

**CORRESPONDENCE  
BETWEEN  
THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE COUNCIL  
OF MINISTERS  
OF THE USSR  
AND  
THE PRESIDENTS  
OF THE USA  
AND  
THE PRIME MINISTERS  
OF GREAT BRITAIN  
DURING  
THE GREAT  
PATRIOTIC WAR  
OF 1941-1945**





From Marx to Mao



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OF 1941-1945

Volume 2

Correspondence  
with Franklin D. Roosevelt  
and Harry S. Truman  
(August 1941-December 1945)



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# **D O C U M E N T S**



No. 1

*Sent on August 4, 1941*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

The U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the matter of neutralising Finland and her dissociation from Germany. The severance of relations between Britain and Finland and the blockade of Finland, announced by Britain, have already borne fruit and engendered conflicts among the ruling circles of Finland. Voices are being raised in support of neutrality and reconciliation with the U.S.S.R.

If the U.S. Government were to threaten Finland with a rupture of relations, the Finnish Government would be more resolute in the matter of breaking with Germany. In that case the Soviet Government could make certain territorial concessions to Finland with a view to assuaging her and conclude a new peace treaty<sup>1</sup> with her.

No. 2

*Received on August 15, 1941*

**F. ROOSEVELT AND W. CHURCHILL  
TO J. V. STALIN\*<sup>2</sup>**

We have taken the opportunity afforded by the consideration of the report of Mr Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow<sup>3</sup> to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defense that you are putting up against the Nazi attack. We are at the moment cooperating to

provide you with the very maximum of supplies that you most urgently need. Already many shiploads have left our shores and more will leave in the immediate future.

We must now turn our minds to the consideration of a more long-term policy, since there is still a long and hard path to be traversed before there can be won that complete victory without which our efforts and sacrifices would be wasted.

The war goes on upon many fronts and before it is over there may be yet further fighting fronts that will be developed. Our resources, though immense, are limited and it must become a question of where and when those resources can best be used to further to the greatest extent our common effort. This applies equally to manufactured war supplies and to raw materials.

The needs and demands of your and our armed services can only be determined in the light of the full knowledge of the many facts which must be taken into consideration in the decisions that we take. In order that all of us may be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of our joint resources, we suggest that we prepare a meeting which should be held at Moscow, to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you. If this conference appeals to you, we want you to know that pending the decisions of that conference we shall continue to send supplies and material as rapidly as possible.

We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union and we feel therefore that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter of planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT  
Winston S. CHURCHILL

**No. 3**

*Received on September 30, 1941*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

My dear Mr Stalin,

This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow.

Mr Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion.

Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you.<sup>3</sup> I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies.

I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including your own.

I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance.

Yours very sincerely,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 4

### **J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Your letter has reached me through Mr Harriman.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you the Soviet Government's deep gratitude for having entrusted the leadership of the U.S. delegation to such an authoritative person as Mr Harriman, whose participation in the Moscow Three-Power Conference<sup>4</sup> was so fruitful.

I have no doubt that you will do all that is necessary to ensure implementation of the Moscow Conference decisions as speedily and fully as possible, all the more because the Hitlerites will certainly try to use the pre-winter months for exerting maximum pressure upon the U.S.S.R. at the front.

Like you, I am confident of final victory over Hitler for the countries now joining their efforts to accelerate the elimination of bloody Hitlerism, a goal for which the Soviet Union is now making such big and heavy sacrifices.

Yours very sincerely,

J. STALIN

October 3, 1941

AIDE-MEMOIRE

*Handed to A. Y. Vyshinsky by the U.S. Ambassador,  
Mr Steinhardt, on November 2, 1941\**

In a personal message to Mr Stalin, President Roosevelt states:

(1) That he has seen the Protocol of the Three-Power Conference in Moscow<sup>4</sup> and has discussed with the members of the American Mission the data set forth therein.

(2) That he has approved all the items of military equipment and munitions and has directed that the raw materials be provided so far as possible as rapidly as possible.

(3) That he has given orders that the deliveries are to begin at once and are to be continued in the largest possible volume.

(4) So as to obviate any financial difficulties he has directed that there be effected immediately arrangements under which shipments may be made under the Lease-Lend Act<sup>5</sup> up to the value of \$1,000,000,000.

(5) He proposes, subject to the approval of the Soviet Government, that no interest be charged by the United States on such indebtedness as may be incurred by the Soviet Government arising out of these shipments and that on such indebtedness as the Soviet Government may incur, payments shall begin only five years after the end of the war, and that the payments be made over a period of ten years after the expiration of this five-year period.

(6) The President hopes that the Soviet Government will make special efforts to sell such commodities and raw materials to the United States as may be available and of which the United States may be in need, the proceeds of sales to the United States to be credited on the account of the Government of the Soviet Union.

(7) The President takes the opportunity to thank the Soviet Government for the speedy manner in which the Three-Power Conference in Moscow was conducted by Mr Stalin and his associates and assures him that the implications of that Conference will be carried out to the utmost.

(8) The President expresses the hope that Mr Stalin will not hesitate to communicate with him directly should the occasion require.

Kuibyshev, November 2, 1941

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Mr President,

I have not yet received the text of your message, but on November 2 Mr Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador, delivered to me through Mr Vyshinsky an Aide-Memoire giving its substance.

I should like first of all to express complete agreement with your appraisal of the results of the Three-Power Conference in Moscow,<sup>4</sup> which should be credited primarily to Mr Harriman and to Mr Beaverbrook who did their best to bring the Conference to an early and successful conclusion. The Soviet Government is most grateful for your statement that the implications of the Conference will be carried out to the utmost.

Your decision, Mr President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of \$1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendous and onerous struggle against our common enemy—bloody Hitlerism.

On instructions from the Government of the U.S.S.R. I express complete agreement with your terms for granting the loan, repayment of which shall begin five years after the end of the war and continue over 10 years after expiration of the five-year period.

The Soviet Government is ready to do everything to supply the United States of America with such commodities and raw materials as are available and as the United States may need.

As regards your wish, Mr President, that direct personal contact be established between you and me without delay if circumstances so require, I gladly join you in that wish and am ready, for my part, to do all in my power to bring it about.

Yours very sincerely,

J. STALIN

November 4, 1941

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am happy to inform you that medical supplies in the list prepared by the Medical Supplies Committee of the Three-Power Conference<sup>4</sup> will be provided as rapidly as these supplies can be purchased and shipped, less such portion thereof as the British may provide. Conditions of American supply and production make impossible the immediate purchase of large amounts of certain items requested, but twenty-five per cent of the total list can be provided within thirty to sixty days and the balance in installments during the next eight months.

The American Red Cross is prepared to provide approximately one-third of the total list at an approximate cost of \$5,000,000 as a gift of the American people. Acting on my instructions the American Red Cross will procure these supplies with funds placed at my disposal by the Congress and also funds contributed by the American people for relief in the Soviet Union. As the American Red Cross must account to the Congress and to its contributors for the use of these funds and supplies, Wardwell, the Chairman of their Delegation, outlined in a letter to Mr Kolesnikov, of the Soviet Alliance, the kind of cooperative arrangement between the Red Cross societies of our respective countries which is desired. The Red Cross is also transmitting a message to Mr Kolesnikov today pointing out the importance of reasonable observation by the American Red Cross representative of the distribution made of its supplies subject, of course, to all appropriate military considerations. I would deeply appreciate it if your Government can assure me that the desired arrangements are acceptable. I may point out that the procedures proposed by the American Red Cross are the same which are followed with regard to their assistance in Great Britain and other countries.

On the basis indicated, the American Red Cross is prepared to consider further substantial assistance in the Soviet Union as needs develop and requests are made.

November 6, 1941



No. 8

*Sent on November 14, 1941*

**PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM J. STALIN  
TO Mr ROOSEVELT**

Your message about the favourable decision taken by the American Red Cross concerning delivery of medical supplies reached me on November 11.

The Soviet Government has no objection to establishing the organisational forms of cooperation between the Red Cross societies of our two countries, it being understood that it will be organised in accordance with the exchange of letters the text of which was agreed early in November by Red Cross representatives of both countries in Kuibyshev.

STALIN

No. 9

*Received on December 16, 1941*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

*(Retranslated)*

It is extremely important, in my view, to take immediate steps for the purpose of paving the way not only for joint operations in the coming weeks, but also for the final defeat of Hitlerism.<sup>6</sup> I should like very much to see you and talk it over personally with you, but since at the moment this is impossible I am taking three preliminary steps which, I hope, will lead to more permanent joint planning.

I am suggesting to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he should immediately convene in Chungking a conference of Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and U.S. representatives. This group should get together not later than December 17 and report the results to their Governments absolutely confidentially by Saturday, December 20. That should give us a preliminary idea of the general problem from the Chungking angle.

2. I am asking the British to call a naval conference at Singapore which could by Saturday, December 20, submit its

report to be compiled chiefly in terms of operations in the southern zone.

3. I would be very glad if you talked this over personally with the United States, British and Chinese Ambassadors in Moscow and let me know your proposals for the whole problem by Saturday, the 20th.

4. In a week or so I will be discussing the same problems with the British Missions here and will inform you of the situation as it appears from here. I had a good talk with Litvinov and I fully understand your immediate tasks. I want to tell you once more about the genuine enthusiasm throughout the United States for the success of your armies in the defense of your great nation. I flatter myself with the hope that the preliminary conferences I have scheduled for the next week will lead to a more permanent organisation for the planning of our efforts. Hopkins and I send you our personal warm regards.

ROOSEVELT

No. 10

*Sent on December 17, 1941*

### **J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

I received your message on December 16. It did not indicate the aims of the conferences to be called in Chungking and Moscow and as they were to open overnight I saw fit when I met Mr Eden, who had just arrived in Moscow,<sup>7</sup> to ask him what those aims were and whether the two conferences could be put off for a while. It appeared, however, that Mr Eden was not posted either. I should like, therefore, to have the appropriate elucidations from you in order to ensure the results expected from Soviet participation.

Thank you for the sentiments expressed over the Soviet armies' successes.

I wish you success in the struggle against the aggression in the Pacific.

Personal warm regards to you and Mr Hopkins.<sup>8</sup>

STALIN

No. 11

*Received on February 11, 1942*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO Mr STALIN**

For January and February our shipments have included and will include 449 light tanks, 408 medium tanks, 244 fighter planes, 24 B-25's, and 233 A-20's.

I realize the importance of getting our supplies to you at the earliest possible date and every effort is being made to get shipments off.

The reports here indicate that you are getting on well in pushing back the Nazis.

Although we are having our immediate troubles in the Far East, I believe that we will have that area reinforced in the near future to such an extent that we can stop the Japs, but we are prepared for some further setbacks.

No. 12

*Received on February 13, 1942*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am much pleased that your Government has expressed its willingness to receive my old and trusted friend, Admiral Standley, as the Ambassador of the United States. He and I have been closely associated for many years, and I have complete confidence in him. I recommend him to you not only as a man of integrity and energy but also as one who is appreciative of and an admirer of the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, which, you will recall, he visited last year with Mr Harriman. Admiral Standley has since his return from Moscow already done much to further understanding in the United States of the situation in the Soviet Union and with his rich background and his knowledge of the problems which are facing our respective countries I am sure that with your cooperation his efforts to bring them still more close together will meet with success.

My attention has just been called to the fact that the Soviet Government has placed requisitions with us for supplies and munitions of a value which will exceed the billion dollars which were placed at its disposal last autumn under the Lease-

Lend Act<sup>5</sup> following an exchange of letters between us. Therefore, I propose that under this same Act a second billion dollars be placed at the disposal of your Government upon the same conditions as those upon which the first billion were allocated. Should you have any counter suggestions to offer with regard to the terms under which the second billion dollars should be made available you may be sure that careful and sympathetic consideration will be given them. It may, in any event, prove mutually desirable later to review such financial arrangements as we may enter into now to meet changing conditions.<sup>9</sup>

**No. 13**

*Sent on February 18, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

I have received your message about U.S. arms deliveries in January and February. I stress that it is now, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and their Army are bending their energies to throw the Hitler troops back by a tenacious offensive, that U.S. deliveries, including tanks and aircraft, are essential for our common cause and our further success.

**No. 14**

*Sent on February 18, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

This is to acknowledge receipt of yours of February 13. I should like first of all to point out that I share your conviction that the efforts of the new U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Admiral Standley, whom you hold in such high esteem, to bring our two countries still closer together, will be crowned with success.

Your decision, Mr President, to grant the Government of the U.S.S.R. another \$1,000,000,000 under the Lend-Lease Act<sup>5</sup> on the same terms as the first \$1,000,000,000, is accepted by the Soviet Government with sincere gratitude. With reference to the matter raised by you I would like to say that, in order not to delay decision, the Soviet Government will not at the moment raise the matter of revising the terms for the second \$1,000,000,000 to be granted to the Soviet Union nor call for taking due account of the extreme strain placed on the U.S.S.R.

by the war against our common foe. At the same time I fully agree with you and hope that later we shall jointly fix the moment when it will be mutually desirable to revise the financial agreements now being concluded, in order to take special account of the circumstances pointed out above.<sup>9</sup>

I take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that in using the loan extended to the U.S.S.R. the appropriate Soviet agencies are encountering great difficulties as far as shipping the munitions and materials purchased in the U.S.A. is concerned. In these circumstances we think that the most useful system is the one effectively used in shipping munitions from Britain to Archangel, a system not introduced so far with regard to supplies from the U.S.A. In keeping with this system the British military authorities supplying the munitions and materials select the ships, supervise their loading in harbour and conveying to the ports of destination. The Soviet Government would be most grateful if the same system of delivering munitions and conveying the ships to Soviet harbours were adopted by the U.S. Government.

Yours very sincerely,

J. STALIN

No. 15

**FROM THE PRESIDENT TO Mr STALIN**

*(Retranslated)*

This is to acknowledge receipt of your message of February 20th.<sup>10</sup>

I would like you to know that in due course we will be glad to revise with you our agreement on the funds advanced by us under the Lend-Lease Act.<sup>9</sup> At the moment the prime task is delivery of supplies to you.

I have given directions to study your proposal for centralizing here munitions deliveries to Russia.

We are greatly encouraged by the latest news of the successes of your Army.

I send you warm congratulations on the 24th anniversary of the Red Army.

February 23, 1942

No. 16

*Received on March 16, 1942*<sup>11</sup>

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH STALIN,  
PRESIDENT  
OF THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS  
OF THE U.S.S.R.**

My dear Mr Stalin.

Mr Harriman has handed me your kind note dated October 3, 1941.<sup>12</sup> I appreciate very much hearing from you.

A cable has already gone to you advising you that we can include the Soviet Union under our Lend-Lease arrangements.<sup>5</sup>

I want to take this opportunity to assure you again that we are going to bend every possible effort to move these supplies to your battle lines.

The determination of your armies and people to defeat Hitlerism is an inspiration to the free people of all the world.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 17

*Received on April 12, 1942*

**PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO Mr STALIN**

It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a meeting of minds in personal conversation would be useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things go as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few days together next summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in the meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance that we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of views.

I have in mind a very important military proposal involving the utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your critical Western Front. This objective carries great weight with me.

Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr Molotov and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate future. Time is of the essence if we are to help in an

important way. We will furnish them with a good transport plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in two weeks.

I do not want by such a trip to go over the head of my friend, Mr Litvinov, in any way, as he will understand, but we can gain time by the visit I propose.

I suggest this procedure not only because of the secrecy, which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we determine with finality the strategic course of our common military action.

I have sent Hopkins to London relative to this proposal.

The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction of Hitler's armies and material more than we are doing now.

I send you my sincere regards.

ROOSEVELT

No. 18

*Sent on April 20, 1942*

### **J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Thank you for the message which I received in Moscow a few days ago.

The Soviet Government agrees that it is essential to arrange a meeting between V. M. Molotov and you for an exchange of views on the organisation of a second front in Europe in the near future. Molotov can arrive in Washington not later than May 10-15, accompanied by an appropriate military representative.

It goes without saying that Molotov will also go to London to exchange views with the British Government.

I have no doubt that I shall be able to have a personal meeting with you, to which I attach great importance, especially in view of the big problems of organising the defeat of Hitlerism that confront our two countries.

Please accept my sincere regards and wishes for success in the struggle against the enemies of the United States of America.

J. STALIN

No. 19

**FOR Mr STALIN**

We are having grave difficulties with the northern convoy route and have informed Litvinov of the complications. You may be sure, however, that no effort will be omitted to get as many ships off as possible.

I have heard of Admiral Standley's cordial reception by you and wish to express my appreciation.

I am looking forward to seeing Molotov and the moment I hear of the route we shall make preparations to provide immediate transportation. I do hope Molotov can stay with me in the White House while he is in Washington but we can make a private home nearby available if that is desired.

ROOSEVELT

May 4, 1942

No. 20

*Sent on May 15, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Thank you for the message delivered by M. M. Litvinov. In connection with the present difficulties in sailing and escorting ships to the U.S.S.R. I have already approached Prime Minister Churchill for his help in overcoming them as quickly as possible. As the delivery of cargoes from the U.S.A. and Britain in May is a pressing matter, I address the same request to you, Mr President.

V. M. Molotov will leave for the U.S.A. and Britain a few days later than planned—on account of weather vagaries. It appears that he can fly in a Soviet aircraft—both to Britain and the U.S.A. I should add that the Soviet Government thinks it necessary for Molotov to travel without any press publicity until he returns to Moscow, as was done in the case of Mr Eden's visit to Moscow last December.

As to Molotov's place of residence in Washington, both he and I thank you for your offer.

J. STALIN



**No. 21**

*Received on June 8, 1942*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am greatly appreciative of your having sent Mr Molotov to see me and I am anxiously awaiting word of his safe arrival back in the Soviet Union. Our visit was very satisfactory.<sup>13</sup>

**No. 22**

*Sent on June 12, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

The Soviet Government considers as you do, Mr President, that the results of V. M. Molotov's visit to the U.S.A. were quite satisfactory.<sup>13</sup>

I take the occasion to express to you, Mr President, the Soviet Government's sincere gratitude for the cordial welcome given to Molotov and his colleagues during their stay in the U.S.A.

He returned safely to Moscow today.

**No. 23**

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

The situation, which is developing in the the Northern Area of the Pacific Ocean and in the Alaskan Area, presents tangible evidence that the Japanese Government may be taking steps to carry out operations against the Soviet Maritime Provinces. Should such an attack materialize the United States is ready to assist the Soviet Union with American air power provided the Soviet Union makes available to it suitable landing fields in the Siberian Area. The efforts of the Soviet Union and of the United States would of course have to be carefully coordinated in order promptly to carry out such an operation.

Ambassador Litvinov has informed me that you have signified your approval of the movement of American planes via Alaska and Northern Siberia to the Western Front and I am pleased to receive this news. I am of the opinion that in our common interests it is essential that detailed information be immediately initiated between our joint Army, Navy and Air

representatives in order to meet this new danger in the Pacific I feel that the question is so urgent as to warrant granting to the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States full power to initiate action and to make definite plans. For this reason I propose that you and I appoint such representatives and that we direct them immediately to confer in Moscow and Washington.

June 17, 1942

No. 24

### F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\*

In connection with my message to you of June 17. I wish to emphasize that if the delivery of aircraft from the United States to the Soviet Union could be effected through Alaska and Siberia instead of across Africa, as is now the practice, a great deal of time would be saved. Furthermore, the establishment of a ferry service through Siberia would permit the delivery by air of short-range aircraft to the Soviet Union instead of by sea, as is now the case.

If landing fields can be constructed in the Siberian area and meteorological and navigational facilities can be established to connect up with the appropriate American air services, I am prepared to instruct the American ferry crews to deliver aircraft to you at Lake Baikal. This air route could be easily connected up with the landing fields leading into the Vladivostok area. In the event of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Maritime Provinces, such a Siberian airway would permit the United States quickly to transfer American aircraft units to the latter area for the purpose of coming to the assistance of the Soviet Union.

From the studies I have made of the problems involved in the establishment of a Siberian-Lake Baikal air service, it is clear that certain rivers which flow into the Arctic Ocean would have to be utilized for the shipping into Eastern Siberia of such bulky goods as fuel, as well as machinery, needed for the construction of the landing fields. The reason why I am communicating with you before receiving an answer to my message of June 17 is dictated by the necessity for immediate action, since this freight must be moved while the rivers in question are free of ice, that is, during the next few weeks.

If you are in agreement with the urgency and importance of this air route, I request that in order to expedite its development you authorize an American airplane to make a survey

and experimental flight from Alaska over the proposed route for the purpose of ascertaining what equipment and supplies would be needed to construct the necessary landing fields and to establish the essential navigational services. Civilian clothes would be worn by the personnel making this flight and they would in fact conduct the flight as personnel of a commercial agency. Furthermore, all necessary measures would be taken to make sure that the personnel in no way would be identified with the military services of the United States. One or two Soviet officers or officials could, of course, be taken on the American plane at Nome, Alaska.

The flight would not be in lieu of the conversations of the joint Army, Navy and Air representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union as recommended in my message of June 17. It would be conducted for the sole purpose of enabling these representatives to enter into their discussions with more accurate and detailed information of the problems involved than would otherwise be the case.

June 23, 1942

No. 25

*Sent on July 1, 1942*

### **J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

With reference to your latest messages I should like to tell you that I fully concur with you as to the advisability of using the Alaska-Siberia route for U.S. aircraft deliveries to the Western Front. The Soviet Government has, therefore, issued instructions for completing at the earliest possible date the preparations now under way in Siberia to receive aircraft, that is, for adapting the existing air fields and providing them with additional facilities. As to whose pilots should fly the aircraft from Alaska, I think the task can be entrusted, as the State Department once suggested, to Soviet pilots who could travel to Nome or some other suitable place at the appointed time. An appropriate group of those pilots could be instructed to carry out the survey flight proposed by you. To fully ensure reception of the aircraft we should like to know the number of planes which the U.S.A. is allocating for despatch to the Western Front by that route.

As to your proposal for a meeting between U.S. and Soviet Army and Navy representatives to exchange information if necessary, the Soviet Government is in agreement and would prefer to have the meeting in Moscow.

No. 26

*Received on July 6, 1942*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

The Egyptian crisis which is threatening the supply route to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has caused Prime Minister Churchill to direct to me an urgent inquiry whether forty A-20 bombers which are now in Iraq en route to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can be transferred to the Egyptian front. Because of limited information here, it is impossible for me to express judgment on this matter. For this reason I have thought it better to request you to make a decision, taking into consideration the interests of the war effort of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> as a whole.

No. 27

*Sent on July 7, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

In view of the situation in which the Allied forces find themselves in Egypt I have no objection to forty of the A-20 bombers now in Iraq en route to the U.S.S.R. being transferred to the Egyptian front.

No. 28

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

As the American representatives at the conferences to be held in Moscow which were suggested in my cable to you of June 17, I am designating Major-General Follet Bradley, our Naval Attaché, Captain Duncan, and our Military Attaché, Colonel Michela. General Bradley is the only representative who will be sent to Moscow from the United States. He will come fully prepared and authorized to discuss all plans in relation to the conference.

We are prepared to have at Nome within the next few days an American four-engine plane to make the survey trip, three or four Soviet officers to accompany it. On the other hand we would be very glad to have American officers accompany a Soviet plane.

