese people.

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Right in the first sessions of the Paris quadripartite conference, on May 8, 1969, the NFL delegation, which later became the delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, proposed a 10-point overall solution to the South Viet

Nam problem, in line with the NFL five-point statement and DRVN four-point position.

Based on respect for the Vietnamese people's basic national rights, this solution could rightly be described as proceeding from the essential principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements while taking into account the actual situation in Viet Nam. A "return to the Geneva Agreements" was often proposed by the US, which however tendentially interpreted those agreements in the sense of a permanent partition of Viet Nam into two different countries: the fable of an aggression of the South by the North might then be concocted. It is obvious that the Vietnamese people, who have built up their national unity in the course of a plurimillenary history, could not accept such a solution. Since territorial unity is—like independence and sovereignty—one of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people, which the Geneva Agreements duly recognized, the only aggression in Viet Nam is that being committed by the US imperialists. It is therefore up to the United States to put an end to this aggression, pull out from South Viet Nam all US troops and troops of the other foreign countries of the US camp, their arms and war materials, and dismantle all US military bases. This is the first condition for any valid solution.

The 10-point overall solution made a clear distinction between two categories of questions: those to be debated between the US aggressors and the Vietnamese people, victim of the aggression, and those concerning only Vietnamese parties, to be debated among themselves.

The withdrawal of US and satellite troops comes under the first category. As for the problem of Vietnamese armed

forces fighting in South Viet Nam, it belongs to the second category. To ask for a "mutual troop withdrawal", as did Washington, was to sow confusion, put the aggressor and his victim on an equal footing, and legalize the presence of US armed forces in a land situated more than 10,000 kilometres away from the United States.

The future political regime of a South Viet Nam freed from US military occupation is another problem of the second category. No foreign interference can be tolerated: it is up to the Vietnamese people, not to Washington, to decide. The question is to define a process guaranteeing the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. The PRG stood for the holding in South Viet Nam of free and democratic elections to set up a government of national concord. The crucial point was who was to organize those elections. Nixon wanted to entrust the Nguyen Van Thieu clique with this task, but even Nguyen Cao Ky, the vice-president of the Saigon regime, had to acknowledge that the Saigon elections were but "a farce and only served to install a government which has nothing in common with the people." (quoted by the Telegraph of Brisbane, April 1, 1969). The PRG, though the fruit of a long and victorious struggle and the embodiment of the deepest aspirations of the people in South Viet Nam, did not arrogate to itself the right to be the sole organizer of the elections. It proposed that that right be exerted by a provisional coalition government formed after consultations, on a basis of equality, democracy and mutual respect, between political forces representing the various social strata and political tendencies that stood for peace, independence and neutrality, including

those persons who, for political reasons, had had to live abroad.

On September 17, 1970, at the 84th plenary session of the Paris Conference, Mme Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister and head of the delegation of the RSVN PRG, presented an 8-point clarification of the May 8, 1969 overall solution.

While reaffirming the demand for a total and unconditional withdrawal of US and satellite troops, Mme Binh's statement specified that in case the US Government declared it would withdraw the troops by June 30, 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces would refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops, and the parties concerned would engage at once in discussions on: a) the question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the troops concerned, b) the question of releasing captured militarymen.

Concerning the problem of power in South Viet Nam, the statement specified that since the present team in Saigon, a warlike and fascist one, and a tool of the US policy of aggression, were mulishly opposing any peaceful settlement, the restoration of genuine peace necessitated their overthrow and the formation of an administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The PRG was prepared to enter into talks with such an administration, and a provisional coalition government was to be set up with the three following components:

- persons from the PRG,
- persons from the said Saigon administration, who

really stood for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy,

— persons from various political and religious forces and tendencies standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy including those who, for political reasons, had had to live abroad.

On December 10, 1970, at the 94th plenary session of the Paris Conference, Mme Nguyen Thi Binh expounded the views of the PRG on an eventual South Viet Nam cease-fire.

A cease-fire would come into force between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the troops and military personnel of the US and the other foreign countries in the US camp immediately after the US Government declared it would withdraw from South Viet Nam all US and satellite troops and military personnel before June 30, 1971; it would be put into effect between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration immediately after an agreement had been reached on the provisional tripartite government referred to above.

The proposal on a "cease-fire-in-place" in Nixon's October 7, 1970 speech was thus dismissed: to accept such a cease-fire would amount to legalizing US occupation of parts of South Viet Nam's territory and giving the aggressor a breathing space for him to prepare for new military ventures.

On July 1, 1971, at the 110th plenary session of the Paris Conference, Mme Nguyen Thi Binh presented a new program in 7 points for the settlement of the South Viet Nam problem. This program, based on the 10-point

overall solution of the PRG, deals with two burning questions among others.

It stipulates that in case the US Government fixes a deadline for such a withdrawal in 1971, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities of two operations: the total withdrawal in safety of the troops concerned, and the release of all militarymen of all parties and of all civilians captured in the war, including American pilots captured in North Viet Nam. These two operations will begin on the same date and end on the same date. Thus, the American president would have only to announce a deadline in 1971 for the total withdrawal of US and satellite troops, and all the GIs in South Viet Nam and all the US pilots detained in North Viet Nam would be able to spend Christmas this year in their homes. The questions of captured military men, which constitutes an issue normally to be settled only after the end of the hostilities, can now find a solution in a very near future as a result of the generous policy of the PRG.

The seven-point peace initiative also stipulates that the US Government must cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon, and stop all manoeuvres, including rigged elections, aimed at maintaining the quisling Nguyen Van Thieu. The PRG program adds that the political, social and religious forces in South Viet Nam aspiring for peace and national concord will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration favouring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, with which the PRG will immediately enter into talks on issues relating

to the cessation of war and restoration of peace, in particular on the formation on a broad-based tripartite government of national concord which will be entrusted with the holding of genuinely free, democratic and fair general elections.

The other points of the July 1, 1971 peace initiative of the PRG—regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam; the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam and the relations between the North and the South zones; the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Viet Nam; the damage caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in both zones; respect and international guarantee for the accords which will have been concluded—while reiterating the proposals contained in the May 8, 1969 overall solution, contain many new elements which only further highlight the good will of the South Vietnamese patriots.

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From the 5-point statement and the 4-point position to the 7-point peace program, the bases for a Viet Nam settlement have been laid down.

Nixon is driven into a tight corner. It is up to him to give proof, not any longer by words but by deeds, of his proclaimed good will for peace, concern for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and solicitude for the GIs and more particularly for the US pilots captured in North Viet Nam

He is beset by difficulties from all sides: the "Vietnamization" program has come to grief in the wake of the heavy setbacks sustained by US-Saigon troops in the first six months of 1971, especially in Lower Laos; successive "pacification" plans have all failed; in Saigon, the popular movement of struggle is being stepped up while Washington's henchmen are tearing one another to pieces as the "presidential elections" are getting nearer. The anti-war drive is growing in the United States; 73 per cent of persons consulted in an opinion poll came out against Nixon's Viet Nam and Indochina policy. The majority of senators and an increasing number of representatives of both the Democratic and Republican parties are demanding a complete reappraisal by Nixon of his Indochina policy. Averell Harriman, the ex-US negotiator in Paris, acknowledged in a book recently published in New York, that in the course of his official trips in the days of the Johnson administration to some fifty countries he could find only one or two governments in the Far East that were favourable to the US stance in face of the Viet Nam problem. This universal criticism has only redoubled ever since.

To opt either for peace in honour—a peace the possibilities for which have been shown by the PRG seven points—or for the continuation of an immoral, disastrous and losing war—the choice now depends upon Nixon.