July 7, 1942

No. 29

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am deeply appreciative of your telegram authorizing the transfer of forty bombers to Egypt. I have arranged for one hundred and fifteen medium tanks with ammunition and spare parts to be shipped to you at once in addition to all tanks being shipped in accordance with the terms of the July protocol.<sup>15</sup>

July 9, 1942

No. 30

*Sent on July 18, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Your message on the designation of Major-General F. Bradley, Captain Duncan and Colonel Michela as the U.S. representatives at the Moscow conference has reached me. The U.S. delegates will be given every assistance in carrying out their assignment.

On the Soviet side the conference will be attended by Major-General Sterligov, Colonel Kabanov and Colonel Levandovich.

As regards the survey flight, we could in the next few days send a plane from Krasnoyarsk to Nome—I mean an American twin-engine aircraft—which could take on the U.S. officers on its way back from Nome.

I take this opportunity to thank you for the news about the despatch of an additional hundred and fifteen tanks to the U.S.S.R.

I consider it my duty to warn you that, according to our experts at the front, U.S. tanks catch fire very easily when hit from behind or from the side by anti-tank rifle bullets. The reason is that the high-grade gasoline used forms inside the tank a thick layer of highly inflammable fumes. German tanks also use gasoline, but of low grade which yields smaller quantities of fumes, hence, they are more fireproof. Our experts think that the diesel makes the best tank motor.

No. 31

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I have received your message regarding the proposed survey flight from Alaska and the Moscow conference. Members of the survey flight will be in Alaska and ready to depart by August first. In this connection a four-engine bomber will be at Nome in the event that it is required.

I greatly appreciate your report on the difficulties experienced at the front with American tanks. It will be most helpful to our tank experts in eradicating the trouble with this model to have this information. The fire hazard in future models will be reduced, however, as they will operate on a lower octane fuel.

July 23, 1942

No. 32

*Sent on August 2, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

I have received your latest message about the survey flight from Alaska. Our B-25 aircraft will arrive at Nome probably between August 8 and 10 and before taking off for the planned survey flight will pick up the three American members of the flight.

No. 33

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I have asked Mr Harriman to go to Moscow to be at your call and that of your visitor<sup>16</sup> to render any help which he may possibly give.

August 5, 1942

No. 34

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

Knowledge has come to me which I feel is definitely authentic that the Government of Japan has decided not to undertake military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at this time. This, I believe, means postponement of any attack on Siberia until the spring of next year. Will you be kind enough to give this information to your visitor.<sup>16</sup>

August 5, 1942

No. 35

*Sent on August 7, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

I have received your messages dated August 5. Thank you for advising me of Mr Harriman's forthcoming arrival in Moscow. I read with interest your information on Japan, and shall not fail to pass it on to my visitor.<sup>16</sup>

No. 36

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

Your frank opinion on the following plan, which I think may be useful, would be very much appreciated:

For the primary purpose of explaining to the Governments of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt the danger they run in a German victory and that their greatest hope for the future lies in the defeat of Nazi domination of the places of the Near East and the Middle East, I am sending Mr Wendell Willkie to visit the Governments of these countries.

For a wholly different purpose Mr Willkie would very much like to visit the Soviet Union. In addition to seeing for himself the undying unity of thought in repelling the invader and the great sacrifices which you are all making, he wants to know more about the wonderful progress made by the Russian people.

As you know Mr Willkie was my opponent in the 1940 elections and he is today the head of the minority party. He is heart and soul with my administration in our foreign policy of opposition to Nazism and real friendship with your Govern-

ment, and he is greatly helping in war work. For the sake of the present and the future I personally think that a visit to the Soviet Union by Mr Willkie would be a good thing. He would proceed to the Soviet Union by air during the first two weeks of September.

I should be grateful if you would confidentially and frankly inform me whether you would welcome a very short visit by him.

August 9, 1942

No. 37

*Sent on August 12, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Your message of August 9 to hand. The Soviet Government takes a favourable view of Mr Wendell Willkie's visit to the U.S.S.R. and I can assure you that he will be most cordially entertained.

No. 38

*Received on August 19, 1942*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I regret indeed that I was unable to have been with you and Mr Churchill in the conferences which have recently taken place in Moscow. The urgent needs of the military situation, especially insofar as the Soviet-German front is concerned, are well known to me.

I am of the opinion that it will be difficult for the Japanese to dislodge us from the vantage point which we have gained in the area of the South-west Pacific.<sup>17</sup> Although the naval losses of our forces were considerable in that area, the advantages which we have gained will justify them and I can assure you we are going to press them in a vigorous manner. I well realize on the other hand that the real enemy of both our countries is Germany and that at the earliest possible moment it will be necessary for both our countries to bring our power and forces to bear against Hitler. Just as soon as it is humanly possible to assemble the transportation you may be sure that this will be done.



In the interim there will leave the United States for the Soviet Union during the month of August over 1,000 tanks, and at the same time other strategic materials are going forward, including aircraft.

The fact that the Soviet Union is bearing the brunt of the fighting and losses during the year 1942 is well understood by the United States and I may state that we greatly admire the magnificent resistance which your country has exhibited. We are coming as quickly and as strongly to your assistance as we possibly can and I hope that you will believe me when I tell you this.

**No. 39**

*Sent on August 22, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Your message of August 19 received. I, too, regret that you were unable to take part in the talks which Mr Churchill and I recently had.

With reference to what you say about the despatch of tanks and other strategic materials from the United States in August I should like to emphasise our special interest in receiving U.S. aircraft and other weapons, as well as trucks in the greatest numbers possible. It is my hope that every step will be taken to ensure early delivery of the cargoes to the Soviet Union, particularly over the northern sea route.

**No. 40**

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH STALIN,  
PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE'S  
COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R.**

Moscow

My dear Mr Stalin,

I am giving this letter of presentation to you to General Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War and at present United States Minister to New Zealand.

General Hurley is returning to his post in New Zealand and I have felt it to be of the highest importance that, prior to his return, he should be afforded the opportunity of visiting Moscow and of learning, so far as may be possible, through his own

eyes the most significant aspects of our present world strategy. I wish him in this way, as a result of his personal experiences, to be able to assure the Government of New Zealand and likewise the Government of Australia that the most effective manner in which the United Nations<sup>14</sup> can join in defeating Hitler is through the rendering of all possible assistance to the gallant Russian armies, who have so brilliantly withstood the attacks of Hitler's armies.

I have requested General Hurley likewise to visit Egypt, as well as Iran and Iraq, in order that he might thus personally familiarize himself with that portion of the Middle East and see for himself the campaign which is being carried on in that area.

As you know, the Governments of Australia and of New Zealand have been inclined to believe that it was imperative that an immediate and all-out attack should be made by the United Nations against Japan. What I wish General Hurley to be able to say to those two Governments after his visit to the Soviet Union is that the best strategy for the United Nations to pursue is for them first to join in making possible the defeat of Hitler and that this is the best and surest way of insuring the defeat of Japan.

I send you my heartiest congratulations on the magnificent achievements of the Soviet armies and my best wishes for your continued welfare.

Believe me.

Yours very sincerely,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

October 5, 1942<sup>18</sup>

No. 41

**FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

In taking this opportunity to send you a personal message through the courtesy of Mr Standley, who is leaving for Washington, I should like to say a few words about U.S. military deliveries to the U.S.S.R.

The difficulties of delivery are reported to be due primarily to shortage of shipping. To remedy the shipping situation the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to a certain curtailment of U.S. arms deliveries to the Soviet Union. We should be prepared temporarily fully to renounce deliveries of tanks, guns, ammunition, pistols, etc. At the same time, however, we are badly in need of increased deliveries of modern fighter aircraft—such as Aircobras—and certain other sup-

plies. It should be borne in mind that the Kittyhawk is no match for the modern German fighter.

It would be very good if the U.S.A. could ensure the monthly delivery of at least the following items: 500 fighters, 8,000 to 10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminium, and 4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives. Besides, we need, within 12 months, two million tons of grain (wheat) and as much as we can have of fats, concentrated foods and canned meat. We could bring in a considerable part of the food supplies in Soviet ships via Vladivostok if the U.S.A. consented to turn over to the U.S.S.R. 20 to 30 ships at the least to replenish our fleet. I have talked this over with Mr Willkie, feeling certain that he will convey it to you.

As regards the situation at the front, you are undoubtedly aware that in recent months our position in the South, particularly in the Stalingrad area, has deteriorated due to shortage of aircraft, mostly fighters. The Germans have bigger stocks of aircraft than we anticipated. In the South they have at least a twofold superiority in the air, which makes it impossible for us to protect our troops. War experience has shown that the bravest troops are helpless unless protected against air attack.

October 7, 1942

No. 42

*Received on October 9, 1942*

### F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\*

I have received a copy of the Prime Minister's message to you. We are going to move as rapidly as possible to place an air force under your strategic command in the Caucasus. I am now trying to find additional planes for you immediately and will advise you soon. I am also trying to arrange to have some of our merchant ships transferred to your flag to increase your flow of materials in the Pacific. I have just ordered an automobile tire plant to be made available to you. We are sending very substantial reinforcements to the Persian Gulf to increase the flow of supplies over that route and are confident that this can be done. We are sending a large number of engines and other equipment as well as personnel. I am confident that our contemplated operation will be successful.

The gallant defense of Stalingrad has thrilled everyone in America and we are confident of its success.

No. 43

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am examining every possibility of increasing the number of fighter planes to be sent to the Soviet Union. The fact of the matter is that all Aircobra production is now going to fighting fronts immediately. While these urgent combat requirements make it impossible to increase the number of Aircobras for you at the moment, nevertheless I am hoping to increase our production of this type at the expense of other types in order to give you more planes. Also if our forthcoming operations which you know about turn out as successfully as they promise, we would then be in a position to release fighters.

Our heavy bombardment group has been ordered mobilized immediately for the purpose of operating on your southern flank. This movement will not be contingent on any other operation or commitment and these planes and sufficient transports will go to the Caucasus at an early date.

I shall telegraph you in a day or so in reference to explosives, aluminium and trucks.

Twenty merchant ships for use in the Pacific are being made available to you.

In October we will ship to you 276 combat planes and everything possible is being done to expedite these deliveries.

October 12, 1942

No. 44

*Sent on October 15, 1942*

**REPLY FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your message of October 12 to hand. I am grateful for the information.

J. STALIN

No. 45

*Received on October 16, 1942*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am glad to inform you, in response to your request, that the items involved can be made available for shipment as follows:

Wheat; two million short tons during the remainder of the protocol year<sup>15</sup> at approximately equal monthly rates.

Trucks; 8,000 to 10,000 per month.

Explosives; 4,000 short tons in November and 5,000 tons per month thereafter.

Meat; 15,000 tons per month.

Canned Meat; 10,000 tons per month.

Lard; 12,000 tons per month.

Soap Stock; 5,000 tons per month.

Vegetable Oil; 10,000 tons per month.

I will advise you at an early date of the aluminum shipments which I am still exploring.

I have given orders that no effort be spared to keep our routes fully supplied with ships and cargo in conformity with your desires as to priorities on our commitments to you.

No. 46

**FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO U.S. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message of October 16. I am behind in answering because front affairs held my attention. The thing now is to have the promised cargoes delivered to the U.S.S.R. as scheduled by you.

October 19, 1942

No. 47

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I have just received from Admiral Standley your personal note, a copy of which you had previously sent me.<sup>19</sup> The Ambassador has also given me a very full report of his views on the situation in the Soviet Union. He confirms reports we have

already received of the fighting qualities and strength of the Soviet Army and the urgent need of the supplies which you have indicated. These needs I fully recognize.

October 24, 1942

No. 48

*Sent on October 28, 1942*

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

Your message of October 24 received. Thank you for the information.

No. 49

**TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
FROM PREMIER STALIN**

My dear Mr President,

Thank you very much for your letter, which reached me through General Hurley<sup>18</sup> today. I have had a long talk with him on strategic matters. I think that he understood me and is now convinced of the soundness of the Allies' present strategy. He asked for an opportunity to visit one of our fronts, in particular the Caucasus. This opportunity will be provided.

No serious changes have occurred on the Soviet-German front in the past week. We plan to launch our winter campaign in the near future and are preparing for it. I shall keep you informed about it.

All of us here rejoice at the brilliant success of U.S. and British arms in North Africa. Congratulations on the victory. With all my heart I wish you further success.

Yours very sincerely,  
STALIN

November 14, 1942

No. 50

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am glad you have been so kind to General Hurley. As you can well recognize, I have had a problem in persuading the people of Australia and New Zealand that the menace of Japan can be most effectively met by destroying the Nazis first. General Hurley will be able to tell them at first hand how you and Churchill and I are in complete agreement on this.

Our recent battles in the South-west Pacific make the position there more secure even though we have not yet eliminated attempts by the Japanese to extend their southward drive.

The American and British staffs are now studying further moves in the event that we secure the whole south shore of the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Syria. Before any further step is taken, both Churchill and I want to consult with you and your staff, because whatever we do next in the Mediterranean will have a definite bearing on your magnificent campaign and your proposed moves this coming winter.

I do not have to tell you to keep up the good work. You are doing that, and I honestly feel that things everywhere look brighter.

With my warm regards,

ROOSEVELT

November 19, 1942

No. 51

*Sent on November 20, 1942*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

We have begun the offensive operations in the Stalingrad area—in its southern and north-western sectors. The objective of the first stage is to seize the Stalingrad-Likhaya railway and disrupt the communications of the Stalingrad group of the German troops. In the north-western sector the German front has been pierced along a 22-kilometre line and along a 12-kilometre line in the southern sector. The operation is proceeding satisfactorily.

No. 52

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I want you to know that we have hit the Japs very hard in the Solomons. There is a probability that we have broken the backbone of the strength of their fleet, although they still have too many aircraft carriers to suit me, but we may well get some more of them soon.

We are in the South-west Pacific with very heavy forces by air, land and sea and we do not intend to play a waiting game. We are going to press our advantages.

I am sure we are sinking far more Jap ships and destroying more airplanes than they can build.

I am hopeful that we are going to drive the Germans out of Africa soon and then we will give the Italians a taste of some real bombing, and I am quite sure they will never stand up under that kind of pressure.

The news from the Stalingrad area is most encouraging and I send you my warmest congratulations.

November 26, 1942

No. 53

*Sent on November 27, 1942*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Thank you for your message, received on November 21. I fully appreciate your desire to explain the military set-up to people in Australia and New Zealand, and your preoccupation with operations in the South-west Pacific. As to the Mediterranean operations, which are making such favourable progress and are important in terms of changing the whole military situation in Europe, I share your view that the time is ripe for appropriate consultations between the General Staffs of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Heartfelt regards and best wishes for further success in your offensive.



No. 54

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Thank you for your message which reached me on November 27. I am glad to hear of your successes in the Solomons area and of the strong build-up of your forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Feeling certain of the speedy expulsion of Germans from North Africa, I trust that this will help in launching Allied offensive operations in Europe. The intensive air raids planned for Italy will no doubt be very- useful.

We have achieved some success in the Stalingrad operation, largely facilitated by snowfall and fog which prevented the Germans from making full use of their aircraft.

We have decided to launch operations on the Central Front, too, to keep the enemy from moving his forces south.

I send you warm regards and best wishes to the U.S. Armed Forces.

November 28, 1942

No. 55

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

The more I consider our mutual military situation and the necessity for reaching early strategic decisions, the more persuaded I am that you, Churchill and I should have an early meeting.

It seems to me that a conference of our military leaders alone will not be sufficient, first, because they could come to no ultimate decisions without our approval and, secondly, because I think we should come to some tentative understanding about the procedures which should be adopted in event of a German collapse.

My most compelling reason is that I am very anxious to have a talk with you. My suggestion would be that we meet secretly in some secure place in Africa that is convenient to all three of us. The time, about January 15th to 20th.

We would each of us bring a very small staff of our top army, air and naval commanders.

I hope that you will consider this proposal favourably because I can see no other way of reaching the vital strategic

decisions which should be made soon by all of us together. If the right decision is reached, we may, and I believe will, knock Germany out of the war much sooner than we anticipated.

I can readily fly, but I consider Iceland or Alaska out of the question at this time of the year. Some place can, I think, be found in Southern Algeria or at or near Khartoum where all visitors and press can be kept out. As a mere suggestion as to date would you think of sometime around January 15.

December 2, 1942

No. 56

*Sent on December 6, 1942*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your message reached me on December 5.

I welcome the idea of a meeting between the three heads of the Governments to establish a common strategy. To my great regret, however, I shall be unable to leave the Soviet Union. This is so crucial a moment that I cannot absent myself even for a single day. Just now major military operations—part of our winter campaign—are under way, nor will they be relaxed in January. It is more than likely that it will be the other way round.

Fighting is developing both at Stalingrad and on the Central Front. At Stalingrad we have encircled a large group of German troops and hope to complete their destruction.

No. 57

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am deeply disappointed you feel you cannot get away for a conference in January. There are many matters of vital importance to be discussed between us. These relate not only to vital strategic decision, but also to things we should talk over in a tentative way in regard to emergency policies which we should be ready with, if, and when, conditions in Germany permit.

These would also include other matters relating to future policies about North Africa and the Far East which cannot be discussed by our military people alone.

I fully realize your strenuous situation now and in the immediate future and the necessity of your presence close to the fighting front. Therefore I want to suggest that we set a tentative date for meeting in North Africa about March 1.

December 8, 1942

**No. 58**

*Sent on December 14, 1942*

### **J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

I, too, express deep regret at not being able to leave the Soviet Union in the immediate future, or even in early March. Front affairs simply will not let me do so. Indeed, they necessitate my continuous presence.

I do not know as yet what were the specific matters that you, Mr President, and Mr Churchill wanted discussed at our joint conference. Could we not discuss them by correspondence until we have an opportunity to meet? I think we shall not differ.

I feel confident that no time is being wasted, that the promise to open a second front in Europe, which you, Mr President, and Mr Churchill gave for 1942 or the spring of 1943 at the latest, will be kept and that a second front in Europe will really be opened jointly by Great Britain and the U.S.A. next spring.

With reference to the rumours about the Soviet attitude to the use of Darlan and people like him, I should like to tell you that as I and my colleagues see it, Eisenhower's policy towards Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and the others is absolutely sound. I consider it an important achievement that you have succeeded in winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against Hitler. Earlier I wrote the same to Mr Churchill.

**No. 59**

### **F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am not clear as to just what has happened in regard to our offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus. I am fully willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think they should operate by units under their American comman-

ders, but each group would, of course, be under overall Russian command as to tactical objectives.

Please let me know your desires as soon as possible, as I truly want to help all I can.

Pursuit plane program would not be affected. What I refer to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to the Caucasus.

December 16, 1942

**No. 60**

*Sent on December 18, 1942*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

Thank you very much for the willingness to help us. The Anglo-American squadrons with crews are no longer needed in Transcaucasia. The main battles are being fought, and will be fought, on the Central Front and in the Voronezh area. I should be most grateful if you would expedite the despatch of aircraft, especially fighters, but without crews, whom you now need badly for use in the areas mentioned.

A feature of the Soviet Air Force is that we have more than enough pilots but suffer from a shortage of machines.

**No. 61**

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I am very sorry arrangements for conference could not be made but I can well understand your position. This will acknowledge your note about the Anglo-American squadrons. We will expedite delivery of planes to the utmost. I have arranged to get you ten transport planes in January.

I am writing you in regard to certain post-war activities.

December 21, 1942

*Received on December 28, 1942*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

Struggling side by side against powerful foes, thousands upon thousands of soldiers of those nations, large and small, which are united in defense of freedom and justice and human rights face the holiday season far from home, across oceans or continents, in fields-of desert sand or winter snow, in jungles, forests, on warships or merchant vessels, on island ramparts from Iceland to the Solomons, in the old and new worlds.

They strive to the limit of their strength, without regard for the clock or the calendar, to hold the enemy in check and to push him back. They strike mighty blows and receive blows in return. They fight the good fight in order that they may win victory which will bring to the world peace, freedom, and the advancement of human welfare.

With a deep and abiding sense of gratitude the Congress of the United States has by a joint resolution asked me to transmit on behalf of the people of the United States to the armed forces and auxiliary services of our Allies on land, on sea, and in the air, the best wishes and greetings of the season to them and to their families and a fervent hope and prayer for a speedy and complete victory and a lasting peace.

Accordingly, I shall be grateful to you if you will convey to your armed forces and auxiliary services, in the name of the Congress of the United States, in my own name, and in the name of the people of the United States, the cordial wishes and greetings and the hope and prayer expressed in the joint resolution.

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I note in a radio news report from Tokyo that a Japanese submarine sank an Allied nation submarine in the Pacific on October 12.

This report appears to refer to your submarine, *Love-16*, sunk by enemy action on October 11 while en route to the United States from Alaska,<sup>20</sup> and I am sending to you this expression of regret for the loss of your ship with its gallant crew, and of my appreciation of the part your gallant Navy is also contributing to the Allied cause in addition to the heroic accomplishments of your Army.

December 30, 1942

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

In the event that Japan should attack Russia in the Far East, I am prepared to assist you in that theater with an American air force of approximately one hundred four-engine bombardment airplanes as early as practicable, provided that certain items of supply and equipment are furnished by Soviet authorities and that suitable operation facilities are prepared in advance.

Supply of our units must be entirely by air transport, hence it will be necessary for the Soviet Government to furnish such items as bombs, fuel, lubricants, transportation, shelter, heat and other minor items to be determined.

Although we have no positive information that Japan will attack Russia, it does appear to be an eventual probability. Therefore, in order that we may be prepared for this contingency, I propose that the survey of air force facilities in the Far East, authorized by you to General Bradley on October 6 be made now, and that the discussions initiated on November 11 on your authority between General Bradley and General Korolenko be continued.

It is my intention to appoint General Bradley, who has my full confidence, to continue these discussions for the United States if you so agree. He will be empowered to explore for the United States every phase of combined Russo-American operations in the Far East theater and based upon his survey to recommend the composition and strength of our air forces,

which will be allocated to assist you should the necessity arise.

He will also determine the extent of advance preparations practicable and necessary to insure effective participation of our units promptly on initiation of hostilities. His party will not exceed twenty persons to fly into Russia in two American Douglas DC-3 type airplanes.

If this meets with your approval, I would suggest that they proceed from Alaska along the ferry route into Siberia, thence, under Russian direction, to the headquarters of the Soviet armies in the Far East, and thence to such other places in Russia as may be necessary to make their quiet survey and discuss operating plans.

It would be very helpful if an English-speaking Russian officer such as Captain Vladimir Ovnovin, Washington, or Captain Smolyarov in Moscow be detailed to accompany General Bradley as adjutant and liaison officer.

I seize this opportunity of expressing my admiration for the courage, stamina and military prowess of your great Russian armies as reported to me by General Bradley and as demonstrated by your great victories of the past month.

December 30, 1942

**No. 65**

*Sent on January 1, 1943*

**TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I would ask you, Mr President, to convey to the United States Congress and accept my gratitude for the cordial greetings and good wishes sent to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the name of the American people.

J. STALIN

**No. 66**

*Sent on January 5, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your message concerning the Far East received. I thank you for the readiness to send 100 bombers to the Far East for the Soviet Union. I must say, however, that what we need at pres-

ent is aircraft, not in the Far East, where the U.S.S.R. is not fighting, but on a front where a most cruel war is being waged against the Germans, that is, on the Soviet-German front. The arrival of those aircraft without pilots—because we have a sufficient number of pilots—on the South-Western or Central Front would play a notable part in the most important sectors of our struggle against Hitler.

As regards the course of the war on our fronts, so far our offensive is, on the whole, making satisfactory progress.

No. 67

### F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\*

After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East, I am afraid I did not make myself clear. As I previously explained reference South Caucasus, it is not practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in existing organized units. Our proposal regarding the one hundred planes referred to a situation which would occur if hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and Russia.

Under such conditions, we calculated that by regrouping our air units in the Pacific theater, one hundred planes in organized units could be concentrated in Eastern Siberia because their action as well as your battle there would enable us to reduce our air strength elsewhere in the Pacific theater.

My radio was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory protective planning against a possibility only.

The immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey and discussions by General Bradley with Soviet officials.

Only by such preliminary survey and advance planning will it be possible to render reasonably prompt assistance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia. I should like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future, and if this can be arranged, I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time.

He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.

Meanwhile I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal of December 30 that General Bradley and his party proceed without delay to the Far East for survey and staff discussions.



My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work.

January 8, 1943

No. 68

### **F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I have arranged that two hundred C-47 transport planes be assigned to you in 1943 beginning in January.

Your mission here is being advised of the dates of delivery by months.

I am going to do everything I can to give you another one hundred but you can definitely count on the two hundred planes referred to above.

January 9, 1943

No. 69

*Sent on January 13, 1943*

### **PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Thank you for the decision to send 200 transport planes to the Soviet Union.

As to sending bomber units to the Far East, I have already pointed out in my previous messages that what we need is not air force units, but planes without pilots, because we have more than enough pilots of our own. Secondly, we need your help in the way of aircraft not in the Far East where the U.S.S.R. is not in a state of war, but on the Soviet-German front, where the need for aircraft aid is particularly great.

I was rather surprised at your proposal that General Bradley should inspect Russian military objectives in the Far East and elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. It should be perfectly obvious that only Russians can inspect Russian military objectives, just as U.S. military objectives can be inspected by none but Americans. There should be no unclarity in this matter.

Concerning General Marshall's visit to the U.S.S.R. I must say I am not quite clear about his mission. Kindly advise me of the purpose of the visit so that I can consider the matter with full understanding and reply accordingly.

My colleagues are upset by the fact that the operations in North Africa have come to a standstill and, I gather, for a long time, too. Would you care to comment on the matter?

No. 70

*Received on January 27, 1943*

**FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL  
TO PREMIER STALIN**

We have been in conference with our military advisers and have decided on the operations which are to be undertaken by the American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943.<sup>21</sup> We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We believe that these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany with a view to achieving an early and decisive victory in the European theater. At the same time we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and the Far East and sustain China and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theaters such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. Our main desire has been to divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and to send Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance in any case by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up naval and air installations to open:

(1) an effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and

(2) an intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, including landing craft and shipping, in Egypt and the North Africa ports. In addition we shall concentrate within the United Kingdom a strong American land and air force. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the continent of Europe as soon as practicable. These concentrations will certainly be known to our enemies

but they will not know where or when or on what scale we propose striking. They will, therefore, be compelled to divert both land and air forces to all the shores of France, the Low Countries, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and the Levant, and Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. In Europe we shall increase the Allied bomber offensive from the United Kingdom against Germany at a rapid rate and by midsummer it should be double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that day bombing attacks result in the destruction of, and damage to, large numbers of German fighter aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and moral damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our intensified and diversified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front.

7. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul<sup>22</sup> within the next few months and thereafter to exploit the success in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen this channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our Air Forces in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our offensives against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

8. Our ruling purpose is to bring to bear upon Germany and Italy the maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be physically applied.

No. 71

*Sent on January 30, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr CHURCHILL**

Your friendly joint message reached me on January 27. Thank you for informing me of the Casablanca decisions about the operations to be undertaken by the U.S. and British armed

forces in the first nine months of 1943. Assuming that your decisions on Germany are designed to defeat her by opening a second front in Europe in 1943, I should be grateful if you would inform me of the concrete operations planned and of their timing.

As to the Soviet Union, I can assure you that the Soviet armed forces will do all in their power to continue the offensive against Germany and her allies on the Soviet-German front. We expect to finish our winter campaign, circumstances permitting, in the first half of February. Our troops are tired, they are in need of rest and they will hardly be able to carry on the offensive beyond that period.

No. 72

*Received on February 5, 1943*

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States of America I congratulate you on the brilliant victory at Stalingrad of the armies under your Supreme Command. The one hundred and sixty-two days of epic battle for the city which has for ever honoured your name and the decisive result which all Americans are celebrating today will remain one of the proudest chapters in this war of the peoples united against Nazism and its emulators. The commanders and fighters of your armies at the front and the men and women, who have supported them in factory and field, have combined not only to cover with glory their country's arms, but to inspire by their example fresh determination among all the United Nations<sup>14</sup> to bend every energy to bring about the final defeat and unconditional surrender of the common enemy.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 73

*Sent on February 6, 1943*

**TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

The White House, Washington

Thank you for your congratulations on the victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad.

I am convinced that the joint combat operations of the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union will soon lead to victory over our common foe.

J. STALIN

No. 74

*Received on February 12, 1943*

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL,  
TO M. STALIN<sup>23</sup>**

Your message of January 30th. I have now consulted the President and the matter has been referred to the Staffs on both sides of the Ocean. I am authorized to reply for us both as follows:

(a) There are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier.

(b) When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Yugoslavia and wearing down of the German Air Force; this is to be closely followed by an operation in the Eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese.

(c) This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault-landing in time, and will be of the order of three or four hundred thousand men. We

shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established.

(d) We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which British and United States units would participate. Here again shipping and assault-landing craft will be the limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by the weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must, of course, be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that time.

(e) Both operations will be supported by very large United States and British air forces, and that across the Channel by the whole metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain. Together these operations will strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Britain and the United States.

(f) The President and I have enjoined upon our Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible.

February 9th, 1943

No. 75

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

On February 12 I received from Mr Churchill a message giving additional information on the decisions taken by the two of you at Casablanca. Since, according to Mr Churchill, his message is a common reply giving your opinion as well, I should like to make some comments, which I have conveyed to Mr Churchill.

It appears from the message that the date—February—fixed earlier for completing the operations in Tunisia is now set back to April. There is no need to demonstrate at length the undesirability of this delay in operations against the Germans and Italians. It is now, when the Soviet troops are still keeping up their broad offensive, that action by the Anglo-American troops in North Africa is imperative. Simultaneous pressure on Hitler from our front and from yours in Tunisia would be of great positive significance for our common cause and would create most serious difficulties for Hitler and Mussolini. It would also expedite the operations you are planning in Sicily and the Eastern Mediterranean.

As to the opening of a second front in Europe, in particular in France, it is planned, judging by your communication, for August or September. As I see it, however, the situation calls for shortening these time limits to the utmost and for the opening of a second front in the West at a date much earlier than the one mentioned. So that the enemy should not be given a chance to recover, it is very important, to my mind, that the blow from the West, instead of being put off till the second half of the year, be delivered in spring or early summer.

According to reliable information at our disposal, since the end of December, when for some reason the Anglo-American operations in Tunisia were suspended, the Germans have moved 27 divisions, including five armoured divisions, to the Soviet-German front from France, the Low Countries and Germany. In other words, instead of the Soviet Union being aided by diverting German forces from the Soviet-German front, what we get is relief for Hitler, who, because of the let-up in Anglo-American operations in Tunisia, was able to move additional troops against the Russians.

The foregoing indicates that the sooner we make joint use of the Hitler camp's difficulties at the front, the more grounds we shall have for anticipating early defeat for Hitler. Unless we take account of this and profit by the present moment to further our common interests, it may well be that, having gained a respite and rallied their forces, the Germans might recover. It is clear to you and us that such an undesirable miscalculation should not be made.

February 16, 1943

No. 76

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***  
**SECRET AND PERSONAL**

In reply to your message of February 16 in which you set forth certain considerations that you had transmitted to Mr Churchill in reply to his message of February 12 to you, I desire to state that I share your regret that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule. It was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both supplies and troops proceeding to the front lines from our landing ports. These rains made the fields and mountains impassable.

I am fully aware of the adverse effect on the common Allied effort of this delay and I am taking every possible step to begin

successful aggressive action against the forces of the Axis in Africa at the earliest possible moment with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

The wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time is well known by you and I can assure you that a maximum effort to increase our transportation is being made.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the continent of Europe at the earliest date practicable in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army. You may be sure that the American war effort will be projected on to the European Continent at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We wish for the continuance of the success of your heroic army which is an inspiration to all of us.

February 22, 1943

No. 77

*Received on February 23, 1943*

### **F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

On behalf of the people of the United States I want to express to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements unsurpassed in all history. For many months in spite of many tremendous losses in supplies, transportation and territory the Red Army denied victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus and finally at the immortal battle of Stalingrad the Red Army not only defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing him heavily in men, supplies, territory and especially in morale. Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training and above all determination to defeat the enemy no matter what the cost in self-sacrifice. At the same time I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army springs and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the supreme sacrifice. The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler forces on the



road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration of the people of the United States.

No. 78

*Sent on February 23, 1943*

**TO THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

Washington

Please accept my heartfelt thanks for your friendly message on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Red Army and your high praise of its combat achievements.

I share your confidence that these achievements clear the way for the final defeat of our common enemy, who must and shall be crushed by the combined might of our countries and of all the freedom-loving nations.

J. STALIN

No. 79

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Now that I have Mr Churchill's reply to my message of February 16, I consider it my duty to answer yours of February 22, which likewise was a reply to mine of February 16.

I learned from Mr Churchill's message that Anglo-American operations in North Africa, far from being accelerated, are being postponed till the end of April; indeed, even this date is given in rather vague terms. In other words, at the height of the fighting against the Hitler troops—in February and March—the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa, far from having been stepped up, has been called off altogether, and the time fixed for it has been set back. Meanwhile Germany has succeeded in moving from the West 36 divisions, including six armoured, to be used against the Soviet troops. The difficulties that this has created for the Soviet Army and the extent to which it has eased the German position on the Soviet-German front will be readily appreciated.

Mr Churchill has also informed me that the Anglo-American operation against Sicily is planned for June. For all its importance that operation can by no means replace a second front in France. But I fully welcome, of course, your intention to expedite the carrying out of the operation.

At the same time I consider it my duty to state that the early opening of a second front in France is the most important thing. You will recall that you and Mr Churchill thought it possible to open a second front as early as 1942 or this spring at the latest. The grounds for doing so were weighty enough. Hence it should be obvious why I stressed in my message of February 16 the need for striking in the West not later than this spring or early summer.

The Soviet troops have fought strenuously all winter and are continuing to do so, while Hitler is taking important measures to rehabilitate and reinforce his Army for the spring and summer operations against the U.S.S.R.; it is therefore particularly essential for us that the blow from the West be no longer delayed, that it be delivered this spring or in early summer.

I appreciate the considerable difficulties caused by a shortage of transport facilities, of which you advised me in your message. Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, in the interest of our common cause, of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in France is fraught. That is why the vagueness of both your reply and Mr Churchill's as to the opening of a second front in France causes me concern, which I cannot help expressing.

March 16, 1943

No. 80

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

The behaviour of the Polish Government towards the U.S.S.R. of late is, in the view of the Soviet Government, completely abnormal and contrary to all the rules and standards governing relations between two allied states.

The anti-Soviet slander campaign launched by the German fascists in connection with the Polish officers whom they themselves murdered in the Smolensk area, in German-occupied territory, was immediately seized upon by the Sikorski Government and is being fanned in every way by the Polish official press. Far from countering the infamous fascist slander against

the U.S.S.R., the Sikorski Government has not found it necessary even to address questions to the Soviet Government or to request information on the matter.

The Hitler authorities, having perpetrated a monstrous crime against the Polish officers, are now staging a farcical investigation, using for the purpose certain pro-fascist Polish elements picked by themselves in occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where no honest Pole can open his mouth.

Both the Sikorski and Hitler Governments have enlisted for the "investigation" the aid of the International Red Cross, which, under a terror régime of gallows and wholesale extermination of the civil population, is forced to take part in the investigation farce directed by Hitler. It is obvious that this "investigation," which, moreover, is being carried out behind the Soviet Government's back, cannot enjoy the confidence of anyone with a semblance of honesty.

The fact that the anti-Soviet campaign has been started simultaneously in the German and Polish press and follows identical lines is indubitable evidence of contact and collusion between Hitler—the Allies' enemy—and the Sikorski Government in this hostile campaign.

At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in a grim struggle against Hitler Germany and bending their energies to defeat the common foe of the freedom-loving democratic countries, the Sikorski Government is striking a treacherous blow at the Soviet Union to help Hitler tyranny.

These circumstances compel the Soviet Government to consider that the present Polish Government, having descended to collusion with the Hitler Government, has, in practice, severed its relations of alliance with the U.S.S.R. and adopted a hostile attitude to the Soviet Union.

For those reasons the Soviet Government has decided to interrupt relations with that Government.

I think it necessary to inform you of the foregoing, and I trust that the U.S. Government will appreciate the motives that necessitated this forced step on the part of the Soviet Government.

April 21, 1943

No. 81

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO Mr STALIN**

I received your telegram during an inspection trip which I was making in the western part of the United States. I fully understand your problem but at the same time I hope that you can find a way in this present situation to define your action as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government in exile in London rather than to label it as a complete severance of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.

I cannot believe that Sikorski has in any way whatsoever collaborated with the Hitler gangsters. In my opinion, however, he has erred in taking up this particular question with the International Red Cross. Furthermore, I am inclined to think that Prime Minister Churchill will find a way of prevailing upon the Polish Government in London in the future to act with more common sense.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know if I can help in any way in respect to this question and particularly in connection with looking after any Poles which you may desire to send out of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, a great many of whom are in the Army and Navy. I can assure you that all of them are bitter against the Hitlerites. However, the overall situation would not be helped by the knowledge of a complete diplomatic break between the Soviet and Polish Governments.

April 26, 1943

No. 82

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I am sorry to say your reply did not reach me until April 27, whereas on April 25 the Soviet Government was compelled to interrupt relations with the Polish Government.

As the Polish Government for nearly two weeks, far from ceasing a campaign hostile to the Soviet Union and beneficial to none but Hitler, intensified it in its press and on the radio Soviet public opinion was deeply outraged by such conduct,

and hence the Soviet Government could no longer defer action.

It may well be that Mr Sikorski himself has no intention of collaborating with the Hitler gangsters. I should be happy to see this surmise borne out by facts. But my impression is that certain pro-Hitler elements—either inside the Polish Government or in its environment—have induced Mr Sikorski to follow them, with the result that the Polish Government has come to be, possibly against its own will, a tool in Hitler's hands in the anti-Soviet campaign of which you are aware.

I, too, believe that Prime Minister Churchill will find ways to bring the Polish Government to reason and help it proceed henceforward in a spirit of common sense. I may be wrong, but I believe that one of our duties as Allies is to prevent this or that Ally from taking hostile action against any other Ally to the joy and benefit of the common enemy.

As regards Polish subjects in the U.S.S.R. and their future, I can assure you that Soviet Government agencies have always treated and will continue to treat them as comrades, as people near and dear to us. It should be obvious that there never has been, nor could have been, any question of their being deported from the U.S.S.R. If, however, they themselves wish to leave the U.S.S.R., Soviet Government agencies will not hinder them, just as they have never done, and will, in fact, try to help them.

April 29, 1943

No. 83

## F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\*

My dear Mr Stalin,

I am sending this personal note to you by the hands of my old friend, Joseph E. Davies. It relates solely to one subject which I think it is easier for us to talk over through a mutual friend. Mr Litvinov is the only other person with whom I have talked about it.

I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me.

I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable to be away from Washington more than a short time. There are

two sides to the problem. The first relates to timing. There is always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up in Germany next winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my belief that you and I ought to meet this summer.

The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of the question in summer and Khartoum is British territory. Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves rather difficult flights and, in addition, would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time.

Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or my side of Bering Straits. Such a point would be about three days from Washington and I think about two days from Moscow if the weather is good. That means that you could always get back to Moscow in two days in an emergency.

It is my thought that neither of us would want to bring any Staff. I would be accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter and a stenographer—and that you and I would talk very informally and get what we call “a meeting of the minds.” I do not believe that any official agreements or declarations are in the least bit necessary.

You and I would, of course, talk over the military and naval situation, but I think we can both do that without Staffs being present.

Mr Davies has no knowledge of our military affairs nor of the post-war plans of this Government, and I am sending him to you for the sole purpose of talking over our meeting.

I greatly hope that our forces will be in complete control of Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will be working on the second phase of the offensive.

Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this summer, and my Staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line.

You are doing a grand job. Good luck!

Always sincerely,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

May 6, 1943

No. 84

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

I wish to inform you that Prime Minister Churchill is proceeding next week to Washington for the purpose of discussing our immediate next steps. General Belyaev will, of course, be kept currently informed of our conversations.

May 6, 1943

No. 85

*Sent on May 8, 1943*

**FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Washington

I congratulate you and the gallant U.S. and British troops on the brilliant victory which has resulted in the liberation of Bizerta and Tunis from Hitler tyranny. I wish you further success.

J. STALIN

No. 86

*Received on May 14, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

I wish to express my appreciation for your kind message of congratulation on the performance of our armies in bringing about the liberation of Tunisia. Now that we have gained the initiative further successes on the Eastern and Western Fronts, as well as further supplies, including aircraft, may reasonably be expected.

*Received on May 20, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

I know that the following American estimates of Axis losses in North Africa during the period December 8, 1940, to May 12, 1943, will be of interest to you. These figures agree substantially with the estimates which have been made by the British with the exception of personnel losses. The British estimates of these losses are somewhat lower than ours.

1. Total personnel losses: 625,000.
2. Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 7,596 destroyed, 1,748 probably destroyed, 4,499 damaged.
3. Total tank losses: Not less than 2,100.
4. Total losses of merchant ships: 625 ships sunk (approximately 2,200,000 tons) and 371 ships damaged (approximately 1,600,000 tons).
5. Italian losses in East Africa: 150,000 (exclusive of natives).

**J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT\***

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Mr Davies has delivered your message to me.

I agree that this summer—possibly as early as June—we should expect the Hitlerites to launch a new major offensive on the Soviet-German front. Hitler has already concentrated about 200 German divisions and up to 30 divisions of his allies for use against us. We are getting ready to repel the new German offensive and to launch counter-attacks, but we are short of aircraft and aircraft fuel. Of course, it is at the moment impossible to foresee all the military and other steps that we may have to take. That will depend on the course of events on our front. A good deal will also depend on the speed and vigour with which Anglo-American military operations are launched in Europe.

I have mentioned these important circumstances to explain why my reply to your suggestion for a meeting between us cannot be quite specific as yet.

I agree that the time is ripe for such a meeting and that it should not be delayed. But I beg you to assess properly the im-



portance of the circumstances I have referred to, because the summer months will be exceedingly trying for the Soviet armies. As I do not know how events will develop on the Soviet-German front in June, I shall not be able to leave Moscow during that month. I therefore suggest holding the meeting in July or August. If you agree, I shall let you know two weeks before the date of the meeting just when it could be held in July or August. If, after being notified by me, you agree to the date suggested, I could arrive in time.

Mr Davies will personally inform you of the meeting place.

I agree with you about cutting down the number of your advisers and mine.

Thank you for sending Mr Davies to Moscow, a man familiar with the Soviet Union and who can pass impartial judgment on things.

Yours very sincerely,

J. STALIN

May 26, 1943

No. 89

*Received on June 4, 1943*

**FOR Mr STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> have recently approved certain decisions which have the approval as well of Mr Churchill and myself.

As these decisions are of the very highest secrecy, I am asking Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you personally.

ROOSEVELT

No. 90

*Received on June 4, 1943*

**FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO Mr STALIN  
(PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET)**

Basic strategy in the recent decisions approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> is divided into the below listed groupings:

A. The control of the threat developed by enemy submarines receives primary consideration, along with the security of Allied maritime communication lines and with every practicable means of support for the Soviet Union.

B. The laying of preparatory groundwork for the participation of Turkey in the war, either as an active or as a passive ally.

C. The reduction of Japanese military power by keeping up an unremitting pressure against her.

D. The carrying out of those measures found practicable by which China may be kept in the war as an effective power and maintained as a base from which operations may be carried out against Japan.

E. The rendering of such aid and assistance to the French forces in Africa that they may be prepared for an active part in the attacks to be made on enemy-held territory in Europe.

Referring to (A) above, we have been greatly encouraged by results recently obtained against enemy submarines by the use of long-range airplanes carrying new devices and equipment and also of groups of special attack vessels. Since the first of May, we have destroyed an average of more than one submarine per day. Destruction at this rate over a period of time will have a tremendous effect on the morale of the crews of the German undersea fleet. It will eventually reduce our ship losses and will thereby increase our shipping pool.

In respect support of the U.S.S.R., the following decisions were made: the air offensive now being mounted against enemy-held Europe will be intensified, for the threefold purpose of destruction of enemy industry, of whittling down of German fighter plane strength, and for the breaking of German civil morale. That this intensification is already in progress is demonstrated by the events of the last three weeks, during which France, Italy, Germany, Sicily and Sardinia have been heavily attacked. British strength in Bomber Command is growing steadily. The United States heavy bomber force operating in England has increased at a constant rate and will continue to do so. In March, there were about 350 United States heavy bombers in England. At the present time there are about 700. Plans call for 900 at the end of June, 1,150 at the end of September and 2,500 by the first of April.

It has been decided to put Italy out of the war at the earliest possible moment. The plan for the attack on Sicily is designated as "Husky." General Eisenhower has been ordered that when "Husky" has been successfully concluded, he is to be prepared to immediately launch offensives directed toward the collapse of Italy. Forces available to Eisenhower for these operations will be the total now in the Mediterranean theater less four American and three British divisions which are to be sent to England

as part of a concentration of forces in that country shortly to be referred to below.

The collapse of Italy will greatly facilitate the carrying out of the air offensive against South and East Germany, will continue the attrition of their fighter strength and will jeopardize the Axis position in the Balkan area.

With Africa firmly in our hands, it was decided that it was now feasible to resume the concentration of ground forces in England. A joint Anglo-American staff has been and is constantly occupied with keeping up to the last minute the necessary plans for instantly taking advantage of any enemy weakness in France or Norway. Under the present plans, there should be a sufficiently large concentration of men and materiel in the British Isles in the spring of 1944 to permit a full-scale invasion of the continent at that time. The great air offensive will then be at its peak. A certain number of large landing craft have necessarily been sent to the South-west Pacific, the Aleutians, and to the Mediterranean. The necessity of so doing has of course reduced by that extent the number of such boats sent to England. This has been the most important limiting factor as far as operations out of England have been concerned.

The decisions enumerated and explained above are believed to be such that the enemy will be forced to disperse his ground forces to an excessive degree, both to oppose actual attacks and to guard against the possibility of attack. He will in addition be subject to heavy and continuous activity in the air. When signs of Axis weakness become apparent in any quarter, actual attacks and threats of attack will easily and quickly be translated into successful operations. We believe that these decisions as stated herein will require the full resources which we will be able to bring to bear.

ROOSEVELT

No. 91

*Received on June 5, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Permit me to express to you my sincere thanks for the courtesies which you have extended to me and to the Government of the United States in your cordial reception of Mr Davies. He has returned safely to Washington bringing with him your

message<sup>25</sup> to me. I am pleased to note that you and I fully agree in principle on all matters set forth in your letter. In accordance with your letter and your understanding with Mr Davies I will await your further communication.