Washington's first reactions to the PRG seven-point proposal tend to show that Nixon is still sticking to his neo-colonialist ambitions. He still believes he could win a military victory by prolonging the war and making a

*maximum use of up-to-date engines of destruction, he seeks by various manoeuvres to undermine the great international movement of aid and support to the Vietnamese people. He has not given up his scheme to make Asians fight Asians, Vietnamese fight Vietnamese, and to camouflage the US sway over South-east Asian countries through regional organizations and agreements. Above all, he relies upon his strategy of genocide to exhaust the force of resistance of the Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer peoples.*

*Nixon is grossly mistaken. The Indochinese people, closing their ranks, are resolved to fight and wrest back their independence and freedom. So long as a single US aggressor remains on the territory of Viet Nam or any other Indochinese country, the struggle will go on. In the world today, nobody can subdue by force of arms, or deceive, those peoples who are determined to fight on. Nobody can deflect from its goal the movement of solidarity linking the three great revolutionary trends of our times—the forces struggling for socialist construction in many countries, those working for national independence in the Third World, and those standing for democracy, peace and social progress in the capitalist countries.*

July 1971

NOTE

As we wrote this article, *Nhan Dan*, the central organ of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, set forth the Vietnamese stand in two important editorials.

We reproduce below as a document some excerpts of those editorials:

July 19 Editorial

“Washington's obstinacy with regard to the Vietnamese problem has thrown light on the aggressive and warlike nature of US imperialism, a full expression of which can be found in its counter-revolutionary global strategy called the 'Nixon doctrine.'”

“The 'Nixon doctrine' was conceived after the Truman doctrine, the Kennedy strategy, etc., had gone bankrupt one after the other. It was the direct outgrowth of a series of US setbacks in Viet Nam, of the failure of the biggest-ever local war waged by more than half-a-million US troops supported by modern air and naval force. It was also the product of the world balance of forces which had changed in favour of the revolutionary forces and to the disadvantage of the imperialist forces, while a weakened imperialist United States was in the throes of a major crisis.

“In a nutshell, the 'Nixon doctrine' is the counter-revolutionary global strategy of US imperialism, which relies on US military force and war means, seeks to set up an alliance of the counter-revolutionary forces in each region, tries to divide the socialist countries, to win over one section and pit it against the other in an effort to check the national-liberation movement, and carry out a counter-revolutionary 'peaceful evolution' in the socialist countries.

“As applied in Asia, it intends to rally the counter-revolutionary forces in this region, with Japanese militarism as the core, into a regional alliance spearheaded against the socialist countries and the liberation movement of various nations. The prime target and also the first testing ground of this doctrine is South Viet Nam, Laos and

Cambodia. Nixon's policy is also aimed at achieving a compromise between the big powers in an attempt to impose their arrangements on smaller countries (...)

"The situation of the Nixon clique was in fact desperate. They were fighting with their backs to the wall. The whole United States and the whole world were shouting: stop the war of aggression in Viet Nam and bring all US troops home. Finding himself in such a fix, Nixon moved heaven and earth for a way out. But he has gone to the wrong place. Though the exit door has been opened, he has strayed into a blind alley.

"It has been a traditional practice of the imperialists to bend others to their will and to use their strength as big powers to bully smaller countries. Now they again want to resort to this ridiculous practice. But today the world has changed. Only those indulging in day-dreams are not aware of the fact that the smaller countries have stood up to take their destiny into their own hands. It is this stupidity and ignorance which keeps the US imperialists in their colonialist dream. This era is one when the nations refuse to bow to dictators, when even a small country can hold in check big aggressors. Viet Nam is not a big country; she has neither a vast territory nor a large population. Yet she has 'defeated several major imperialisms'. The fight of the Vietnamese people is one of the resplendent signs of the times when the nations are shaping their own destinies. The alliance among the nations and among the revolutionary forces in the world makes up a great, invincible strength. The time when the imperialists lorded it over the whole world is definitively gone. The time when big powers could browbeat smaller countries has ended for good.

"So long as the Nixon clique do not reconcile themselves to defeat, the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Laos and Cambodia will continue their fight."

"The Nixon clique is the most reactionary, warlike anti-communist group. It remains very obstinate in spite of its heavy setbacks. In pursuance of its 'Vietnamization of the war' scheme and its 'Nixon doctrine', it is endeavouring to counter-attack at all costs, in the illusory hope of gaining on the battlefield a position of strength from which to negotiate. So long as the Yankees mulishly continue their aggression, our people and armed forces will perseveringly carry on and intensify their resistance. Nixon and his confederates may resort to any kind of crafty manoeuvres and rush about trying to find a way out, they cannot escape defeat. Since even their efforts on the battlefield have not allowed them to change the situation, all their *démarches* will be to no avail. The decisive voice in the matter belongs to those who have defeated them."

Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

## Documents

**FIVE-POINT STATEMENT  
BY THE NFL CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

(March 22, 1965)

1. The US imperialists are the saboteurs of the Geneva Agreements, the most brazen warmongers and aggressors and the sworn enemy of the Vietnamese people.
2. The heroic South Vietnamese people are resolved to drive out the US imperialists in order to liberate South Viet Nam, build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral South Viet Nam and ultimately achieve national reunification.
3. The valiant South Vietnamese people and the South Viet Nam Liberation Army are resolved to fulfil their sacred duty, which is to drive out the US imperialists so as to liberate the South and defend the North.
4. The South Vietnamese people express their profound gratitude to the peace- and justice-loving people all over the world for their wholehearted support and declare their readiness to receive all assistance, including weapons and all other war materials, from their friends in the five continents.
5. Let our entire people unite, take up arms, continue to march forward heroically, and be resolved to fight and defeat the US aggressors and Vietnamese traitors.

**FOUR-POINT POSITION  
OF THE DRVN GOVERNMENT**

Presented by Premier Pham Van Dong  
to the DRVN National Assembly  
(April 8, 1965)

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the US Government must withdraw from South Viet Nam all US troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases there, cancel its "military alliance" with Saigon. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet Nam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the US Government must end its war acts against the North, definitely end all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam, while Viet Nam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954

Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territories.

3. The affairs of South Viet Nam are to be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.
4. The peaceful reunification of Viet Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

### TEN-POINT OVERALL SOLUTION

Presented by Mr. Tran Bui Kiem, head of the NFL Delegation, at the 16th plenary session of the Paris Conference on Viet Nam (May 3, 1969).

Proceeding from a desire to reach a political solution with a view to ending the US imperialists' war of aggression in South Viet Nam and helping restore peace in Viet Nam ;

On the basis of respect for the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people ;

Proceeding from the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam and the actual situation in Viet Nam ;

On the basis of the Political Programme and the five-point solution of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, which are in keeping with the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam ;

The South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation expounds as follows the principles and main content of an overall solution to the South Viet Nam problem to help restore peace in Viet Nam :

1. To respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, viz., independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.
2. The US Government must withdraw from South Viet Nam all US troops, military personnel, arms and war materials, and all troops, military personnel, arms and war materials of the other foreign countries of the US camp without posing any condition whatsoever ; liquidate all US military bases in South Viet Nam ; renounce all encroachments on the sovereignty, territory and security of South Viet Nam and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
3. The Vietnamese people's right to defend their Fatherland is the sacred, inalienable right of self-defence of all peoples. The question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves.
4. The people of South Viet Nam settle themselves their own affairs without foreign interference. They decide themselves the political regime of South Viet Nam through free and democratic general elections. Through free and democratic general elections, a Constituent Assembly will be set up, a Constitution worked out, and a coalition government of South Viet Nam installed, reflecting national concord and the broad union of all social strata.

5. During the period between the restoration of peace and the general elections, neither party shall impose its political regime on the people of South Viet Nam.