Please give my kind remembrances and warm personal regards to Mr Brown.<sup>26</sup>

No. 92

*Sent on June 11, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

Your message informing me of certain decisions on strategic matters adopted by you and Mr Churchill reached me on June 4. Thank you for the information.

It appears from your communication that the decisions run counter to those reached by you and Mr Churchill earlier this year concerning the date for a second front in Western Europe.

You will doubtless recall that the joint message of January 26,<sup>27</sup> sent by you and Mr Churchill, announced the decision adopted at that time to divert considerable German ground and air forces from the Russian front and bring Germany to her knees in 1943.

Then on February 12 Mr Churchill communicated on his own behalf and yours the specified time of the Anglo-American operation in Tunisia and the Mediterranean, as well as on the west coast of Europe. The communication said that Great Britain and the United States were vigorously preparing to cross the Channel in August 1943 and that if the operation were hindered by weather or other causes, then it would be prepared with an eye to being carried out in greater force in September 1943.

Now, in May 1943, you and Mr Churchill have decided to postpone the Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe until the spring of 1944. In other words, the opening of the second front in Western Europe, previously postponed from 1942 till 1943, is now being put off again, this time till the spring of 1944.

Your decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which, straining all its resources, for the past two years, has been engaged against the main forces of Germany and her satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, which is fighting not only for its country, but also for its Allies, to do the job alone,

almost single-handed, against an enemy that is still very strong and formidable.

Need I speak of the disheartening negative impression that this fresh postponement of the second front and the withholding from our Army, which has sacrificed so much, of the anticipated substantial support by the Anglo-American armies, will produce in the Soviet Union—both among the people and in the Army?

As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent course of the war.

No. 93

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PREMIER STALIN**

I wish to reply herewith to your special request in connection with the supply of aluminum.

In July, August and September the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will receive from Canada and the United States the following shipments: (Long tons) Primary aluminum, 5,000 tons per month; Secondary aluminum, 1,000 tons per month.

The secondary aluminum is of a high quality and we use it in the construction of airplanes.

The monthly shipments of primary aluminum which is 1,000 tons over the agreement for 4,000 tons as contained in the Protocol<sup>15</sup> may possibly make it necessary that succeeding shipments after September will have to be cut down in compensation. I hope that this will not be necessary. I regret that due to a shortage of primary aluminum we find it impossible to increase the Protocol Agreement amount. The secondary aluminum is, however, an additional offering. We will inform you again within the next two months regarding the schedule of shipments for October, November and December. We will also try to give you information on shipments for the rest of the protocol year<sup>15</sup> at the same time.

June 16, 1943

No. 94

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PREMIER STALIN**

I have given instructions that you are to receive during the remainder of 1943 the following additional planes over the new Protocol Agreement<sup>28</sup>:

78 B-25 bombers,  
600 P-40-N fighters.

We have no fighters that are more maneuverable than the P-40-N type which was used with excellent results in the recent fighting in Tunisia. This plane proved to be our best protection against dive bombers. It also proved to be highly useful in covering low-level strafing attacks of the P-39's.

We will be in a position to furnish you in November with a shipping schedule covering the last half of the protocol year as we will by that time have again reviewed the aircraft situation.

June 16, 1943

No. 95

*Received on June 20, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

What the Prime Minister cabled you has my full accord. Please be assured that everything possible at this time is being done. I hope you will understand and appreciate that the situation as to shipping is still tight. We are, however, encouraged by the way our anti-submarine campaign has been going during the last two months. It has resulted in a good net gain in available shipping.

This answer is a few days late as I was away when your telegram was received.

No. 96

*Received on June 22, 1943*

**MARSHAL JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE U.S.S.R.**

The Kremlin, Moscow

Two years ago tomorrow by an act of treachery in keeping with the long record of Nazi duplicity the Nazi leaders launched their brutal attack upon the Soviet Union. They thus added to their growing list of enemies the mighty forces of the Soviet Union. These Nazi leaders had underestimated the extent to which the Soviet Government and people had developed and strengthened their military power to defend their country and had utterly failed to realize the determination and valor of the Soviet people during the past two years. The freedom-loving peoples of the world have watched with increasing admiration the history-making exploits of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the almost incredible sacrifices which the Russian people are so heroically making. The growing might of the combined forces of all the United Nations<sup>14</sup> which is being brought increasingly to bear upon our common enemy testifies to the spirit of unity and sacrifice necessary for our ultimate victory. This same spirit will, I am sure, animate us in approaching the challenging tasks of peace, which victory will present to the world.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 97

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

I am sending you the text of my reply to a message from Mr Churchill, with which you are in full accord, as stated in the message delivered to me by Mr Standley on June 20.<sup>29</sup>

June 24, 1943

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your message of June 19 received.

I fully realise the difficulty of organising an Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe, in particular, of transferring troops across the Channel. The difficulty could also be discerned in your communications.

From your messages of last year and this I gained the conviction that you and the President were fully aware of the difficulties of organising such an operation and were preparing the invasion accordingly, with due regard to the difficulties and the necessary exertion of forces and means. Even last year you told me that a large-scale invasion of Europe by Anglo-American troops would be effected in 1943. In the Aide-Memoire handed to V. M. Molotov on June 10, 1942, you wrote:

“Finally, and most important of all, we are concentrating our maximum effort on the organisation and preparation of a large-scale invasion of the Continent of Europe by British and American forces in 1943. We are setting no limit to the scope and objectives of this campaign, which will be carried out in the first instance by over a million men, British and American, with air forces of appropriate strength.”

Early this year you twice informed me, on your own behalf and on behalf of the President, of decisions concerning an Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe intended to “divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front.” You had set yourself the task of bringing Germany to her knees as early as 1943, and named September as the latest date for the invasion.

In your message of January 26<sup>27</sup> you wrote:

“We have been in conference with our military advisers and have decided on the operations which are to be undertaken by the American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We believe that these operations together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943.”

In your next message, which I received on February 12, you wrote, specifying the date of the invasion of Western Europe, decided on by you and the President:



“We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which British and United States units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault-landing craft will be the limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by the weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September.”

Last February, when you wrote to me about those plans and the date for invading Western Europe, the difficulties of that operation were greater than they are now. Since then the Germans have suffered more than one defeat: they were pushed back by our troops in the South, where they suffered appreciable loss; they were beaten in North Africa and expelled by the Anglo-American troops; in submarine warfare, too, the Germans found themselves in a bigger predicament than ever, while Anglo-American superiority increased substantially; it is also known that the Americans and British have won air superiority in Europe and that their navies and mercantile marines have grown in power.

It follows that the conditions for opening a second front in Western Europe during 1943, far from deteriorating, have, indeed, greatly improved.

That being so, the Soviet Government could not have imagined that the British and U.S. Governments would revise the decision to invade Western Europe, which they had adopted early this year. In fact, the Soviet Government was fully entitled to expect that the Anglo-American decision would be carried out, that appropriate preparations were under way and that the second front in Western Europe would at last be opened in 1943.

That is why, when you now write that “it would be no help to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-Channel attack,” all I can do is remind you of the following:

First, your own Aide-Mémoire of June 1942 in which you declared that preparations were under way for an invasion, not by a hundred thousand, but by an Anglo-American force exceeding one million men at the very start of the operation.

Second, your February message, which mentioned extensive measures preparatory to the invasion of Western Europe in August or September 1943, which, apparently, envisaged an operation, not by a hundred thousand men, but by an adequate force.

So when you now declare: “I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet armies,” is it not clear that a statement of this kind in relation to the Soviet

Union is utterly groundless and directly contradicts your previous and responsible decisions, listed above, about extensive and vigorous measures by the British and Americans to organize the invasion this year, measures on which the complete success of the operation should hinge.

I shall not enlarge on the fact that this responsible decision, revoking your previous decisions on the invasion of Western Europe, was reached by you and the President without Soviet participation and without inviting its representatives to the Washington conference, although you cannot but be aware that the Soviet Union's role in the war against Germany and its interest in the problems of the second front are great enough.

You say that you "quite understand" my disappointment. I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in its Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress. One should not forget that it is a question of saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and of reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, compared with which the sacrifices of the Anglo-American armies are insignificant.

June 24, 1943

No. 98

*Sent on June 26, 1943*

**TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Washington

Thank you for your high commendation of the resolve and bravery of the Soviet people and Armed Forces in fighting the Hitler invaders.

As a result of the two years of the Soviet Union's struggle against Hitler Germany and her vassals and of the telling blows delivered by the Allies to the Italo-German armies in North Africa, conditions have been created for the final defeat of our common enemy.

I have no doubt that the sooner we strike from east and west our joint, combined blows at the enemy, the sooner victory will come.

J. STALIN

No. 99

*Received on July 16, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Following the unfortunate sinking of one of your ships in the North Pacific, for which I am deeply sorry, I have directed that every possible precaution be taken in the future.<sup>30</sup>

Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies are making against the German offensive at Kursk.

I hope to hear from you soon about the other matter which I still feel to be of great importance to you and me.

No. 100

**FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Your forces have, during a month of tremendous fighting, by their skill, their courage, their sacrifices and their ceaseless effort, not only stopped the long planned German attack, but have launched a successful counter-offensive of far-reaching import.

Sincere congratulations to the Red Army, the people of the Soviet Union and to yourself upon the great victory of Orel.

The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic achievements.

August 6, 1943

No. 101

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I can answer your latest message—that of July 16—now that I am back from the front. I have no doubt that you are aware of our military position and will appreciate the delay.

Contrary to our expectations, the Germans launched their offensive in July, not in June, and now fighting is in full swing on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet armies have, as you

know, repulsed the July offensive of the Hitlerites, switched to the offensive, taking Orel and Belgorod, and are still pressing the enemy.

It will be readily seen that in the present crucial situation on the Soviet-German front the Soviet Command has to exert great efforts and display the utmost vigilance towards the enemy's activities. For this reason I, too, am compelled to put aside other problems and my other duties, to a certain degree, except my chief duty, that of directing the front. I have to go to the various front sectors more frequently and to subordinate all else to the interests of the front.

I hope you will appreciate that in these circumstances I cannot start on a distant journey and shall unfortunately be unable during the summer and autumn to make good the promise I gave you through Mr Davies.

I am very sorry about this, but circumstances, as you know, are stronger than people, and so we must bow to them.

I consider it highly advisable for responsible representatives of our two countries to meet. In the present military situation the meeting could be held either in Astrakhan or in Archangel. If that does not suit you personally, then you might send a fully authorised man of confidence to one of these two towns. If you accept, we should specify beforehand the range of problems to be discussed at the conference and draft appropriate proposals.

I have already told Mr Davies that I have no objection to Mr Churchill attending the conference and to the bipartite conference being turned into a tripartite one. I still hold this view provided you have no objections.

2. I take this opportunity to congratulate you and the Anglo-American forces on their outstanding success in Sicily, which has led to the fall of Mussolini and his gang.

3. Thank you for congratulating the Red Army and the Soviet people on their success at Orel.

August 8, 1943

No. 102

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL,  
TO MARSHAL J. V. STALIN**

On August 15th the British Ambassador at Madrid reported that General Castellano<sup>31</sup> had arrived from Badoglio with a letter of introduction from the British Minister to the Vatican. The

General declared that he was authorized by Badoglio to say that Italy was willing to surrender unconditionally provided that she could join the Allies. The British representative to the Vatican has since been furnished by Marshal Badoglio with a written statement that he has duly authorized General Castellano. This therefore seems a firm offer.

We are not prepared to enter into any bargain with Badoglio's Government to induce Italy to change sides; on the other hand there are many advantages and a great speeding up of the campaign which might follow therefrom. We shall begin our invasion of the mainland of Italy probably before the end of this month and about a week later we shall make our full-scale thrust at "Avalanche."<sup>32</sup> It is very likely that Badoglio's Government will not last so long. The Germans have one or more armoured divisions outside Rome and once they think that the Badoglio Government is playing them false, they are quite capable of overthrowing it and setting up a Quisling Government of Fascist elements under, for instance, Farinacci. Alternatively, Badoglio may collapse and the whole of Italy pass into disorder.

Such being the situation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> have prepared, and the President and the Prime Minister approved, as a measure of military diplomacy, the following instructions which have been sent to General Eisenhower for action:

"The President and the Prime Minister having approved, the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct you to send at once to Lisbon two Staff Officers; one United States', and one British. They should report upon arrival to the British Ambassador. They should take with them agreed armistice terms which have already been sent to you. Acting on instructions the British Ambassador at Lisbon will have arranged a meeting with General Castellano. Your Staff Officers will be present at this meeting.

At this meeting a communication to General Castellano will be made on the following lines:

(a) The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on the terms stated in the document to be handed to him. (He should then be given the armistice terms for Italy already agreed and previously sent to you. He should be told that these do *not* include the political, economic or financial terms which will be communicated later by other means.)<sup>33</sup>

(b) These terms do not visualize active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war.

The United Nations, however, state without reservation, that wherever Italian troops or Italians fight the Germans, or destroy German property, or hamper German movements, they will be given all possible support by troops of the United Nations. Meanwhile, provided that information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied, Allied bombing will so far as possible be directed on targets which affect the movements and operations of German troops.

(c) Cessation of hostilities between the United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

(*N o t e:* General Eisenhower should make this notification a few hours before Allied troops land in Italy in strength.)

(d) Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the Armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, and to order their troops and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

(*N o t e:* As will be seen from 2(c) above,<sup>34</sup> the Italian Government will be given a few hours' notice.)

(e) Italian Government must, at the hour of Armistice, order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans shall be immediately released.

(f) Italian Government must at the hour of the Armistice order the Italian fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture must be destroyed.

2. General Castellano should be told that meanwhile there is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment but the following are the general lines which should be suggested to him:

(a) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the Germans' knowing.

(b) Minor sabotage throughout the country, particularly of communications and of air fields used by the Germans.

(c) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should be released.

(d) *No* Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all of these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should

*not* be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

(e) *No* merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports south of a line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

(f) Germans must *not* be allowed to take over Italian coast defences.

(g) Instructions to be put into force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast with a view to their being taken off to Italy by the United Nations.

3. A safe channel of communication between General Eisenhower and the Italian headquarters is to be arranged with General Castellano by General Eisenhower's representatives."

(End of General Eisenhower's message.)

To turn to another subject, following on decisions taken at "Trident,"<sup>35</sup> His Majesty's Government entered upon negotiations with Portugal in order to obtain naval and air facilities in a "life-belt."<sup>36</sup> Accordingly His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon invoked the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance which has lasted 600 years unbroken and invited Portugal to grant the said facilities. Dr. Salazar was of course oppressed by the fear of German bombing out of revenge and of possible hostile moves by the Spaniards. We have accordingly furnished him with supplies of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft which are now in transit, and we have also informed Dr. Salazar that should Spain attack Portugal we shall immediately declare war on Spain and render such help as is in our power. We have not however made any precise military convention earmarking particular troops as we do not think either of these contingencies probable. Dr. Salazar has now consented to the use of a "life-belt" by the British with Portuguese collaboration in the early part of October. As soon as we are established there and he is relieved from his anxieties we shall press for extensions of these facilities to United States ships and aircraft.

The possession of the "life-belt" is of great importance to the sea war. The U-boats have quitted the North Atlantic where convoys have been running without loss since the middle of May and have concentrated on the southern route. The use of the "life-belt" will be of the utmost help in attacks on them from the air. Besides this there is the ferrying of United States

heavy bombers to Europe and Africa which is also most desirable. All the above is of most especially secret operational character.

August 19th, 1943

No. 103

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL**

Mr Churchill and I are here,<sup>37</sup> accompanied by our staffs, and will confer for a period of perhaps ten days. We are very desirous of emphasizing to you again the importance of our all three meeting. We at the same time entirely understand the strong reasons which cause you to be near the fronts of battle, fronts where your personal presence has been so fruitful of victory.

Neither Astrakhan nor Archangel are suitable, in our opinion. We are quite prepared, however, to go with appropriate officers to Fairbanks, Alaska. There, we may survey the entire picture, in common with you.

We are now at a crucial point in the war, a time presenting a unique chance for a rendezvous. Both Mr Churchill and I earnestly hope you will give this opportunity your consideration once more.

If we are unable to agree on this very essential meeting between our three governmental heads, Churchill and I agree with you that we should in the near future arrange a meeting of foreign office level representatives. Final decisions must, of course, be left to our respective Governments, so such a meeting would be of an exploratory character.

In 38 days General Eisenhower and General Alexander have accomplished the conquest of Sicily.

The Axis defenders amounted to a total of 405,000 men: 315,000 Italians and 90,000 Germans. We attacked with 13 American and British divisions, suffering approximately 18,000 casualties (killed and wounded). The Axis forces lost 30,000 dead and wounded: 23,000 Germans and 7,000 Italians, collected and counted. There were 130,000 prisoners.

Italian forces on Sicily have been wiped out, with the exception of some few who took to the countryside in plain clothes. There is a tremendous amount of booty, guns and planes and munitions of all sorts lying about everywhere, including more than 1,000 airplanes captured on the various air fields.



As you have been informed previously, we will soon make a powerful attack on the mainland of Italy.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

August 19, 1943

No. 104

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

I have received your message on the negotiations with the Italians and on the new armistice terms for Italy. Thank you for the information.

Mr Eden advised Sobolev that Moscow had been kept fully informed of the negotiations with Italy. I must say, however, that Mr Eden's statement is at variance with the facts, for I received your message with large omissions and without the closing paragraphs.<sup>38</sup> It should be said, therefore, that the Soviet Government has not been kept informed of the Anglo-American negotiations with the Italians. Mr Kerr assures me that he will shortly receive the full text of your message, but three days have passed and Ambassador Kerr has yet to give it to me. I cannot understand how this delay could have come about in transmitting information on so important a matter.

2. I think the time is ripe for us to set up a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries—the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.—for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various Governments falling away from Germany. To date it has been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the U.S.S.R. is informed of the agreement between the two Powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer. I propose setting up the commission and making Sicily its seat for the time being.

3. I am looking forward to receiving the full text of your message on the negotiations with Italy.

August 22, 1943

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL,  
AND THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT**

Your joint message of August 19 has reached me.

I fully share your opinion and that of Mr Roosevelt concerning the importance of a meeting between the three of us. At the same time I earnestly request you to appreciate my position at a moment when our armies are exerting themselves to the utmost against the main forces of Hitler and when Hitler, far from having withdrawn a single division from our front, has already moved, and keeps moving, fresh divisions to the Soviet-German front. At a moment like this I cannot, in the opinion of all my colleagues, leave the front without injury to our military operations to go to so distant a point as Fairbanks, even though, had the situation on our front been different, Fairbanks would doubtless have been a perfectly suitable place for our meeting, as I indeed thought before.

As to a meeting between representatives of our states, and perhaps representatives in charge of foreign affairs, I share your view of the advisability of such a meeting in the near future. However, the meeting should not be restricted to the narrow bounds of investigation, but should concern itself with practical preparations so that after the conference our Governments might take specific decisions and thus avoid delay in reaching decisions on urgent matters.

Hence I think I must revert to my proposal for fixing beforehand the range of problems to be discussed by the representatives of the three states and drafting the proposals they will have to discuss and submit to our Governments for final decision.

2. Yesterday we received from Mr Kerr the addenda and corrections to the joint message in which you and Mr Roosevelt informed me of the instructions sent to General Eisenhower in connection with the surrender terms worked out for Italy during the discussions with General Castellano.<sup>31</sup> I and my colleagues believe that the instructions given to General Eisenhower follow entirely from the thesis on Italy's unconditional surrender and hence cannot give rise to any objections.

Still, I consider the information received so far insufficient for judging the steps that the Allies should take in the negotiations with Italy. This circumstance confirms the necessity of Soviet participation in reaching a decision in the course of the

negotiations. I consider it timely, therefore, to set up the military-political commission representing the three countries, of which I wrote to you on August 22.

August 24, 1943

No. 106

*Received on August 26, 1943*

**F. ROOSEVELT AND W. CHURCHILL  
TO J. V. STALIN\***

The following is the decision as to the military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944 which we have arrived at in our conference at Quebec just concluded. We shall continue the bomber offensive against Germany from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy on a rapidly increasing scale. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the air combat strength of Germany, to dislocate her military, economic and industrial system and to prepare the way for an invasion across the Channel. A large-scale building-up of American forces in the United Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an assemblage force of American and British divisions for operations across the Channel. Once a bridgehead on the Continent has been secured it will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions a month. This operation will be the primary American and British air and ground effort against the Axis. The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. In that area our objectives will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance and the occupation of Italy, as well as of Corsica and Sardinia, as bases for operations against Germany. In the Balkans operations will be limited to the supply by air and sea transport of the Balkan guerrillas, minor commando raids and the bombarding of strategic objectives. In the Pacific and in South-east Asia we shall accelerate our operations against Japan. Our purposes are to exhaust the air, naval and shipping resources of Japan, to cut her communications and to secure bases from which Japan proper may be bombed.

No. 107

*Received on August 29, 1943*

**FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

*(Retranslated)*

We are just examining your proposals and are almost certain that plans satisfactory to all of us can be made both for a meeting of representatives of the Foreign Ministries and for setting up a tripartite commission. The Prime Minister and I meet again early next week and shall communicate with you again by cable.

No. 108

*Received on September 4, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

General Charlie<sup>31</sup> has stated that the Italians accept and he is coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this statement refers to the short military terms, which have been seen by you, or to the more complete and comprehensive terms which your readiness to sign has been specifically indicated.<sup>39</sup>

The military situation there is both critical and hopeful. The mainland invasion begins almost immediately while the heavy blow called "Avalanche"<sup>32</sup> will be delivered in the next week or so. The difficulties of the Italian Government and people in escaping from the clutches of Hitler may make a still more daring move necessary, and for this General Eisenhower will require as much Italian help as he can get. The acceptance of the terms by the Italians is largely supported by the fact that we shall send an air-borne division to Rome to help them hold off the Germans who have gathered Panzer strength near there and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling administration probably headed by Farinacci. We think, since matters are moving so fast there, that General Eisenhower should have discretion not to delay settlement with the Italians because of differences between the long and the short terms. The short terms, it is clear, are included in the long terms, that

they are based on unconditional surrender, and that clause ten of the short terms<sup>40</sup> places the interpretation in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

We are assuming, therefore, that you expect General Eisenhower to sign the short terms in your behalf, if that be necessary, to avoid the further journeying of General Charlie to Rome and the consequent delay and uncertainty affecting military operations.

We are, of course, anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States and Britain. The date of the surrender announcement must, of course, be fitted in with the military coup.

CHURCHILL  
ROOSEVELT

No. 109

*Received on September 6, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM  
THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Both the Prime Minister and myself are pleased with the idea of a political and military meeting on the State Department level.

It should be held, I think, as soon as possible. Perhaps September 25 would be a good date. What do you think of this?

The Prime Minister has suggested London or some other place in England, and I should agree to have my representative go to either of these if you also think it best. I am inclined, however, to the thought of a more remote spot where the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. Perhaps Casablanca or Tunis, and I do not object to Sicily, except that the communications from and to there are more troublesome.

The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments as I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, although I do not want to have the meeting develop at this stage into a full-scale combined chiefs' conference.

If Mr Molotov and Mr Eden attend I should wish to send Mr Hull but I do not want Mr Hull to undertake such a long journey, so I would, therefore, send Mr Welles, the Under Secretary

of State. Mr Harriman would also attend as he has an excellent knowledge of shipping and commercial matters. I shall endeavor to send someone from my staff as American military adviser. He would be in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.<sup>24</sup>

May I congratulate you again on the tenacity and drive of your armies. It is magnificent.