The political forces representing the various social strata and political tendencies in South Viet Nam that stand for peace, independence and neutrality, including those persons who, for political reasons, have had to live abroad, will enter into talks to set up a provisional coalition government based on the principle of equality, democracy and mutual respect with a view to building a peaceful, independent, democratic and neutral South Viet Nam.

The provisional coalition government is to have the following tasks:

a) -- To implement the agreements to be concluded on the withdrawal of the troops of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp, etc.

b) -- To achieve national concord, and a broad union of all social strata, political forces, nationalities, religious communities, and all persons, no matter what their political beliefs and their past may be, provided they stand for peace, independence and neutrality.

c) To achieve broad democratic freedoms -- freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, freedom to establish political parties and organizations, freedom to demonstrate, etc.; to set free those persons jailed

on political grounds; to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination against people having collaborated with either side, whether they are now in the country or abroad, as provided for in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.

d) To heal the war wounds, to restore and develop the economy, to restore a normal life for the people, and to improve the living conditions of the labouring people.

e) To hold free and democratic general elections in the whole of South Viet Nam with a view to achieving the right for the people of South Viet Nam to settle themselves their own affairs, in accordance with the content of point 4 mentioned above.

6. South Viet Nam will carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality:

To carry out a policy of good-neighbourly relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia on the basis of respect for her independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity within her present borders. To carry out a policy of good-neighbourly relations with the Kingdom of Laos on the basis of respect for the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos.

To establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with all countries, irrespective of

political and social regime, including the United States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence: respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence; to accept economic and technical aid with no political conditions attached from any country.

7. The reunification of Viet Nam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, through discussions and agreement between the two zones, without foreign interference.

Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam, the two zones will re-establish normal relations in all fields on the basis of mutual respect.

The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel, as provided for by the 1954 Geneva Agreements, is a provisional line and does not constitute in any way a political boundary. The two zones will reach agreement on the statute of the demilitarized zone, and work out modalities for movements across the provisional military demarcation line.

8. As provided for in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam, pending the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam, the two zones, North and South, of Viet Nam undertake to refrain from joining any alliance with foreign countries, not to allow any foreign country to maintain military bases, troops

and military personnel on their respective soil, and not to recognize the protection of any country or military alliance or bloc.

9. To resolve the aftermath of the war:

- a) — The parties will negotiate the release of the armymen captured in war.

- b) — The US Government must bear full responsibility for the losses and devastations it has caused to the Vietnamese people in both zones.

10. The parties will reach agreement on an international supervision of the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the troops, military personnel, arms and war materials of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp.

The principles and content of the overall solution expounded above form an integral whole. On the basis of these principles and content, the parties will reach understanding to the effect of concluding agreements on the above-mentioned questions with a view to ending the war in South Viet Nam and contributing to restoring peace in Viet Nam.

**EIGHT-POINT CLARIFICATION  
OF THE TEN-POINT OVERALL SOLUTION**

Presented by Mme Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister and head of the Delegation of the RSVN PRG, at the 84th plenary session of the Paris Conference on Viet Nam (September 17, 1970)

1. The US Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Viet Nam, stop its policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, withdraw from South Viet Nam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as all troops, military personnel, weapons and war materials of the other foreign countries in the US camp, without posing any condition whatsoever, and dismantle all US military bases in South Viet Nam.

If the US Government declares that by June 30, 1971, it will have withdrawn from South Viet Nam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussions on:

— the question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the US troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp; and

— the question of releasing captured militarymen.

2. The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves.
3. The warlike and fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, a tool of the US policy of aggression, are frantically opposing peace, striving for the intensification and expansion of the war and for the prolongation of the US military occupation of South Viet Nam, and are enriching themselves with the blood of the people. They are serving the US imperialist aggressors who massacre their compatriots and devastate their country. They have stepped up "pacification" campaigns to terrorize the people and hold them in the vice of their regime, set up a barbarous system of jails of the type of the "tiger cages" in Con Dao and established a police regime of the utmost cruelty in South Viet Nam. They carry out ferocious repression against those who stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, regardless of social condition, political tendency and religion. They repress all those who are not of their clan. They increase forcible press-ganging and endeavour to plunder the property of the South Viet Nam people so as to serve the US

policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. The restoration of genuine peace in South Viet Nam necessitates the formation in Saigon of an administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, an administration which stands for peace, independence, neutrality, improves the people's living conditions, ensures democratic liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, etc, releases those who have been jailed for political reasons, and dissolves concentration camps so that the people kept there may return to live in their native places. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam is prepared to enter into talks with such an administration on a political settlement of the South Viet Nam problem so as to put an end to the war and restore peace in Viet Nam.

4. The South Viet Nam people will decide themselves the political regime of South Viet Nam through really free and democratic general elections, elect a national assembly, work out a constitution of a national and democratic character, and set up a government reflecting the entire people's aspirations and will for peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and national concord.

The general elections must be held in a really free and democratic way. The modalities of the elections must guarantee genuine freedom and equality during the electoral campaigns and voting to all citizens, irrespective of their political tendencies, including those who are living abroad. No

party shall usurp for itself the right to organize general elections and lay down their modalities. General elections organized by the puppet administration of the US in Saigon at the point of the bayonets of the US occupying troops cannot be free and democratic.

A provisional government of broad coalition is indispensable for the organization of really free and democratic general elections and also for ensuring the right to self-determination of the South Viet Nam people during the transitional period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections.

5. The provisional coalition government will include three components:
  - persons from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam;
  - persons from the Saigon administration who really stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy;
  - persons from various political and religious forces and tendencies standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, including those who, for political reasons, have had to live abroad.

The provisional coalition government will implement the agreements reached by the parties.

The provisional coalition government will carry out a policy of national concord, ensure the democratic freedoms of the people, prohibit all

acts of terror, reprisal, and discrimination against those who have collaborated with either side, stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people and organize general elections to form a coalition government.

The provisional coalition government will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, practise a policy of good-neighbourliness with the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia, respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of these two countries. It will establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their political regime, including the United States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

6. Viet Nam is one, the Vietnamese people is one. The reunification of Viet Nam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without coercion or annexation by either side, without foreign interference. The time for reunification as well as all questions relating to reunification will be discussed and agreed upon by both zones. Pending the peaceful reunification of the country, the two zones will re-establish normal relations in all fields on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and will respect each other's political regime and internal and external policies.

7. The parties will decide together measures aimed at

ensuring respect for and the correct implementation of the provisions agreed upon.

8. After the signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and restoring peace in Viet Nam, the parties will implement the modalities that will have been laid down for a cease-fire in South Viet Nam.

To attain a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam declares its readiness henceforth to get in touch with forces or persons of various political tendencies and religions both in the country and abroad, including members of the present Saigon administration, except Thieu, Ky and Khiem.

#### STATEMENT ON AN EVENTUAL CEASE-FIRE

By Mme Nguyen Thi Binh, at the 94th plenary session of the Paris Conference on Viet Nam (December 10, 1970).

1. A cease-fire will come into force between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the troops and military personnel of the US and the other foreign countries in the American camp immediately after the US Government declares that it will withdraw from South Viet Nam all troops and military personnel of the US and the other foreign countries of the American camp before June 30, 1971. The parties will immediately discuss measures to ensure safety for all withdrawing US troops and troops of the other foreign countries in the American camp and the release of captured militarymen.
2. A cease-fire will be put into effect between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration immediately after the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and a Saigon administration without Thieu, Ky, Khiem

that favours peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, have come to terms on the formation of an interim coalition government including three components in order to organize general elections as stipulated in the RSVN PRG statement of September 17, 1970.

3. The parties concerned will agree on measures to ensure respect for and the scrupulous application of the points on which agreement will have been reached.

**SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM FOR A SETTLEMENT  
OF THE SOUTH VIET NAM PROBLEM**

Presented by Mme Nguyen Thi Binh at the 119th plenary session of the Paris Conference on Viet Nam (July 1, 1971).

In compliance with the Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace and national independence, the American and the world's people's desire for peace, in token of its goodwill to make the Paris Conference on Viet Nam progress, basing itself on the ten-point overall solution, and following the September 17, 1970, eight-point and the December 10, 1970, three-point statements, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam declares the following:

*II. Regarding a deadline for the total withdrawal of US forces.*

The US Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Viet Nam, stop "Vietnamization", withdraw from South Viet Nam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the US camp, and dismantle all US bases in

South Viet Nam, without laying down any condition whatsoever.

The US Government must set a deadline for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the totality of US forces and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp.

If the US Government fixes such a date for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam in 1971 of the totality of US forces and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp, the parties will at the same time agree on modalities for :

a) the withdrawal in safety from South Viet Nam of the totality of US forces and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp;

b) the release of the totality of militarymen of all parties and civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Viet Nam), so that they may all rapidly return home.

These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the US camp as soon as the parties have reached agreement on the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the totality of US forces and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp.

2. *Regarding the question of power in South Viet Nam.*

The US Government must really respect the South Viet Nam people's right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam, cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon, and stop all manoeuvres, including rigged elections, aimed at maintaining the quisling Nguyen Van Thieu.

The political, social and religious forces in South Viet Nam aspiring for peace and national concord will use all suitable means to form in Saigon a new administration favouring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam will immediately enter into talks with that administration to settle the following questions:

a) To form a broad three-component interim government of national concord which will function during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and organize general elections in South Viet Nam.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration as soon as a government of national concord has been formed.

b) To take specific measures with the required guarantees to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal,

and discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other party, to ensure every democratic liberty to the South Viet Nam people, to release all persons jailed for political reasons, to dissolve all concentration camps and to liquidate all forms of constraint and coercion so as to permit the people to return to their native places in complete freedom and to freely engage in their occupations.

c) To see that the people's living conditions are stabilized and gradually improved, to create conditions allowing everyone to contribute his talents and efforts to heal the war wounds and rebuild the country.

d) To agree on measures to ensure the holding of genuinely free, democratic, and fair general elections in South Viet Nam.

3. *Regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam.*

The Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam in a spirit of national concord, equality, and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation and with a view to lightening the people's contributions.

4. *Regarding the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam and the relations between the North and the South.*

a) The reunification of Viet Nam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, through discussions and agreements between the two zones,

without constraint and annexation by either party and without foreign interference.

Pending the reunification of the country, the North and the South will re-establish normal relations, guarantee free movement, free correspondence, free choice of residence, and maintain economic and cultural relations on the principle of mutual interests and mutual assistance.

All questions concerning the two zones will be settled by qualified representatives of the Vietnamese people in the two zones through negotiations, without foreign interference.

b) In keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam, while the country is still temporarily divided into two zones, the North and the South zones of Viet Nam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, allowing any foreign country to have military bases, troops and military personnel on their soil, and accepting the protection of any country, and any military alliance or bloc.

5. *Regarding the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Viet Nam.*

South Viet Nam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social regime, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, accept the

co-operation of foreign countries in the exploitation of the resources of South Viet Nam, accept from any country economic and technical aid without any political conditions attached, and participate in regional plans of economic co-operation.

On the basis of these principles, after the end of the war, South Viet Nam and the United States will establish relations in the political, economic, and cultural fields.

6. *Regarding the damage caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.*

The US Government must bear full responsibility for the losses and the destruction it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

7. *Regarding respect and international guarantee for the accords which will have been concluded.*

The parties will come to terms on the forms of respect and international guarantee for the accords which will have been concluded.

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- Theses and positions of the DRVN and the PRG of South Viet Nam.
  - Essential documents on the question.
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