While this coming conference is a very good thing, I still have the hope that you and Mr Churchill and myself can meet as soon as possible. I, personally, could arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November 15 and December 15. You will understand, I know, that I cannot be away for more than 20 days from Washington as, under our constitution, no one can sign for me while I am absent.

Why not send an officer to General Eisenhower's headquarters in connection with the commission to sit in Sicily on further settlements with the Italians? He would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject.

There is no objection as far as I am concerned to adding a French member to this commission, as we are now in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. It would, however, be very unwise to let the French take part in the discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with the terms of surrender, which they have already signed, I hope they will wholeheartedly support the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians dislike the French greatly, and if we bring the French into occupation discussions, the civil and military elements in Italy will resent it extremely.

The problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs can be discussed later on.

ROOSEVELT

No. 110

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT,  
Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL**

I have received your message of September 4. The question which you ask me, namely, whether the Soviet Government would agree to General Eisenhower signing on its behalf the

short armistice terms for Italy, should be considered as having been answered in the letter which V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Mr Kerr, the British Ambassador, on September 2. The letter said that the powers which the Soviet Government entrusted to General Eisenhower also extended to his signing the short armistice terms.

September 7, 1943

No. 111

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT**

I received on September 6 your message dealing with a number of important subjects.

I still think that the most pressing problem is to set up a three-Power military-political commission, with headquarters in Sicily, or in Algiers to begin with. The despatch of a Soviet officer to Gen. Eisenhower's headquarters can in no way replace the military-political commission, which is required to direct on the spot negotiations with Italy and with the Governments of other countries falling away from Germany. Much time has passed without things making the slightest headway.

As to French participation in the commission, I have already stated my opinion.<sup>41</sup> However, if you have any doubts we can naturally discuss the matter after the three-Power commission is set up.

2. The time suggested by the Prime Minister for the meeting of our three representatives—early October—would be suitable; as to the place, I suggest Moscow. By that time the three Governments could agree on the range of subjects to be discussed, as well as on proposals relating to those problems, otherwise the conference will not yield the results which our Governments want.

3. As regards a personal meeting between us with Mr Churchill participating, I, too, desire this as early as possible. The date suggested by you is acceptable to me. It would be advisable to select a country where all the three countries are represented, such as Iran. I should add, however, that we shall yet have to specify the date of meeting with due regard to the situation on the Soviet-German front, where more than 500 divisions are engaged on both sides and where supervision by the Supreme Command of the U.S.S.R. is required almost daily.

4. Thank you for your congratulations on the successes of the Soviet armies. I take the occasion to congratulate you and the Anglo-American forces on their latest brilliant successes in Italy.

September 8, 1943

No. 112

*Received on September 10, 1943*

**F. ROOSEVELT AND W. CHURCHILL  
TO J. V. STALIN\***

We are pleased to tell you that General Eisenhower has accepted the unconditional surrender of Italy, terms of which were approved by the United States, the Soviet Republics and the United Kingdom.

Allied troops have landed near Naples and are now in contact with German forces. Allied troops are also making good progress in the southern end of the Italian peninsula.

No. 113

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr CHURCHILL**

I have received your message of September 10. I congratulate you on your latest success, particularly the landing in the Naples area. There can be no doubt that the landing in the Naples area and Italy's break with Germany will be yet another blow to Hitler Germany and considerably facilitate the Soviet armies' operations on the Soviet-German front.

So far the offensive of the Soviet troops is making good progress. I think we shall have further success in the next two or three weeks. It may be that we shall take Novorossiisk in a day or two.

September 10, 1943



*Received on September 11, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I thank you for your message received today.

I agree on the immediate setting up of the military-political commission, but think that Algiers would be better than Sicily if only because of communications and, therefore, suggest they meet in Algiers on Tuesday, 21 September. Full information will be given, of course, in regard to the progress of current and future negotiations, but they should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their governments before final action.

I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all their deliberations be fully maintained.

Regarding the meeting of our three representatives, I will cheerfully agree that the place of meeting be Moscow and the date the beginning of October—say Monday, the fourth. I will send you in two or three days a suggested informal list of subjects to be discussed, but I think the three members should feel free, after becoming acquainted with each other, to discuss any other matters which may come up.

I am delighted with your willingness to go along with the third suggestion, and the time about the end of November is all right. I fully understand that military events might alter the situation for you or for Mr Churchill or myself. Meanwhile, we can go ahead on that basis. Personally, my only hesitation is the place, but only because it is a bit further away from Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at that time and, under our constitution, I must act on legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents and return them to the Congress within ten days, and Tehran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is bad. If the Azores route is not available, it means coming by way of Brazil and across the South Atlantic Ocean. For these reasons I hope that you will consider some part of Egypt, which is also a neutral state, and where every arrangement can be made for our convenience.

I really feel that the three of us are making real headway.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

I have received your messages of September 10.<sup>42</sup>

Basically, the point about the military-political commission can be regarded as settled. We have appointed as the Soviet Ambassador A. Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, whom you know. A. Y. Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in London, has been appointed his deputy. In addition, we are sending a group of responsible military and political experts and a small technical staff.

I think that the date September 25-30 should be fixed for the military-political commission getting down to work. I have nothing against the commission functioning in Algiers for a start and later deciding whether it should move to Sicily or elsewhere in Italy.

The Prime Ministers' considerations regarding the functions of the commission are correct in my view, but I think that later, taking into account the initial experience of the commission, we shall be able to specify its functions in respect of both Italy and other countries.

2. Concerning the meeting of our three representatives I suggest that we consider it agreed that Moscow be the place, and the date, October 4, as suggested by the President.

As stated in previous messages, I still believe that for the conference to be a success it is essential to know in advance the proposals that the British and U.S. Governments intend to submit to it. I do not, however, suggest any restrictions as far as the agenda is concerned.

3. As regards the meeting of the three heads of the Governments, I have no objection to Tehran, which, I think, is a more suitable place than Egypt where the Soviet Union is not yet represented.

September 12, 1943

No. 116

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the meeting of the foreign ministers, but on further consideration I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the meeting with Mr Molotov and Mr Eden.

Mr Hull would find the long flight to Moscow extremely difficult for physical reasons. Would it be possible, therefore, for the conference to be held in England. It would, I believe, be a great advantage to all of us if Mr Hull could personally attend the conference.

I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change. Could the date be made October 15 for the opening session.

September 27, 1943

No. 117

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

Your message of September 27 reached me today.

I agree on the desirability of the Secretary of State, Mr Hull, being present at the forthcoming conference of the representatives of the three Governments.

At the same time I must call your attention to the great difficulties we should encounter if the agreed decision to hold the conference in Moscow were revised. If the conference were convened, not in Moscow, but in Britain, as you now suggest, V. M. Molotov, who I think should attend the three-Power conference as the representative of the Soviet Government, would be unable to get there in time. Molotov will not be able to leave the U.S.S.R.—at least in the immediate future—because A. Y. Vyshinsky, who is his first deputy in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, is expected, as you know, to leave for Algiers shortly.

Moreover, as you are aware, the U.S. and British press has been announcing for a long time that the forthcoming meeting will be held in Moscow, and a change of place might give rise to undesirable comments.

I have no objection to October 15 as the date of meeting. Presumably by that time the three Governments will have reached final agreement on the conference agenda.

September 28, 1943

No. 118

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The Prime Minister of Great Britain and I have agreed with a recommendation of General Eisenhower that the long-term surrender document, after it is signed by the Italian Government, should be retained in a confidential status and not published at the present time.

September 28, 1943

No. 119

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean area, Eisenhower, has recommended the following changes in the "Instrument of Surrender of Italy."<sup>43</sup>

Change the title to "Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy.

Change the last sentence of the preamble to read "and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government."

Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in Paragraph One.

General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress in defeating the German forces in Italy in that it will help to align the Italian army, navy and civil population on our side.

Eisenhower urgently requests that pending a decision on these recommendations, secrecy in regard to the terms of the surrender document is "absolutely vital to our success in Italy."

I hope that these recommendations of General Eisenhower will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage to us.

Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date.

October 1, 1943

No. 120

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

I have no objection to you and the British Prime Minister having approved General Eisenhower's suggestion that the long-term surrender document be kept secret after the Italian Government has signed it and not published for the time being.

October 2, 1943

No. 121

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your wire has reached me and our delegation will be in Moscow on October 15th. While I do not consider this conference as one to plan or recommend military strategy, I have no objection to and would welcome the widest exchange of views of your proposal relating to an expedition directed against France.<sup>44</sup>

General Deane, who is to be a member of our mission, will be informed fully of our plans and intentions.

That this is a three-Power conference and that any discussion on our proposal should be limited to the future intentions and plans of these three Powers exclusively is agreeable to me. This would, of course, in no way preclude a wider participation at some later date and under circumstances which would be mutually acceptable to our three Governments.

I am sure that we are going to find a meeting of minds for the important decisions which must finally be made by us. And so this preliminary conference will explore the ground, and if difficulties develop at the meeting of our Foreign Ministers, I would still have every hope that they can be reconciled when you and Mr Churchill and I meet.

It appears that the American and British armies should enter Rome in another few weeks.

October 4, 1943

No. 122

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I received your message of October 1 only today, October 5. I have no objection to the changes you suggest making in the "Instrument of Surrender of Italy."

October 5, 1943

No. 123

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

Your message of October 4 received.

Regarding military matters, that is, Anglo-American measures to shorten the war, you already know the Soviet Government's point of view from my previous message.<sup>44</sup> It is still my hope that in this respect a preliminary three-Power conference will be useful and clear the ground for further important decisions.

If I have understood you aright, the Moscow conference will confine itself to discussing matters bearing on our three countries only, hence we can take it as agreed that a four-Power declaration is not to be on the agenda.

Our representatives should do their best to overcome the difficulties that may arise in their responsible work. As to decisions, they can, of course, only be taken by our Governments—I hope when you, Mr Churchill and myself meet in person.

I wish the U.S. and British armies successful fulfilment of their mission and entry into Rome, which will be another blow to Mussolini and Hitler.

October 14, 1943

No. 124

*Received on October 13, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

War will be declared on Germany on October 13 by Badoglio. Allied forces have secured air and naval facilities in the Azores. This move is based on old treaty relationships.

October 12, 1943

No. 125

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

Your message of October 13 received. Thank you for the news. All success to the armed forces of the United States of America and Great Britain.

October 14, 1943

No. 126

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The Secretary of State and his staff are well on their way to Moscow but it seems doubtful if they can get there before the 17th. I will let you know of their progress.

I am very much disturbed in regard to the location of the other meeting, but I will send you this problem in another message.

October 14, 1943

**PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel that I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountain—first east-bound and then west-bound—is insurmountable. We know from experience that planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days.

I do not think that any one of us will need legation facilities as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations.

In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated. Asmara, the former Italian capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field—good at all times.

Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you, we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front.

Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering.

In any event I think the press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way. What would you think of November 20th or November 25th as the date of the meeting.

I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have for on them depend the hopes of the future world.

Your continuous initiative along your whole front heartens all of us.

October 14, 1943



No. 128

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your two messages of October 14.

Thank you for the news about the Secretary of State and his staff who are on their way. I hope they will soon arrive safely in Moscow.

As regards the subject raised in your second message, I shall send you a reply after I have conferred with my Government colleagues.

October 17, 1943

No. 129

**SECRET AND PERSONAL TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

In view of Mr Molotov's note to the United States Chargé d'Affaires of October 14,<sup>45</sup> and in order that there may be no misunderstanding with regard to representation on the Political-Military Commission, I think I should make clear that, as indicated in my telegram to you of September 5, I feel that French representation should be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy in which the three Governments establishing the Commission decide that France has a direct interest.

I feel that in this regard French representation should correspond to that which I suggested in my message of October 13<sup>46</sup> should be accorded to the Governments of China, Brazil, Greece and Yugoslavia, or to any other Governments which may by mutual agreement be invited to participate.

It was never my intention that the French Committee of National Liberation should function on the same plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States or enter into its deliberations on all subjects.

October 17, 1943

No. 130

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

With regard to the place for the meeting of the three heads of the Governments I should like to inform you of the following.

I am afraid I cannot accept as suitable any one of the places suggested by you as against Tehran. It is not a matter of security, for that does not worry me.

In the course of the Soviet troops' operations in the summer and autumn of this year it became evident that our forces would be able to continue their offensive operations against the German Army and that the summer campaign would thus continue into winter. My colleagues hold that the operations necessitate day-to-day guidance by the Supreme Command and my personal contact with the Command. In Tehran, unlike the other places, these requirements can be met by communicating directly with Moscow by telegraph or telephone. For this reason my colleagues insist on Tehran.

I agree that the press should be barred. I also accept your proposal for fixing November 20 or 25 as possible dates for the meeting.

Mr Hull has arrived safely in Moscow, and I hope his attendance at the Moscow three-Power conference<sup>47</sup> will be very useful.

October 19, 1943

No. 131

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your message of October 17 received. I have nothing against your suggestion for the powers to be accorded the French representatives on the Allied military-political commission.

October 21, 1943

*Received on October 25, 1943*<sup>48</sup>

## PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN

Your message in regard to our meeting was received today (October 21). I am deeply disappointed.

Your reason for needing daily guidance from and your personal contact with the Supreme Command, which is causing such outstanding results, is fully appreciated by me. Please accept my assurance on that.

All this is of high importance, and I wish you would realize that there are other vital matters which, in our constitutional American Government, are my fixed obligations. These I cannot change. Under our constitution legislation must be acted on by the President within ten days after such legislation has been passed. In other words, the President must receive and return to Congress physical documents, with his written approval or veto, within this period. As I have told you previously, I cannot do this by cable or radio.

The difficulty with Tehran is this simple fact. The over-the-mountain approach to that city often makes flying impossible for some days at a time. This risk of delay is double, both for the plane delivering documents from Washington and for the one returning these documents to Congress. I regret to say that, as the head of the nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where it is impossible to fulfill my obligations under our constitution.

The flying risks for documents up to and including the low country as far as the Gulf of Persia can be assumed by me through a relay system of planes. I cannot assume, however, the delays suffered by flights over the mountains in both directions into the saucer where Tehran lies. With much regret, therefore, I must tell you that I cannot go to Tehran. My cabinet members and legislative leaders are in complete agreement on this.

One last practical suggestion, however, can be made. Let all three of us go to Basra where we shall be perfectly protected in three camps, established and guarded by our respective troops. You can have easily, as you know, a special telephone, controlled by you, laid from Basra to Tehran where it would connect with your own line into Russia. All your needs should be met by such a wire service, and by plane you will only be a little further off from Russia than at Tehran itself.

I do not consider in any way the fact that from United States territory I would have to travel to within six hundred miles from Russian territory.

I must carry on a constitutional government more than one hundred and fifty years old. Were it not for this fact I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you.

Your obligation to your people to carry on the defeat of our common enemy is great, but I am begging you not to forget my great obligation to the American Government and toward maintenance of the all-out United States war effort.

I look upon our three meetings as of the greatest possible importance; this not only as regards our people of today, but also in the light of a peaceful world for generations to come. This I have told you before.

Future generations would look upon it as a tragedy if a few hundred miles caused yourself, Mr Churchill and me to fail.

I say again that I would go to Tehran gladly if limitations over which I have no control did not prevent me.

Because of your communications problem, may I suggest Basra.

If this does not appeal to you, may I hope deeply you will think again of Bagdad or Asmara, or even Ankara. I think the latter place is worth considering. It is in neutral territory. The Turks might think well of the idea of being hosts. Of course, this has not been mentioned by me to them or to anyone else.

Please do not fail me in this crisis.

ROOSEVELT

No. 133

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

Mr Hull delivered your latest message to me on October 25, and I discussed it with him. I did not reply at once, being certain that Mr Hull had informed you of our talk and of my considerations as to the meeting with you and Mr Churchill.

I cannot but take into account the circumstances which you say prevent you from going to Tehran. It is for you alone, of course, to decide whether you can go there.

As far as I am concerned, there is no city more suitable than the one mentioned.

I have been entrusted with the Supreme Command of the Soviet forces, which obliges me to direct military operations day in and day out. This is particularly essential now, when the continuous four-month summer campaign is developing into a winter campaign and when military operations are getting under way practically along the entire 2,600-kilometre front. In this situation I, as Supreme Commander, cannot possibly go any farther than Tehran. My Government colleagues tend to the view that at present I cannot leave the U.S.S.R. at all in view of the exceedingly complicated situation at the front.

That accounts for the idea which has occurred to me and which I have already mentioned to Mr Hull. I could be fully replaced at that meeting by my First Deputy in the Government, V. M. Molotov, who during the discussions will enjoy, in keeping with our Constitution, the rights of head of the Soviet Government. In that case the difficulties of choosing a place would disappear. I hope this suggestion will at the moment be found suitable.

November 5, 1943

No. 134

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Your Ambassador, Mr Gromyko, was good enough to deliver to me your message of November 5th and I thank you for it.

I hope in a few days to leave here and to arrive in Cairo by November 22nd.

You will be glad to know that I have worked out a method whereby, if I receive word that there has been passed by the Congress and forwarded to me a bill requiring my veto, I will fly to Tunis to meet it and then return to the Conference.

I have therefore decided to go to Tehran and this makes me especially happy.

As I have told you, I regard it as of vital importance that you and Mr Churchill and I should meet. Even if our meeting lasted only two days, the psychology of the present feeling really demands it. It is my thought, therefore, that the staffs begin their work on November 22nd in Cairo, and I hope Mr Molotov and your military representative will come to Cairo at that time.

We can then all go to Tehran on November 26th and meet with you there on the 27th, 28th, or 30th, for as long as you feel you can be away. Churchill and I and the top staff people can then return to Cairo to complete the details.

The whole world is watching for this meeting of the three of us and the fact that you and Churchill and I have got to know each other personally will have far-reaching effect on the good opinion within our three nations and will assist in the further disturbance of Nazi morale even if we make no announcements as vital as those announced at the recent highly successful meeting in Moscow.

I am looking forward with keen anticipation to a good talk with you.

ROOSEVELT

November 8, 1943

No. 135

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of yours of November 8. Thank you for your reply.

I agree with your plan for our meeting in Iran and hope Mr Churchill will do likewise.

V. M. Molotov and our military representative will arrive in Cairo on November 22, and there work out with you everything about our meeting in Iran.

November 10, 1943

No. 136

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

It now turns out that reasons of a serious nature will prevent V. M. Molotov from reaching Cairo on November 22. He will accompany me to Iran towards the end of the month. I am simultaneously advising Mr Churchill of this, as you will be informed.

P.S. Despatch of this message was, unfortunately, held up through the fault of some members of the staff, but I hope it will arrive in time just the same.

November 12, 1943

No. 137

*Sent on November 13, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I feel that I must inform you that today I sent a message to Mr Churchill which reads as follows:

“Today I received two messages from you.

“Although I had written to the President that V. M. Molotov would arrive in Cairo on November 22, I must say that, owing to reasons of a serious nature, Molotov will not, unfortunately, be able to go to Cairo. He will travel with me to Tehran towards the end of November. A number of military officers will also accompany me.

“It goes without saying that the Tehran meeting should involve only the three heads of the Governments as agreed. Participation of representatives of any other Powers should be absolutely ruled out.

“I wish you success in your conference with the Chinese on Far Eastern affairs.

“November 12, 1943.”

No. 138

*Received on November 13, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Your telegram of November 10th and the definite prospect of our meeting makes me, of course, very happy. I shall be very glad to see Mr Molotov in Cairo on November 22nd.

I am just departing for North Africa.

Warm regards.

No. 139

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I am sincerely happy about the fine continuance of your gains. I have just landed. I am sorry about Mr Molotov and hope he is all well again. I will be glad to see him with you in Tehran. Let me know when you expect to get there. I will be in Cairo from tomorrow on and Mr Churchill will be nearby.

November 20, 1943

No. 140

*Received on November 24, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

This morning I arrived in Cairo and have begun discussions with the Prime Minister. By the end of the week, conference will follow with the Generalissimo<sup>49</sup> after which he will return to China. Then the Prime Minister and myself accompanied by our senior staffs can proceed to Tehran to meet you, Mr Molotov and your staff officers. I could arrive the afternoon of November 29 if it meets with your convenience. I am prepared to remain for two to four days depending upon how long you can stay away from your compelling responsibilities. If you would telegraph me what day you wish to set for the meeting and how long you could stay I would be very grateful. I would appreciate your keeping me informed of your plans as I realize bad weather often causes delays in travel from Moscow to Tehran at this time of the year.

I understand that your Embassy and the British Embassy in Tehran are placed close together whereas my Legation is some distance away. I am informed that all three of us would be incurring unnecessary risks while driving to and from our meetings if we were staying too far apart.

Where do you think we should live?

It is with keen anticipation that I look forward to our conversations.



No. 141

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

Your Cairo message has reached me. I shall be at your service in Tehran on November 28 in the evening.

November 25, 1943

No. 142

*Received on November 27, 1943*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I thank you very much for your message of November 23 telling me of your intention to arrive at Tehran on the 28th or 29th of November.<sup>50</sup>

As for myself, I hope to get there on the 27th. It will be good to see you.

No. 143

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

**PROPOSALS PRESENTED  
BY UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE<sup>47</sup>**

During the recent Moscow Conference the United States Delegation proposed that air bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which United States aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired and rearmed in connection with shuttle bombing from the United Kingdom. It was also proposed that a more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented and that both signal and air communication between our two countries be improved.

It was my understanding that the U.S.S.R. agreed to these proposals in principle and that appropriate Soviet authorities would be given instructions to meet with my Military Mission

for the purpose of considering concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out the proposals.

I hope that it will be possible to work out these arrangements promptly.

No. 144

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

**ADVANCE PLANNING FOR AIR OPERATIONS  
IN NORTH-WESTERN PACIFIC**

With a view of shortening the war, it is our opinion that the bombing of Japan from your Maritime Provinces, immediately following the beginning of hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, will be of the utmost importance, as it will enable us to destroy Japanese military and industrial centers.

If agreeable, would you arrange for my Military Mission in Moscow to be given the necessary information covering airports housing, supplies, communications, and weather in the Maritime Provinces and the route thereto from Alaska. Our objective is to base the maximum bomber force possible, anywhere from 100 to 1,000 four-engine bombers, with their maintenance and operating crews in that area, the number to depend upon facilities available.

It is of the utmost importance that planning to this end should be started at once. I realize that the physical surveys by our people should be limited at this time to a very few individuals and accomplished with the utmost secrecy. We would of course meet any conditions you might prescribe in this regard.

If the above arrangements are worked out now, I am convinced that the time of employment of our bombers against Japan will be materially advanced.

November 29, 1943<sup>51</sup>

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

**ADVANCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS  
IN NORTH-WESTERN PACIFIC**

I would like to arrange with you at this time for the exchange of information and for such preliminary planning as may be appropriate under the present conditions for eventual operations against Japan when Germany has been eliminated from the war. The more of this preliminary planning that can be done, without undue jeopardy to the situation, the sooner the war as a whole can be brought to a conclusion.

Specifically, I have in mind the following items:

a. We would be glad to receive combat intelligence information concerning Japan.

b. Considering that the ports for your Far Eastern submarine and destroyer force might be threatened seriously by land or air attack, do you feel it desirable that the United States should expand base facilities sufficiently to provide for these forces in U.S. bases?

c. What direct or indirect assistance would you be able to give in the event of a U.S. attack against the Northern Kuriles?

d. Could you indicate what ports, if any, our forces could use, and could you furnish data on these ports in regard to their naval use as well as port capacities for despatch of cargo?

These questions can be discussed as you may find appropriate with our Military Mission in Moscow, similar to the procedure suggested for plans regarding air operations.

November 29, 1943<sup>51</sup>

**TO MARSHAL JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
PREMIER OF THE U.S.S.R.**

Moscow, Russia

Dear Marshal Stalin,

The weather conditions were ideal for crossing the mountains the day of our departure from Tehran so that we had an easy and comfortable flight to Cairo. I hasten to send you my personal thanks for your thoughtfulness and hospitality in pro-

viding living quarters for me in your Embassy at Tehran. I was not only extremely comfortable there but I am very conscious of how much more we were able to accomplish in a brief period of time because we were such close neighbors throughout our stay.

I view those momentous days of our meeting with the greatest satisfaction as being an important milestone in the progress of human affairs. I thank you and the members of your staff and household for the many kindnesses to me and to the members of my staff.

I am just starting home and will visit my troops in Italy on the way.

Cordially yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

December 3, 1943

No. 147

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The destination of our party has been reached in safety and all of us earnestly hope that by this time you also have arrived safely. I consider the conference to have been a great success, and it was an historic event, I feel sure, in the assurance not only of our ability to wage war together but also to work for the peace to come in utmost harmony. Our personal talks together were enjoyed very much by me, and particularly the opportunity of meeting with you face to face. I look forward to seeing you again sometime, and, until that time, I wish the greatest success to you and your armies.

December 4, 1943

No. 148

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
FROM PREMIER STALIN**

Thank you for your telegram.

I agree that the Tehran Conference was a great success and that our personal meetings were of great importance in many

respects. I hope the common enemy of our peoples—Hitler Germany—will soon feel this. Now there is certainty that our peoples will cooperate harmoniously, both at present and after the war

I wish you and your armed forces the best of success in the coming momentous operations.

I also hope that our meeting in Tehran will not be the last and that we shall meet again.

December 6, 1943

No. 149

*Received on December 7, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

It has been decided to appoint General Eisenhower immediately to the command of cross-Channel operations.

No. 150

*Received on December 7, 1943*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

In the Conference just concluded in Cairo we have reached the following decisions regarding the conduct of the war against Germany in 1944 in addition to the agreements arrived at by the three of us at Tehran.

With the purpose of dislocating the German military, economic and industrial system, destroying the German air combat strength, and paving the way for an operation across the Channel the highest strategic priority will be given to the bomber offensive against Germany.

The operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal has been reduced in scale in order to permit the reinforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.

We have directed the greatest effort be made to increase the production of landing craft in the United States and Great Brit-

ain to provide reinforcement of cross-Channel operations. The diversion from the Pacific of certain landing craft has been ordered for the same purpose.

**No. 151**

**SECRET AND PERSONAL TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL  
FROM PREMIER STALIN**

Thank you for your joint message informing me of the additional decisions on waging the war against Germany in 1944. Best regards.

December 10, 1943

**No. 152**

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
FROM PREMIER STALIN**

I have received your message about the appointment of General Eisenhower. I welcome it. I wish him success in preparing and carrying out the forthcoming decisive operations.

December 10, 1943

**No. 153**

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
FROM PREMIER STALIN**

Thank you for your letter, which reached me through your Ambassador on December 18.<sup>52</sup>

I am glad that chance enabled me to render you a service in Tehran. I, too, attach great importance to our meeting and to the talks we had on the vital problem of accelerating our common victory and establishing lasting peace among the nations.

December 20, 1943

No. 154

**MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT**

I am glad to learn from the press that your health is improving. I send you best regards and, more important, wish you speedy and complete recovery.

January 4, 1944

No. 155

*Received on January 23, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL**

**MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL  
AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

With regard to the handing over to Soviet Russia of the Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow Conference<sup>47</sup> and agreed to with you by us both at Tehran, we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum, we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance.

Nevertheless if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Marshal Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to the Italian naval forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with the Italian naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that the Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied ports where they would be collected by Russian crews, who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones open where any refitting necessary would be undertaken.

We are, however, very conscious of the dangers of the above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have

therefore decided to propose the following alternative, which from the military point of view has many advantages.

The British battleship *Royal Sovereign* has recently completed refitting in the United States. She is fitted with radar for all types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser available at approximately the same time.

His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions.

These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to Soviet Russia and would fly the Soviet flag until, without prejudice to military operations, the Italian vessels can be made available.

His Majesty's Government and the United States Government will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can be obtained without prejudice to the projected essential operations "Overlord"<sup>53</sup> and "Anvil."<sup>54</sup>

This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of the vessels at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus, if our efforts should take a favourable turn with the Turks, and the Straits become open, these vessels would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative, which we think is in every way superior to the first proposal.

CHURCHILL  
ROOSEVELT

No. 156

*Received on January 23, 1944*

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL**

**MESSAGE FROM  
Mr CHURCHILL AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Our immediately preceding telegram.

Our Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> have made the following positive recommendation with supporting data:

(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer



of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

(b) To impose the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations and would interfere with their assistance now being given by Italian repair facilities. It might cause scuttling of Italian warships and result in the loss of Italian cooperation, thus jeopardizing "Overlord"<sup>53</sup> and "Anvil."<sup>54</sup>

(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation of the delivery of the Italian vessels may proceed.

CHURCHILL  
ROOSEVELT

No. 157

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL**

The joint messages signed by you, Mr President, and you, Mr Prime Minister, concerning the transfer of Italian vessels to the Soviet Union, arrived on January 23.

I must say that after getting your joint favourable reply to my question in Tehran about transferring Italian ships to the Soviet Union before the end of January 1944, I had considered the matter settled; it never occurred to me that that decision reached and agreed to by the three of us could be revised in any way. All the more so because we agreed at the time that the matter would be fully settled with the Italians during December and January. Now I see that this is not the case and that nothing has been said to the Italians on this score.

However, in order not to delay settlement of this matter, which is so vitally important to our common fight against Germany, the Soviet Union is willing to accept your proposal for the battleship *Royal Sovereign* and one cruiser being transferred from British ports to the U.S.S.R. and for the Soviet Naval Command using the two ships temporarily, until corresponding Italian ships can be made available to the Soviet Union. In the same way we are ready to accept from the U.S.A. and Britain 20,000 tons of merchant shipping apiece, which we shall likewise use until we are provided with the same amount of Italian shipping. The important thing is that there should no longer be any delay in the matter and that the ships mentioned above be handed over to us before the end of February.

However, there is no mention in your reply of the transfer to the Soviet Union at the end of January of the eight Italian destroyers and four submarines to which you, Mr President, and you, Mr Prime Minister, consented in Tehran. Yet this question of destroyers and submarines is of paramount importance to the Soviet Union, for without them the transfer of one battleship and one cruiser would be pointless. You will agree that cruisers and battleships are powerless unless accompanied by destroyers. As the whole of the Italian Navy is at your disposal, it should not be difficult for you to carry out the Tehran decision for the transfer of eight destroyers and four submarines from that Navy to the Soviet Union. I also agree to accept, instead of Italian destroyers and submarines, as many U.S. or British destroyers and submarines for the Soviet Union. The transfer of the destroyers and submarines should not be delayed it should be effected simultaneously with the transfer of the battleship and cruiser, as agreed by the three of us in Tehran.

January 29, 1944

No. 158

*Received on February 24, 1944*

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL**

**JOINT PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND Mr CHURCHILL  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

The receipt is acknowledged of your message in regard to the handing over of the Italian shipping to Soviet Russia.

It is our intention to carry out the transfer agreed to at Tehran at the earliest date practicable without hazarding the success of "Anvil"<sup>54</sup> and "Overlord,"<sup>53</sup> which operations we all agree should be given the first priority in our common effort to defeat Germany at the earliest possible date.

There is no thought of not carrying through the transfers agreed at Tehran. The British battleship and American cruiser can be made available without any delay and an effort will be made at once to make available from the British Navy the eight destroyers. Four submarines will also be provided temporarily by Great Britain. We are convinced that disaffecting Italian

Navy at this time would be what you have so aptly termed an unnecessary diversion and that it would adversely affect the prospects of our success in France.

February 7th, 1944

No. 159

*Received on February 11, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have been following the recent developments in your relations with Poland with the closest attention. I feel that I am fully aware of your views on the subject and am therefore taking this opportunity of communicating with you on the basis of our conversations at Tehran. First of all, let me make it plain that I neither desire nor intend to attempt to suggest much less to advise you in any way as to where the interests of Russia lie in this matter since I realize to the full that the future security of your country is rightly your primary concern. The observations which I am about to make are prompted solely by the larger issues which affect the common goal towards which we are both working.

As you know, the overwhelming majority of our people and Congress welcomed with enthusiasm the broad principles subscribed to at the Moscow<sup>47</sup> and Tehran conferences, and I know that you agree with me that it is of the utmost importance that faith in these understandings should not be left in any doubt. I am sure that a solution can be found which would fully protect the interests of Russia and satisfy your desire to see a friendly, independent Poland, and at the same time not adversely affect the cooperation so splendidly established at Moscow and Tehran.

I have given careful consideration to the views of your Government as outlined by Mr Molotov to Mr Harriman on January 18 regarding the impossibility from the Soviet point of view of having any dealings with the Polish Government in Exile in its present form and Mr Molotov's suggestion that the Polish Government should be reconstituted by the inclusion of Polish elements at present in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate your desire to deal only with a Polish Government in which you can repose confidence and which can be counted upon to establish permanent friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but it is my earnest hope that

while this problem remains unsolved nothing should be done to transform this special question into one adversely affecting the larger issues of future international collaboration. While public opinion is forming in support of the principle of international collaboration, it is especially incumbent upon us to avoid any action which might appear to counteract the achievement of our long-range objective.

I am told by Prime Minister Churchill that he is endeavoring to persuade the Polish Prime Minister to make a clean-cut acceptance as a basis for negotiation of the territorial changes which have been proposed by your Government. Is it not possible on that basis to arrive at some answer to the question of the composition of the Polish Government which would leave it to the Polish Prime Minister himself to make such changes in his government as may be necessary without any evidence of pressure or dictation from a foreign country?

It seems to me, as a matter of timing, that the first consideration at this time should be that Polish guerrillas should work with and not against your advancing troops. That is of current importance and as a first step some assurance on the part of all Poles would be of great advantage.

No. 160

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your message on the Polish question to hand. It goes without saying that a correct solution of this problem is of great importance both to the U.S.S.R. and to our common cause.

There are two major points to be considered: first, the Soviet-Polish frontier and, second, the composition of the Polish Government. The Soviet Government's point of view is familiar to you from its recently published statements<sup>55</sup> and from V. M. Molotov's letter<sup>56</sup> in reply to Mr Hull's Note, received in Moscow through the Soviet Ambassador, Gromyko, on January 22.

First of all, about the Soviet-Polish frontier. As you know, the Soviet Government has officially declared that it does not consider the 1939 boundary final, and has agreed to the Curzon Line.<sup>57</sup> In stating this we have made quite important concessions to the Poles on the frontier question. We had grounds for anticipating an appropriate declaration on the part of the Polish Government. It should have officially declared that the frontier established by the Riga Treaty<sup>58</sup> would be revised and that it accepts the Curzon Line as the new frontier line between the

U.S.S.R. and Poland. It should have made an official declaration on recognition of the Curzon Line just as the Soviet Government has done. But the Polish Government in London refused to budge, and continued to insist in official statements that the frontier imposed upon us under the Riga Treaty at a difficult moment should be left unchanged. Hence, there is no basis for agreement, for the standpoint of the present Polish Government, as we see, precludes agreement.

In view of this circumstance the question of the composition of the Polish Government has likewise become more acute. It is clear that the Polish Government, in which the main role is played by pro-fascist, imperialist elements hostile to the Soviet Union, such as Sosnkowski, and in which there are hardly any democratic elements, can have no basis in Poland, nor, as experience has shown, can it establish friendly relations with democratic neighbouring countries. Clearly, such a Polish Government is incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union and it cannot be anticipated that it will not sow discord among the democratic countries which, on the contrary, would like to strengthen their unity. It follows that a radical improvement in the composition of the Polish Government is an urgent matter.

I had to delay reply, being busy at the front.

February 16, 1944

No. 161

*Received on February 18, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I am glad to inform you, in response to your message of the 29th of January, that the United States vessels listed below are available to the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R. for temporary use until adequate Italian tonnage can be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union to replace them:

The cruiser *Milwaukee* scheduled to arrive on March 8 in the United Kingdom at some port not yet designated.

The 10,000-ton merchant ships *John Gorrie* and *Harry Percy* now at Liverpool and Glasgow respectively.

No. 162

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of your message of February 18. Thank you for the news.

It does not, however, exhaust the matter as it says nothing about Anglo-American destroyers and submarines in lieu of the Italian ones—eight destroyers and four submarines—as decided at Tehran. I look forward to an early reply on these points mentioned in my message of January 29.

February 21, 1944

No. 163

*Received on February 21, 1944*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The recent successes of your armies in the North-west and in the Ukraine have been followed by us with keen interest and deep satisfaction. I send you my best wishes and congratulations.

No. 164

**PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message with congratulations on the latest successes of the Soviet forces. Please accept my thanks for your friendly wishes.

February 23, 1944

No. 165

*Received on February 23, 1944*

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

*(Retranslated)*

Moscow

On the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the Red Army I would like to convey to you as Supreme Commander my sincere congratulations on the great and momentous victories won by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union over the past year. The splendid victories which the Red Army has achieved under your leadership were an inspiration to all. The heroic defence of Leningrad was crowned and rewarded with the recent crushing defeat of the enemy at the gates of that city. As a result of the victorious offensive of the Red Army millions of Soviet citizens have been freed from slavery and oppression. These achievements, along with the cooperation on which agreement was reached at Moscow<sup>47</sup> and Tehran, ensure our eventual victory over the Nazi aggressors.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 166

*Received on February 24, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your message of the twenty-first of February about the loan of British and American ships to the Soviet Navy has been received.

According to my understanding, Great Britain would provide the battleship, the four submarines and the eight destroyers. I have cabled to the Prime Minister about this. When I hear from him, I will let you know.

No. 167

*Received on February 25, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

With reference to my message of February 23, 1944, I have received a reply from Prime Minister Churchill and our understanding as expressed to you is now confirmed.

No. 168

*Received on February 25, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

A number of important steps have been taken in recent months by the Governments of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> toward laying the foundations for post-war cooperative action in the various fields of international economic relations. You will recall that the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held in May 1943, gave rise to an interim commission which is now drafting recommendations to lay before the various Governments for a permanent organization in this field. More recently, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration<sup>59</sup> has been established and is now in operation.

There have been for nearly a year informal technical discussions at the expert level among many of the United Nations on mechanisms for international monetary stabilization; these discussions are preparatory to a possible convocation of a United Nations monetary conference. Similar discussions have been taking place, though on a more restricted scale, with regard to the possibility of establishing mechanisms for facilitating international development investment. Also, to some extent, informal discussions have taken place among some of the United Nations with regard to such questions as commercial policy, commodity policy, and cartels. Discussions are in contemplation on such questions as commercial aviation, oil, and others. A conference of the International Labor Organization will take place in April, in part for the purpose of considering its future activities.

The need for both informal discussions and formal conferences on various economic problems was emphasized in a document presented by the Secretary of State at the Moscow meet-



ing of Foreign Ministers<sup>47</sup> entitled "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation." It was suggested that "the time has come for the establishment of a commission comprising representatives of the principal United Nations and possibly certain others of the United Nations for the joint planning of the procedures to be followed in these matters." It is clear to me that there is a manifest need for United Nations machinery for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration should be given to the various fields of international economic cooperation, the subjects which should be discussed, the order of discussion, and the means by which existing and prospective arrangements and activities are to be coordinated.

It is not my purpose at this time and in this connection to raise the broader issues of international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. Preliminary discussions on this subject are currently in contemplation between our three Governments under the terms of the Moscow Protocol.<sup>60</sup> What I am raising here is the question of further steps toward the establishment of United Nations machinery for post-war economic collaboration, which was raised at the Moscow meeting by the Secretary of State and was discussed at Tehran by you, Prime Minister Churchill and myself.

I should very much appreciate it if you would give me your views on the suggestion made by the Secretary of State at Moscow, together with any other thoughts as to the best procedure to be followed in this extremely important matter.

No. 169

**SECRET AND PERSONAL**

**FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your two messages concerning the Italian vessels reached me, through Mr Harriman, on February 24 and 25. I have also received from you and the Prime Minister the message of February 7,<sup>61</sup> transmitted by British Ambassador Kerr on February 24.

My thanks to you and the Prime Minister for the news about the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines, as well as a battleship and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping by Great Britain and a cruiser and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping by the United States.

Mr Kerr has expressly warned us that all the destroyers are old ones so that I have misgivings about their combat qualities. It seems to me that the British and U.S. Navies should find no difficulty in assigning, out of the eight destroyers, at least four modern, not old, ones. I still hope that you and the Prime Minister will find it possible to transfer at least four modern destroyers. As a result of military operations by Germany and Italy we have lost a substantial part of our destroyers. It is, therefore, very important for us to have that loss repaired at least in part.

February 26, 1944

No. 170

*Sent on February 28, 1944*

**TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA**

The White House, Washington

Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for your friendly congratulations on the 26th anniversary of the Red Army and the successes achieved by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the struggle against the Hitler invaders.

I am firmly convinced that the day is not far off when the successful struggle of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union jointly with the Armies of the United States and Great Britain will, on the basis of the agreements reached at Moscow<sup>47</sup> and Tehran, result in the final defeat of our common foe, Hitler Germany.

J. STALIN

No. 171

*Received on February 28, 1944*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The text of the Prime Minister's message of February 20 to you on the subject of a tentative settlement of the Polish post-war boundary by an agreement between the Soviet and Polish Governments is known to me.

If accepted, the Prime Minister's suggestion goes far toward furthering our prospects of an early defeat of Germany and I am pleased to recommend that you give favorable and sympathetic consideration to it.

I think, as I intimated before, that the most realistic problem is to be assured that when you get into Poland your armies will be assisted by the Poles.

No. 172

**SECRET AND PERSONAL**

**FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Much as I should like to react favourably to Mr Churchill's message about the Poles—a message you are familiar with—I feel obliged to say that the Polish émigré Government does not want normal relations with the U.S.S.R. Suffice it to say that the Polish émigrés in London not only reject the Curzon Line,<sup>57</sup> they also claim Lvov, and Vilna, the Lithuanian capital.

All I can say is that the time is not yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Polish-Soviet relations. For your information I enclose my reply to Mr Churchill on this matter.

March 3, 1944

**SECRET AND PERSONAL**

**FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Both messages of February 20 on the Polish question reached me through Mr Kerr on February 27.

Now that I have read the detailed record of your conversations with the leaders of the Polish émigré Government, I am more convinced than ever that men of their type are incapable of establishing normal relations with the U.S.S.R. Suffice it to point out that they, far from being ready to recognise the Curzon Line, claim both Lvov and Vilna. As regards the desire to place certain Soviet territories under foreign control, we cannot agree to discuss such encroachments, for, as we see it, the mere posing of the question is an affront to the Soviet Union.

I have already written to the President that the time is not

yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Soviet-Polish relations I am compelled to reaffirm the soundness of this conclusion.

March 3, 1944

**No. 173**

*Received on March 4, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I stated today at a press conference in response to insistent questioning that Italian warships and merchant ships are now being used in our war effort by the Allied Mediterranean Command and that in order to assist the Soviet Navy in their requirements for the war effort Italian ships or substitutions therefore from the American and British tonnage will be allocated to the Soviet Navy.

**No. 174**

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT,  
Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of your communication on the statement made at the press conference in Washington concerning the transfer of a number of Italian vessels or their equivalent of U.S. and British shipping to the Soviet Union. Thank you.

March 6, 1944

*Received on March 9, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET**

**MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL  
AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you that the destroyers we are lending you were old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. There are only seven fleet destroyers in the whole Italian Navy, the rest being older destroyers and torpedo-boats. Moreover, these Italian destroyers when we do get them, are absolutely unfitted for work in the North without very lengthy refit. Therefore we thought the eight which the British Government had found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to you. The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the present time. He lost two the week before last, one in the Russian convoy, and for landing at "Overlord"<sup>53</sup> alone he has to deploy, for close in-shore work against batteries no fewer than forty-two destroyers, a large proportion of which may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The movement of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore creates a new situation for us both in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in Anzio bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the Atlantic with the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are being run up to the last minute before "Overlord" with very heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is "Overlord" itself. The President's position is similarly strained but in this case mainly because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the Pacific. Our joint intentions to deliver to you the Italian ships agreed on at Moscow<sup>47</sup> and Tehran remain unaltered, and we shall put the position formally to the Italian Government at the time the latter is broadened and the new Ministers take over their responsibilities. There is no question of our right to dispose of the Italian Navy, but only of exercising that right with the least harm to our common interests. Meanwhile all our specified ships are being prepared for delivery to you on loan as already agreed.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

No. 176

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

Your message on post-war economic cooperation to hand. The problems of international economic cooperation, raised in Mr Hull's Memorandum,<sup>62</sup> are undoubtedly of great importance and merit attention. I think it quite timely to set up a United Nations<sup>14</sup> staff to study them and to specify ways and means of examining the various aspects of international economic cooperation in keeping with the decisions of the Moscow<sup>47</sup> and Tehran conferences.

March 10, 1944

No. 177

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

I have received your message on the transfer of eight destroyers to the Soviet Union by the British Government. I am glad to agree that the said destroyers are quite fit for escort service but surely you realise that the Soviet Union also needs destroyers fit for other combat operations. The Allies' right to dispose of the Italian Navy is absolutely beyond question, of course and this should be made clear to the Italian Government especially as regards the Italian ships which are to be transferred to the Soviet Union.

March 17, 1944

No. 178

*Received on March 18, 1944*

**F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN\***

I have today despatched by air a personal letter to President Inonu on the subject of chrome, as I am impressed by the importance of Turkish chrome to Germany. I have sent the letter

to Ambassador Steinhardt in Ankara for delivery. I feel sure that you will concur, but please let me know if this action should run counter to any steps you are now taking or contemplating so that I can halt delivery of the letter. The text of my letter to President Inonu reads in paraphrase as follows:

Almost every day in the week there are many matters about which I would like to talk to you and I greatly wish that you and I were not thousands of miles apart.

“At this time I want to write to you about the subject of chrome.

“As you are aware, the Russians by the capture of Nikopol have succeeded in denying an important source of manganese to the Germans. For many purposes Turkish chrome ore can be substituted for manganese, and the denial to the Germans of manganese from Nikopol consequently multiplies the importance of chrome from Turkey to the German war production.

“It is obvious that it has now become a matter of grave concern to the United Nations<sup>14</sup> that large supplies of chrome ore continue to move to Germany from Turkey. You can best decide how the Germans can be denied further access to Turkish chrome ore. Knowing of your inventive genius I hope you will find some method to bring this about. I firmly believe that you will recognize this opportunity for a unique contribution to be made by Turkey to what really is the welfare of the world.

“It is needless to tell you how very happy I was in our talks in Cairo and I feel that now you and I can talk to each other as old friends.

“I send you all my good wishes and count on our meeting again in the near future.”

I am sending Mr Churchill a similar telegram.

No. 179

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message setting forth the draft of your letter to the President of Turkey about Turkish deliveries of chrome to Germany.

The representation you suggest making to the Turks is, I think, most timely, although I must say that I have little hope of positive results.

March 20, 1944

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Since Mr Churchill has sent you, as he tells me, a copy of his March 21 message to me on the Polish question, I think it proper to send, for your information, a copy of my reply to his message.

Copy enclosed.

March 23, 1944

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr W. CHURCHILL**

I have lately received two messages from you on the Polish question and have read the statement made by Mr Kerr on the question to V. M. Molotov on instructions from you.<sup>63</sup> I have not been able to reply earlier as front affairs often keep me away from non-military matters.

I shall now answer point by point.

I was struck by the fact that both your message and particularly Kerr's statement bristle with threats against the Soviet Union. I should like to call your attention to this circumstance because threats as a method are not only out of place in relations between Allies, but also harmful, for they may lead to opposite results.

The Soviet Union's efforts to uphold and implement the Curzon Line<sup>57</sup> are referred to in one of your messages as a policy of force. This implies that you are now trying to describe the Curzon Line as unlawful and the struggle for it as unjust. I totally disagree with you. I must point out that at Tehran you the President and myself were agreed that the Curzon Line was lawful.

At that time you considered the Soviet Government's stand on the issue quite correct, and said it would be crazy for representatives of the Polish émigré Government to reject the Curzon Line. But now you maintain something to the contrary.

Does this mean that you no longer recognise what we agreed on in Tehran and are ready to violate the Tehran agreement? I



have no doubt that had you persevered in your Tehran stand the conflict with the Polish émigré Government could have been settled. As for me and the Soviet Government, we still adhere to the Tehran standpoint, and we have no intention of going back on it, for we believe implementation of the Curzon Line to be evidence, not of a policy of force, but of a policy of re-establishing the Soviet Union's legitimate right to those territories, which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers recognised as non-Polish in 1919.

You say in your message of March 7 that the problem of the Soviet-Polish frontier will have to be put off till the armistice conference is convened. I think there is a misunderstanding here. The Soviet Union is not waging nor does it intend to wage war against Poland. It has no conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an ally of Poland and the Polish people. That is why it is shedding its blood to free Poland from German oppression. It would be strange, therefore, to speak of an armistice between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. But the Soviet Union is in conflict with the Polish émigré Government, which does not represent the interests of the Polish people or express their aspirations. It would be stranger still to identify Poland with the Polish émigré Government in London, a government isolated from Poland. I even find it hard to tell the difference between Poland's émigré Government and the Yugoslav émigré Government, which is akin to it, or between certain generals of the Polish émigré Government and the Serb General Mihajlović.

In your message of March 21 you tell me of your intention to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all territorial questions must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious Powers and that in the meantime you cannot recognise any *forcible* transferences of territory. As I see it you make the Soviet Union appear as being hostile to Poland, and virtually deny the liberation nature of the war waged by the Soviet Union against German aggression. That is tantamount to attributing to the Soviet Union something which is non-existent, and, thereby, discrediting it. I have no doubt that the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion will evaluate your statement as a gratuitous insult to the Soviet Union.

To be sure you are free to make any statement you like in the House of Commons—that is your business. But should you make a statement of this nature I shall consider that you have committed an unjust and unfriendly act in relation to the Soviet Union.

In your message you express the hope that the break-down over the Polish question will not affect our cooperation in other

spheres. As far as I am concerned, I have been, and still am, for cooperation. But I fear that the method of intimidation and defamation, if continued, will not benefit our cooperation.

March 23, 1944

No. 181

*Received on March 23, 1944*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Ambassador Harriman has just informed me that the Soviet Union is not planning to participate in the conference of the International Labor Organization starting April 2 in Philadelphia.

I have given considerable thought to the role that the International Labor Organization should play in constantly improving the labor and social standards throughout the world. I am anxious that you should know about this matter.

The International Labor Organization should be, in my opinion, the instrument for the formulation of international policy on matters directly affecting the welfare of labor and for international collaboration in this field. I should like to see it become a body which will serve as an important organ of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> for discussing economic and social matters relating to labor and an important agency for consideration of international economic policies which look directly toward improvement in standards of living. It would be unfortunate if both our Governments did not take advantage of the conference in Philadelphia to help develop our common objectives. We could thereby adapt the existing International Labor Organization to the tasks facing the world without loss of time.

The United States Government delegates to the Philadelphia Conference are being instructed by me to propose measures to broaden the activities and functions of the International Labor Organization and raise the question of its future relationship to other international organizations. In view of your interest in these matters and since there is a great range of social and economic problems that are of common interest to both our Governments, I greatly hope that your Government will participate in this conference.

No. 182

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I share your desire for cooperation between our two Governments in studying economic and social problems linked with improving the welfare of labour on an international scale. The Soviet Union cannot, however, send representatives to the International Labour Organisation conference in Philadelphia for the reasons set forth in the letter to Mr Harriman,<sup>64</sup> because the Soviet trade unions are opposed to participation in it, and the Soviet Government cannot but take account of the opinion of the trade unions.

It goes without saying that if the International Labour Organisation were to become an agency of the United Nations,<sup>14</sup> not of the League of Nations with which the Soviet Union cannot associate itself, Soviet participation would be possible. I hope that this will become feasible and the appropriate steps taken in the near future.

March 25, 1944

No. 183

*Received on March 25, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Dr. Lange and Father Orlemański will, in accordance with your suggestion, be given passports in order to accept your invitation to proceed to the Soviet Union.<sup>65</sup> Our transportation facilities, however, are greatly overcrowded at the present time due to military movements, and accordingly transportation from the United States to the Soviet Union will have to be furnished by Soviet facilities. You will realize, I know, that Dr. Lange and Father Orlemański are proceeding as private citizens in their individual capacity and the Government of the United States can assume no responsibility whatsoever for their views or activities. It might be necessary for the United States Government to make this point clear should the trip become the subject of public comment.

No. 184

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of your message advising me that passports have been issued to Dr. Lange and Father Orlemański.<sup>65</sup> Although Soviet transport facilities are greatly overtaxed, we shall make transport available for Lange and Orlemański. The Soviet Government regards the Lange and Orlemański visit to the Soviet Union as a visit by two private persons.

March 28, 1944

No. 185

*Received on April 4, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Many thanks for your message of March 25. It is my hope that the International Labor Organization at the coming meeting will make it clear that it no longer is an organ of the League of Nations and that it will affiliate itself with the United Nations.<sup>14</sup> I trust, therefore, that the Soviet Union will have representatives at the next conference.

I will keep you informed of what takes place at the meeting in Philadelphia.

No. 186

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message about the International Labour Organisation reached me on April 4. Thank you for reply. I believe that implementation of measures for reconstructing the International Labour Organisation will pave the way for future Soviet participation in its work.

April 6, 1944

No. 187

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET**

**MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL  
AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Pursuant to our talks at Tehran, the general crossing of the sea will take place around "R" date, which Generals Deane and Burrows have recently been directed to give to the Soviet General Staff.<sup>66</sup> We shall be acting at our fullest strength.

2. We are launching an offensive on the Italian mainland at maximum strength about mid-May.

3. Since Tehran your armies have been gaining a magnificent series of victories for the common cause. Even in the month when you thought they would not be active they have gained these great victories. We send you our very best wishes and trust that your armies and ours, operating in unison in accordance with our Tehran agreement, will crush the Hitlerites.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

April 18th, 1944

No. 188

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your message of April 18 received.

The Soviet Government is gratified to learn that in accordance with the Tehran agreement the sea crossing will take place at the appointed time, which Generals Deane and Burrows have already imparted to our General Staff,<sup>66</sup> and that you will be acting at full strength. I am confident that the planned operation will be a success.

I hope that the operations you are undertaking in Italy will likewise be successful.

As agreed in Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new offensive at the same time so as to give maximum support to the Anglo-American operations.

Please accept my thanks for the good wishes you have expressed on the occasion of the Red Army's success. I subscribe to your statement that your armies and our own, supporting each other, will defeat the Hitlerites and thus fulfil their historic mission.

April 22, 1944

No. 189

**TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA**

The White House, Washington

Please accept the sincere condolences of the Soviet Government on the occasion of the grievous loss suffered by the United States through the death of Franklin Knox, U.S. Secretary of the Navy.

J. STALIN

April 29, 1944

No. 190

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

Accept, please, my real appreciation and that of the Government and people of the United States for your kind message on the tragic death of Mr Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy.

May 5, 1944

No. 191

*Sent on May 6, 1944*

**TO FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA**

Dear friend,

Thank you very much for helping Father Stanislaw Orlemański<sup>65</sup> to obtain permission to come to Moscow.

I wish you good health and success.

Sincerely yours,

STALIN

No. 192

*Received on May 14, 1944*

**JOINT MESSAGE  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

In order to give the maximum strength to the attack across the sea against Northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France simultaneously with the "Overlord"<sup>53</sup> assault. We are planning to make such an attack later, for which purpose additional landing craft are being sent to the Mediterranean from the United States. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from Northern France and the Eastern Front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

No. 193

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your joint message received. You can best decide how and in what way to allocate your forces. The important thing, of course, is to ensure complete success for "Overlord."<sup>53</sup> I express confidence also in the success of the offensive launched in Italy.

May 15, 1944

No. 194

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

I would appreciate receiving your views on my making a statement to be issued after "D" day<sup>67</sup> along the following lines in place of a tripartite statement to be issued by the Soviet, United States, and British Governments:

"A suggestion has been made that the Allied Governments issue a joint statement to the people of Germany and their sympathizers in which emphasis would be placed on the recent landings made on the European continent. I have not agreed with this as it might overemphasize the importance of these landings. What I desire to impress upon the German people and their sympathizers is that their defeat is inevitable. I also wish to emphasize to them that it is unintelligent on their part to continue in the war from now on. They must realize in their hearts that, with their present objectives and their present leaders, it is inevitable that they will be totally defeated.

"From now on, every German life that is lost is an unnecessary loss. It is true, from a cold-blooded point of view, that the Allies will also suffer losses. However, the Allies outnumber so greatly Germany in population and in resources that the Germans on a relative basis will be much harder hit—down to the last family—than the Allies, and mere stubbornness will never help Germany in the long run. It has been made abundantly clear by the Allies that they do not seek the total destruction of the people of Germany. What they seek is the total destruc-



tion of the philosophy of those Germans who have stated that they could subjugate the world.

“The Allies desire to attain the long-range goal of human freedom—greater real liberty—political, intellectual, and religious, and a greater justice, economic and social.

“We are being taught by our times that no group of men can ever be sufficiently strong to dominate the entire world. The United States Government and the people of the United States—with almost twice the population of Germany—send word to the German people that this is the time for them to abandon the teachings of evil.

“By far the greater part of the population of the world of nearly two billion people feel the same way. It is only Germany and Japan who stand out against all the rest of humanity.

“In his heart every German knows that this is true. Germany and Japan have made a disastrous and terrible mistake. Germany and Japan must atone reasonably for the wanton destruction of lives and property which they have committed. They must renounce the philosophy which has been imposed upon them—the falsity of this philosophy must be very clear to them now.

“The more quickly the fighting and the slaughter shall terminate, the more rapidly shall arrive a more decent civilization in the entire world.

“The attacks which the American, the British, and the Soviet armies and their associates are now making in the European theater will, we hope, continue with success. However, the people of Germany must realize that these attacks are only a part of many which will increase in volume and number until victory, which is inevitable, is attained.”

Prime Minister Churchill has agreed to follow me with a message along the above lines.

May 23, 1944

No. 195

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES,  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

My dear Marshal Stalin,

I am sending to you two scrolls for Stalingrad<sup>68</sup> and Leningrad<sup>69</sup> which cities have won the wholehearted admiration of

the American people. The heroism of the citizens of these two cities and the soldier who so ably defended them has not only been an inspiration to the people of the United States, but has served to bind even more closely the friendship of our two nations. Stalingrad and Leningrad have become synonyms for the fortitude and endurance which has enabled us to resist and will finally enable us to overcome the aggression of our enemies.

I hope that in presenting these scrolls to the two cities you will see fit to convey to their citizens my own personal expressions of friendship and admiration and my hope that our people will continue to develop that close understanding which has marked our common effort.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

May 25, 1944<sup>70</sup>

No. 196

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your communication on a statement to the people of Germany has reached me.

In view of the experience of the war against the Germans and the German character I do not think that your suggested statement would have a positive effect, seeing that it is to be synchronised with the beginning of the landing and not with the moment when the Anglo-American landing and the forthcoming offensive of the Soviet armies will have registered notable success.

As to the nature of the statement, we can return to this when circumstances favour publication.

May 26, 1944

No. 197

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

With reference to my message of May 23 proposing for consideration a message to be issued by me with the purpose of influencing the German people, I am informed that the suggestion is not approved by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his Cabinet.

Because the proposed statement is not of essential importance and in view of a definite and positive objection by the British Government, I propose to do nothing in the way of a statement of that nature at the present time.

May 27, 1944

No. 198

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message informing me that you have decided not to do anything in the way of a statement to the German people at the present time has reached me.

Thank you for the communication.

May 30, 1944

No. 199

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

I have your message of May 26 regarding my proposal to make a statement designed to influence the German people.

The message I sent to you on May 27, which evidently crossed your message in transit, is in agreement with your opinion that at the present time such a statement should not be made.

May 30, 1944

No. 200

**FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A.,  
Mr ROOSEVELT**

I congratulate you on the taking of Rome—a grand victory for the Allied Anglo-American troops.

The news has caused deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

June 5, 1944

No. 201

*Sent on June 7, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

I feel it necessary to let you know that on June 6, in reply to a message from Mr Churchill I sent the following personal message about the plan for a Soviet summer offensive.

“Your communication on the successful launching of ‘Overlord’ has reached me. It is a source of joy to us all and of hope for further successes.

“The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, to be launched in keeping with the agreement reached at the Tehran Conference, will begin in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the front. The general offensive will develop by stages, through consecutive engagement of the armies in offensive operations. Between late June and the end of July operations will turn into a general offensive of the Soviet troops.

“I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the operations.

“June 6, 1944.”

No. 202

*Received on June 8, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message of congratulation on the fall of Rome and thank you very much for it, also for sending me the copy of your message to Mr Churchill. All of this makes me very happy.

From Northern France the news is that everything is progressing as scheduled.

I send my warm regards to you.

No. 203

*Received on June 19, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Mr Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, has, as you know, just completed a brief visit to Washington and for reasons which Ambassador Harriman has already explained to you I considered his visit to be desirable and necessary at this time.

Therefore you are aware that his visit was not connected with any attempt on my part to inject myself into the merits of the differences which exist between the Polish Government in Exile and the Soviet Government. Although we had a frank and beneficial exchange of views on a wide variety of subjects affecting Poland, I can assure you that no specific plan or proposal in any way affecting Polish-Soviet relations was drawn up. I believe, however, that you would be interested in my personal impression of Mr Mikolajczyk and of his attitude toward the problems with which his country is confronted.

Mr Mikolajczyk impressed me as a very sincere and reasonable man whose sole desire is to do what is best for his country. He is fully cognizant that the whole future of Poland depends upon the establishment of genuinely good relations with the Soviet Union and to achieve that end will, in my opinion, make every effort.

The vital necessity for the establishment of the fullest kind of collaboration between the Red Army and the forces of the Polish underground in the common struggle against our enemy

is his primary immediate concern. He believes that coordination between your armies and the organized Polish underground is a military factor of the highest importance not only to your armies in the East but also to the main task of finishing off the Nazi beast in his lair by our combined efforts.

It is my impression that the Prime Minister is thinking only of Poland and the Polish people and will not allow any petty considerations to stand in the way of his efforts to reach a solution with you. In fact it is my belief that he would not hesitate to go to Moscow, if he felt that you would welcome such a step on his part, in order to discuss with you personally and frankly the problems affecting your two countries, particularly the urgency of immediate military collaboration. I know you will understand that in making this observation I am in no way attempting to press upon you my personal views in a matter which is of special concern to you and your country. I felt, however, that you were entitled to have a frank account of the impressions I received in talking with Premier Mikolajczyk.

No. 204

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

I am in a position to inform you that not later than a week from now the Soviet armies will start the second round of their offensive. It will involve 130 divisions, including armoured ones. I and my colleagues anticipate important success. I hope that it will be a substantial help to the Allied operations in France and Italy.

June 21, 1944

No. 205

*Received on June 23, 1944*

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Thanks for your message of June 21. Your good action together with our efforts on the Western Front should quickly put the Nazis in a very difficult position.

No. 206

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

Thank you for informing me of your meeting with Mr Mikolajczyk.

If we have in view military cooperation between the Red Army and the Polish underground forces fighting the Hitler invaders, that, undoubtedly, is vital to the final defeat of our common enemy. Certainly, the proper solution of the problem of Soviet-Polish relations is of great importance in this respect. You are aware of the Soviet Government's point of view and of its desire to see Poland strong, independent and democratic, and Soviet-Polish relations good-neighbourly and based on lasting friendship. A vital condition for this, in the view of the Soviet Government, is a reconstruction of the Polish émigré Government that would ensure participation of Polish leaders in Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and more particularly of Polish democratic leaders inside Poland, plus recognition by the Polish Government of the Curzon Line<sup>57</sup> as the new frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

I must say, however, that Mr Mikolajczyk's Washington statement makes it appear that he has not made a step forward on this point. Hence at the moment I find it hard to express an opinion about a visit to Moscow by Mr Mikolajczyk.

We all greatly appreciate your attention to Soviet-Polish relations and your efforts in this field.

Moscow, June 24, 1944

No. 207

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

Your message about the two scrolls for Stalingrad and Leningrad has reached me. They were handed to me by Ambassador Harriman and will be forwarded to their destinations. Upon receiving the scrolls I made the following statement:

“I accept President Roosevelt’s scrolls as a symbol of the fruitful cooperation between our two countries in the name of the freedom of our nations and of human progress

“The scrolls will be handed to the representatives of Leningrad and Stalingrad.”

2. Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for your high commendation of the efforts exerted by Stalingrad and Leningrad in the struggle against the German invaders.

June 27, 1944

No. 208

**PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT,  
Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT**

Please accept my warm congratulations on the liberation of Cherbourg from the German invaders. I salute the valiant U.S. and British troops on the occasion of their splendid success.

J. STALIN

June 27, 1944

No. 209

*Received on June 28, 1944*

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The news of your major victory at Vitebsk has made me very happy. I send herewith my congratulations to you personally and to your gallant Army.



No. 210

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**

I thank you on my own behalf and on behalf of the Red Army for your congratulations on the liberation of Vitebsk by Soviet troops.

June 30, 1944

No. 211

*Received on July 19, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I feel that, as things are moving so fast and so successfully, there should be a meeting in the reasonably near future between you, the Prime Minister and me. Mr Churchill is in hearty accord with this thought.

It would be best for me to have a meeting between the 10th and 15th of September. I am now on a trip in the Far West and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return.

The North of Scotland would be the most central point for me and you. You could come either by ship or by plane and I could go by ship.

I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Security and secrecy can be maintained either on shore or on shipboard.

No. 212

**TO MARSHAL JOSEPH V. STALIN**

Moscow

My dear Marshal,

Just as I was leaving on this trip to the Pacific, I received the very delightful framed photograph of you which I consider excellent. I am particularly happy to have it and very grateful to you.

The speed of the advance of your armies is amazing and I wish much that I could visit you to see how you are able to maintain your communications and supplies to the advancing troops.

We have taken the key island of Saipan after rather heavy losses and are at this moment engaged in the occupation of Guam. At the same time, we have just received news of the difficulties in Germany and especially at Hitler's headquarters. It is all to the good.

With my very warm regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

July 21, 1944

**No. 213**

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I share your opinion about the desirability of a meeting between you, Mr Churchill and myself.

I must say, however, that now, with the Soviet armies deeply involved in fighting along so vast a front, it is impossible for me to leave the country and withdraw myself for any length of time from direction of front affairs. My colleagues consider it absolutely impossible.

July 22, 1944

**No. 214**

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I am sending you for your information the text of my message to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, on the Polish question.

July 3, 1944

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER,  
Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your message of July 20 received. I am now writing to you on the Polish question only.

Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace. Lublin, one of Poland's major towns, was taken today by our troops, who continue their advance.

In this situation we find ourselves confronted with the practical problem of administration on Polish territory. We do not want to, nor shall we, set up our own administration on Polish soil, for we do not wish to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. That is for the Poles themselves to do. We have, therefore, seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, recently set up by the National Council of Poland, which was formed in Warsaw at the end of last year, and consisting of representatives of democratic parties and groups, as you must have been informed by your Ambassador in Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to set up an administration on Polish territory, and I hope this will be done. We have not found in Poland other forces capable of establishing a Polish administration. The so-called underground organisations, led by the Polish Government in London, have turned out to be ephemeral and lacking influence. As to the Polish Committee, I cannot consider it a Polish Government, but it may be that later on it will constitute the core of a Provisional Polish Government made up of democratic forces.

As for Mikolajczyk, I shall certainly not refuse to see him.

It would be better, however, if he were to approach the Polish National Committee, who are favourably disposed towards him.

July 23, 1944

No. 215

*Received on July 28, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Your telegram about the Polish situation has reached me and the Prime Minister<sup>71</sup> tells me that Mikolajczyk is leaving for Moscow to call on you.

Needless to say I greatly hope you can work out with him this whole matter to the best advantage of our common effort.

No. 216

*Received on July 28, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

In view of the rapid military progress now being made, I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference with the Prime Minister<sup>71</sup> and me, but I hope you can keep very much in mind such a conference and that we can meet as early as possible. We are approaching the time for further strategical decisions and such a meeting would help me domestically.

No. 217

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your messages of July 28.

I share your opinion concerning the importance of a meeting, but circumstances connected with the operations on our front, of which I apprised you last time, prevent me, unfortunately, from reckoning on the possibility of a meeting in the immediate future.

As regards the Polish question, the matter hinges primarily on the Poles themselves and on the ability of members of the Polish émigré Government to cooperate with the Committee of National Liberation which is already functioning in Poland

and to which the democratic forces of Poland are rallying more and more. For my part I am ready to render all Poles whatever assistance I can.

August 2, 1944

No. 218

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I should like to inform you of my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has inadequate information about the situation in Poland. At the same time I had the impression that Mikolajczyk is not against ways being found to unite the Poles.

As I do not think it proper to impose any decision on the Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and his colleagues should meet and discuss their problems with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, first and foremost the matter of early unification of all democratic forces on liberated Polish soil. Meetings have already taken place. I have been informed of them by both parties. The National Committee delegation suggested the 1921 Constitution as a basis for the Polish Government and expressed readiness if the Mikolajczyk group acceded to the proposal, to give it four portfolios, including that of Prime Minister for Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk, however, could not see his way to accept. I regret to say the meetings have not yet yielded the desired results. Still, they were useful because they provided Mikolajczyk and Morawski as well as Bierut, who had just arrived from Warsaw, with the opportunity for an exchange of views and particularly for informing each other that both the Polish National Committee and Mikolajczyk are anxious to cooperate and to seek practical opportunities in that direction. That can be considered as the first stage in the relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. Let us hope that things will improve.

I understand the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin has decided to invite Professor Lange to join it and take charge of foreign affairs. If Lange, a well-known Polish democratic leader, were enabled to go to Poland<sup>72</sup> in order to assume that office it would undoubtedly promote Polish unity and the struggle against our common enemy. I hope you

share this view and will for your part not withhold your support in this matter, which is so very important to the Allied cause.

August 9, 1944

No. 219

*Received on August 12, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have received your telegram of August 9 and am most grateful for the resume you have been good enough to give me of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's conversations with you and the Polish Committee in Moscow.

It is as you know my earnest hope that there will emerge from these conversations some solution satisfactory to all concerned and which will permit an interim legal and truly representative Polish Government to be formed.

I am sure you recognize the difficulty of this Government taking official action at this stage in regard to Lange. He as a private citizen has of course every right under law to do what he sees fit, including the renunciation of his American citizenship. I am sure you will understand why, under the circumstances and particularly pending the outcome of the conversations between Premier Mikolajczyk, whose government we still officially recognize, and the Polish Committee, the Government of the United States does not want to become involved in the request of the Polish Committee that Professor Lange join it as head of the section on Foreign Affairs, nor to express any opinion concerning this request.

No. 220

**URGENT AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM  
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND Mr CHURCHILL  
TO MARSHAL STALIN**

We are thinking of world opinion if anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles of Warsaw, or will you agree to help our planes in doing it very quickly? We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

August 20, 1944

No. 221

*Received on August 20, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have just seen our Commanders in the Pacific theater. Though I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made, I am greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces has been reported to me by Harriman. I have been told by General Deane of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet-American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your Staff to pursue expeditiously with the United States Military Mission in Moscow the joint preparation of plans. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have authorized the Military Mission to represent them in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do at the present time in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion that would be of more assistance.

No. 222

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message on Pacific affairs and I appreciate the importance you attach to them. We, too, attach considerable importance to your success there. At the same time I feel sure that you are well aware of the effort exerted by our forces in order to ensure success of the struggle that has now been joined in Europe. This gives us reason to hope that the day is not far off when we shall succeed in fulfilling our urgent task and be able to turn to other matters. It is my wish that General Deane will even now cooperate fruitfully with our Staff.

August 22, 1944

No. 223

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT,  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

The message from you and Mr Churchill about Warsaw has reached me. I should like to state my views.

Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out. Those elements, playing on the credulity of the inhabitants of Warsaw, exposed practically unarmed people to German guns, armour and aircraft. The result is a situation in which every day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Warsaw, but by the Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civilian population.

From the military point of view the situation, which keeps German attention riveted to Warsaw, is highly unfavourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops, who of late have had to face renewed German counter-attacks, are doing all they can to repulse the Hitlerite sallies and go over to a new large-scale offensive near Warsaw. I can assure you that the Red Army will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles. That will be the best, really effective, help to the anti-Nazi Poles.

August 22, 1944



No. 224

*Received on September 1, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The reference made by your Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks<sup>73</sup> that the Soviet Government might desire to have the sixteen Constituent Republics considered for individual membership in the new International Organization gives me much concern. Even though your Delegation made it clear that this subject would not be raised again during this present stage of the conversations, I feel I must tell you that the whole project, certainly as far as the United States is concerned and undoubtedly other important countries as well, would very definitely be imperiled if this question is raised at any stage before the final establishment and entry into its functions of the International Organization. I hope you will find it possible to reassure me with regard to this.

Deferring this question now would not prejudice later discussion once the Assembly has come into being. The Assembly would have full authority to act at that time.

No. 225

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message about participation of the Soviet Union Republics in the International Security Organisation.

I attach the utmost importance to the statement made by the Soviet Delegation on the subject. Since the constitutional changes in our country early this year the Governments of the Union Republics have been taking very careful note of the friendly countries' reaction to the extension of their rights in international relations, set down in the Soviet Constitution. You know, of course, that the Ukraine and Byelorussia, for instance, which are members of the Soviet Union, surpass some countries in population and political importance, countries which we all agree should be among the founders of the International Organisation. I hope, therefore, to have an opportunity of explaining

to you the political importance of the question raised by the Soviet Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks.<sup>73</sup>

September 7, 1944

No. 226

*Received on September 9, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have had an interesting and pleasant talk with your Ambassador on the progress of the talks at Dumbarton Oaks.<sup>73</sup> One issue of importance only apparently remains on which we have not yet reached agreement. This is the question of voting in the Council. We and the British both feel strongly that in the decisions of the Council parties to a dispute should not vote even if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council, whereas I gather from your Ambassador that your Government holds a contrary view.

Traditionally since the founding of the United States parties to a dispute have never voted on their own case. I know that public opinion in the United States would never understand or support a plan of international organization which violated this principle. I know, furthermore, that many nations of the world hold this same view and I am fully convinced that the smaller nations would find it difficult to accept an international organization in which the Great Powers insisted upon the right to vote in the Council in disputes involving themselves. They would most certainly see in this an attempt on the part of the Great Powers to set themselves up above the law. I would have real trouble with the Senate.

I hope for these reasons that you will find it possible to instruct your Delegation to agree to our suggestion on voting. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be speedily concluded with complete and outstanding success if this can be done.

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of your message on the Dumbarton Oaks discussions.<sup>73</sup>

It is my wish, too, that those important discussions be brought to a successful close. This may play a prominent part in furthering cooperation between our countries and promoting future peace and security as a whole.

The voting procedure in the Council will, I feel, be of appreciable importance to the success of the International Security Organisation because it is essential that the Council should base its work on the principle of agreement and unanimity between the four leading Powers on all matters, including those that directly concern one of these Powers. The original American proposal for establishing a special voting procedure in the event of a dispute directly involving one or several members of the Council who have the status of permanent members is, I think, sound. Otherwise the agreement we reached at the Tehran Conference, where we were guided by the desire to ensure above all the four-Power unity of action so vital to preventing future aggression, will be reduced to nought.

This unity implies, naturally, that there must be no suspicions among the Powers. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot very well ignore the existence of certain absurd prejudices which often hamper a genuinely objective attitude to the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, other countries should likewise weigh the likely consequences of lack of unity among the leading Powers.

I hope you will appreciate the importance of these considerations and that we shall arrive at an agreed decision on this matter.

September 14, 1944

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
TO MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
AND HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT**

We have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations in our conference at Quebec just concluded:

North-west Europe—Our intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and the Saar since the enemy will concentrate there the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that before bad weather sets in we should open up the northern ports, particularly Rotterdam and Antwerp. It is on the left, therefore, that our main effort will be exerted.

2. Italy—Our present operations in Italy will result in either: (A) The forces of Kesselring will be routed, in which event it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit toward the Ljubljana Gap; or (B) Kesselring will succeed in effecting an orderly retreat, in which event we may have to be content this year with the clearing of the plains of Lombardy.

The progress of the battle will determine our future action. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation to be carried out if the situation so demands on the Istrian Peninsula.

3. The Balkans—We will continue operations of our air forces and commando type operations.

4. Japan—With the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland we have agreed on further operations to intensify in all theaters the offensive against the Japanese.

5. Plans were agreed upon for the prompt transfer of power after the collapse of Germany to the Pacific theater.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

September 19, 1944

No. 229

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received the message from you and Mr Churchill about the Quebec Conference, informing me of your future military plans. Your communication shows the important tasks ahead of the U.S. and British armed forces. Allow me to wish you and your armies every success.

At present Soviet troops are mopping up the Baltic group of German forces which threatens our right flank. Without wiping out this group we shall not be able to thrust deep into Eastern Germany. Besides, our forces have two immediate aims—to knock Hungary out of the war and to probe the German defences on the Eastern Front and, if the situation proves favourable, pierce them.

September 29, 1944

No. 230

*Received on October 5, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Although it had been my hope that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill, and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wished to have a conference with you at an early date.

I am sure you understand that in this global war there is literally no question, military or political, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution of the questions still unresolved. In this sense, while appreciating Mr Churchill's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with the Prime Minister as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which can take place any time after the elections here as far as I am concerned.

I am suggesting, under the circumstances, if you and the Prime Minister approve, that my Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Mr Hariman naturally would not be in position to commit this Govern-

ment in respect to the important matters which very naturally will be discussed by you and Mr Churchill.

By this time you will have received from General Deane the statement of the position of our Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>24</sup> regarding the war against Japan, and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances on this point that you have given us. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and surely we can join together with no less success in crushing a nation which is, I am sure, as great an enemy of Russia as of us.

No. 231

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I was somewhat puzzled by your message of October 5. I had imagined that Mr Churchill was coming to Moscow in keeping with an agreement reached with you at Quebec. It appears, however, that my supposition is at variance with reality.

I do not know what points Mr Churchill and Mr Eden want to discuss in Moscow. Neither of them has said anything to me so far. In a message, Mr Churchill expressed the wish to come to Moscow if it was all right with me. I agreed, of course. That is how matters stand with the Churchill visit to Moscow.

I shall keep you informed, according as I clear up things with Mr Churchill.

October 8, 1944

No. 232

**MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
FROM MARSHAL STALIN  
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL**

In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view of the situation as it affects us and have planned out the course of our meetings, social and others. We have invited Messrs Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski to come at once for further conversations with us and with the Polish National Committee. We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to the Dumbarton Oaks issues,<sup>73</sup> and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reach-

ing an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr Harriman to sit in as an observer at all the meetings, where business of importance is to be transacted, and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries together with Mr Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make.

2. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on the prowess of the United States forces and upon the conduct of the war in the West by General Eisenhower.

CHURCHILL  
STALIN

October 10, 1944

No. 233

*Received on October 12, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER  
FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Thanks for your joint message of October 10 Number 794.<sup>74</sup>

I am most pleased to know that you are reaching a meeting of your two minds as to international policies in which, because of our present and future common efforts to prevent international wars, we are all interested.

ROOSEVELT

No. 234

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

During the stay of Mr Churchill and Mr Eden in Moscow we exchanged views on a number of issues of common interest. Am-

important talks. I also know that the Prime Minister intended sending you his appraisal of the talks. For my part I can say that they were very useful in acquainting us with each other's views on such matters as the future of Germany, the Polish question, policy on the Balkans and major problems of future military policies. The talks made it plain that we can without undue difficulty coordinate our policies on all important issues and that even if we cannot ensure immediate solution of this or that problem, such as the Polish question, we have, nevertheless, more favourable prospects in this respect as well. I hope that the Moscow talks will be useful also in other respects, that when we three meet we shall be able to take specific decisions on all the pressing matters of common interest to us.

2. Ambassador Gromyko has informed me of his recent talk with Mr Hopkins, who told him that you could arrive at the Black Sea late in November and meet with me on the Soviet Black Sea coast. I should very much welcome your doing so. My talk with the Prime Minister convinced me that he shares the idea. In other words, the three of us could meet late in November to examine the questions that have piled up since Tehran. I shall be glad to hear from you about this.

October 19, 1944

No. 235

*Received on October 21, 1944*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
PERSONAL AND SECRET**

We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic recognition of the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. These authorities have been made more representative of the French people by the recent enlargement of the consultative assembly. It is expected that the French, with the agreement of General Eisenhower, will set up in the very near future a real zone of the interior which will be under French administration and that when this is done it would be an appropriate time to recognize French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. I am informing you of our intentions in this regard in advance in the event that you may wish, when the zone of the interior is set up under French administration, to take some similar action.



No. 236

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message of October 21 concerning your intention to recognise the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France and to establish a zone of the interior under French administration. The British Government, too, has notified the Soviet Government of its desire to recognise the Provisional Government of France. As regards the Soviet Union, it welcomes the decision to recognise the French Provisional Government and has already given proper instructions to its representative in Paris.

October 22, 1944

No. 237

*Received on October 25, 1944*

**TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I am delighted to learn from reports made by Ambassador Harriman and from your message of October 19 of the success attained by you and the Prime Minister in approaching agreement on a number of questions of high interest to all of us in our common desire to secure and maintain a durable and satisfactory peace. I am sure that the progress made during your conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work in the next meeting when we three should come to a full agreement on our future activities, policies, and mutual interests.

All of us must investigate the practicability of various places where our November meeting can be held, i.e., from the standpoint of living accommodations, security, accessibility, and so forth. I would appreciate receiving your suggestions.

I have been considering the practicability of Cyprus, Athens, or Malta in the event that my entering the Black Sea on a ship should be too difficult or impracticable. I prefer travelling and living on a ship. We know that security and living conditions in Cyprus and Malta are satisfactory.

I am looking forward to seeing you again with much pleasure.

I would be pleased to have your advice and suggestions.

No. 238

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT,  
Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message of October 25 to hand.

If a meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast, as suggested by you earlier, is all right with you, I should think it highly desirable to carry out that plan. Conditions are quite favourable for a meeting there. I hope the safe entry of your ship into the Black Sea will also be possible by that time. My doctors advise for the time being against long journeys so I must take their view into account.

I shall be glad to see you if you find it possible to make the voyage.

October 29, 1944

No. 239

*Sent on November 9, 1944*

**FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Washington

I congratulate you on your re-election. I am confident that under your tried and tested leadership the American people will, jointly with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the other democratic countries, round off the struggle against the common foe and ensure victory in the name of liberating mankind from Nazi tyranny.

J. STALIN

No. 240

*Received on November 11, 1944*

**PERSONAL  
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

I am very pleased to have your message of congratulations and happy that you and I can continue together with our Allies to destroy the Nazi tyrants and establish a long period of peace in which all of our peoples freed from the burdens of war may reach a higher order of development and culture each in accordance with its own desires.

No. 241

*Received on November 19, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

We are all three of us of one mind that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographic do not make this easy at this moment. Under difficulties, I can arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas, but frankly it would be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after my inauguration on the 20th of January.

My naval authorities strongly recommend against the Black Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Dardanelles or the Aegean as this would involve a very large escort which is much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested Alexandria or Jerusalem and there is a possibility of Athens, though this is not yet sure.

In addition to this, I have at the present time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not final adjourning until the 15th of December. Furthermore I am required by the Constitution to be here in order to send the annual message to the new Congress which meets here early in January.

My suggestion is that we should all meet about the 28th or 30th of January and I should hope that by that time it will be possible for you to travel by rail to some Adriatic port and that we should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further in and that we should all meet at some place like Taormina, in Eastern

Sicily, which at that time should provide a fairly good climate.

Almost any spot in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy distance of Washington by air in order that I may carry out action on legislation—a subject you are familiar with. It must be possible for me to get bills or resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days. I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time and I do not think that we should put off the meeting longer than to the end of January or early February.

If, of course, in the meantime the Nazi army or people should disintegrate quickly, we should have to meet earlier, although I should much prefer that the meeting take place at the end of January.

Another suggestion is that the place of meeting should be one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on withdrawal of the German troops from the north-western part of Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

There are many things I hope to talk over with you. You and I understand each other's problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.

General Hurley, my Ambassador in China, is doing his best to iron out problems between the forces in Northern China and the Generalissimo.<sup>49</sup> He is making some progress but so far nothing has been signed.

I send you my warmest regards.

No. 242

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT F. ROOSEVELT**

It is too bad that your naval authorities question the advisability of your original idea that the three of us should meet on the Soviet Black Sea coast. There is no objection, as far as I am concerned, to the time of meeting suggested by you—late January or early February; I expect, however, that we shall be able to select one of the Soviet sea ports. I still have to pay heed to my doctors' warning of the risk involved in long journeys.

Even so I hope that we shall be able to reach final agreement—a little later if not now—on a place acceptable to all of us.

Best wishes.

November 23, 1944

**MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT F. ROOSEVELT**

The indications are that de Gaulle and his friends, who have arrived in the Soviet Union, will raise two questions.

1. Concluding a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual aid similar to the Anglo-Soviet pact.

We shall find it hard to object. But I should like to know what you think. What do you advise.

2. De Gaulle will probably suggest revising the eastern frontier of France and shifting it to the left bank of the Rhine. There is talk, too, about a plan for forming a Rhine-Westphalian region under international control.<sup>75</sup> Possibly French participation in the control is likewise envisaged. In other words, the French proposal for shifting the frontier line to the Rhine will compete with the plan for a Rhineland region under international control.

I would like your advice on this matter as well.

I have sent a similar message to Mr Churchill.

December 2, 1944

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT,  
Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

The meeting with General de Gaulle provided the opportunity for a friendly exchange of views on Franco-Soviet relations. In the course of the talks General de Gaulle, as I had anticipated, brought up two major issues—the French frontier on the Rhine and a Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact patterned on the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

As to the French frontier on the Rhine, I said, in effect, that the matter could not be settled without the knowledge and consent of our chief Allies, whose forces are waging a liberation struggle against the Germans on French soil. I stressed the difficulty of the problem.

Concerning the proposal for a Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact I pointed to the need for a thorough study of the matter and for clearing up the legal aspects, in particular the question of who

in France in the present circumstances is to ratify such a pact. This means the French will have to offer a number of elucidations, which I have yet to receive from them.

I shall be obliged for a reply to this message and for your comments on these points.

I have sent a similar message to Mr Churchill.

Best wishes.

December 3, 1944

**No. 245**

*Received on December 7, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Many thanks for your two informative messages of December 2nd and 3rd.

With reference to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security generally.

With your replies to General de Gaulle regarding the post-war frontier of France I am in complete agreement. At the present time it appears to me that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now, and that it is preferable that it be settled subsequent to the collapse of Germany.

**No. 246**

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Thank you for your communication on the subject of France. General de Gaulle and I have arrived at the conclusion that the Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact will benefit both Franco-Soviet relations and European security in general. The pact was signed today.

As to the post-war frontier of France, examination of this question has, as I informed you, been deferred.

December 10, 1944

*Received on December 14, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Since the prospects are still unsettled for an early meeting between us and because of my conviction, in which I am confident you concur, that we must move forward as rapidly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> on the subject of an International Organization, I am requesting Ambassador Harriman to deliver this message and to discuss with you on my behalf the important subject of the voting procedure in the Security Council. Before the general conference will be possible, we will of course have to agree upon this and other questions. I am taking this matter up with Prime Minister Churchill as well.

I now feel, after giving this whole subject further consideration, that the substance of the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everyone concerned.

Proposal for Section C of the Chapter on the Security Council:

**Section C  
Voting**

1. One vote should be allotted to each member of the Security Council.

2. On matters of procedure decisions of the Security Council should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. On all other matters decisions of the Security Council should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that a party to a dispute should abstain from voting in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under Paragraph One of Chapter VIII, Section C.<sup>76</sup>

This calls, you will note, for the unanimity of the permanent members in all Council decisions relating to a determination of a threat to peace, as well as to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. As a practical matter, I can see that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible. I am consequently prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meetings<sup>73</sup> on an International Security Organization. This naturally means that each permanent member would always have a vote in decisions of this character.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals at the same time provide

in Chapter VIII Section A for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which may be employed by the Security Council in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. In this respect, also, I am satisfied that if recommendations of the Security Council are concurred in by the permanent members they will carry far greater weight. However, I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice. I firmly believe, therefore, that by accepting a provision under which all parties to a dispute would abstain from voting with regard to such procedures and thus indicating their willingness not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect, the permanent members would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace, without jeopardizing in any way their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that the Great Powers must act unanimously in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests. To do this would make much more acceptable to all nations the overall plan, which must necessarily assign a special role to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace.

Specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this nature were not contained in either the Soviet or the American memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks. Our representatives there were not in a position, of course, to reach a definite agreement on this question. You and I must now find a way of completing the work which they have carried forward on our behalf so well.

Would you, if you are disposed to give favorable consideration to some such approach as I now suggest to the problem of voting in the Council, be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Prime Minister Churchill to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general conference of the United Nations?



*Received on December 20, 1944*<sup>77</sup>

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I believe that, in view of the interest aroused in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland it may be necessary for this Government to issue some statement on the subject in the next few days. If issued, this statement will outline our attitude along the following lines:

(There followed the substance of the statement issued on December 18 by Mr Stettinius, the full text of which is attached.)

As you will note, the proposed statement will, I am sure, contain nothing that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and, in so far as it goes, is I believe in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn and I am sure you will welcome it for this reason.

It is my feeling that it is of the highest importance that, until we three can get together and discuss this troublesome question thoroughly there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult.

I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee<sup>78</sup> may be intending to give itself the status of a Provisional Government of Poland. I appreciate fully the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. However, because of the great political implications which such a step would entail, I very much hope that you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a Government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not continue to deal with the Committee in its present form until that date? I know that my views on this point are shared by Prime Minister Churchill.

## STATEMENT BY Mr STETTINIUS

Issued on December 18, 1944

The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammelled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government that questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. As Mr Hull stated in his address of April 9, 1944, "this does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be settled by friendly conferences and agreement." In the case of the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations<sup>14</sup> directly concerned, this Government would have no objection to such an agreement which could make an essential contribution to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy. If as a result of such agreement the Government and people of Poland decide that it would be in the interests of the Polish state to transfer national groups, the United States Government, in cooperation with other governments, will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in such transfers. The United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of declining to give guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with other member states would assume responsibility for the preservation of general security.

It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to legislative authority, to assist the countries liberated from the enemy in repairing the devastation of war and thus to bring to their peoples the opportunity to join as full partners in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the other United Nations.

The policy of the United States Government regarding Poland outlined above has as its objective the attainment of the announced basic principles of the United States foreign policy.

No. 249

*Received on December 22, 1944*

**HIS EXCELLENCY J. V. STALIN,  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

It gives me great pleasure on this anniversary of your Excellency's birth to extend to you my sincere congratulations and best wishes.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 250

*Received on December 24, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

In order that all of us may have information essential to our coordination of effort, I wish to direct General Eisenhower to send a fully qualified officer of his staff to Moscow to discuss with you Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front. We will maintain complete secrecy.

It is my hope that you will see this officer from General Eisenhower's staff and arrange to exchange with him information that will be of mutual benefit. The situation in Belgium is not bad but we have arrived at the time to talk of the next phase.

An early reply to this proposal is requested in view of the emergency.

No. 251

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message about the sending of a competent officer from Gen. Eisenhower's staff to Moscow.

It goes without saying that I agree to your proposal, and, by the same token, I am ready to meet the officer from Gen. Eisenhower's staff and to exchange information with him.

December 25, 1944

No. 252

*Sent on December 26, 1944*

**TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

The White House, Washington

Please accept my thanks for your congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of my birthday.

J. STALIN

No. 253

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message reached me through Mr Harriman on December 14.

I fully share your opinion that before the general conference of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> meets to discuss the founding of an International Organisation it would be advisable for us to reach agreement on the more important problems that found no solution at Dumbarton Oaks,<sup>73</sup> primarily on the voting procedure in the Security Council. I feel it necessary to recall that the original American draft stressed the necessity of drawing up special rules with regard to voting procedure in

the event of a dispute directly affecting one of several permanent members of the Council. The British draft, too, pointed out that the general procedure of settling disputes between the Great Powers, should disputes arise, might prove unworkable.

In this connection paragraphs 1 and 2 of your proposal do not give rise to any objections and can be accepted, it being understood that paragraph 2 is concerned with questions of procedure mentioned in Chapter VI, Section D.<sup>79</sup>

As to paragraph 3 of your proposal, I regret to say that I cannot accept it as worded by you. As acknowledged by you, the principle of unanimity of the permanent members is indispensable in all Council decisions determining a threat to peace, as well as in those calling for action to remove the threat or to crush aggression or other breaches of peace. In adopting decisions on these questions there should without doubt be complete agreement among the Powers who are permanent members of the Council and who bear the chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. It goes without saying that any attempt to bar at any stage one or several permanent members of the Council from voting on the questions mentioned above, and this, theoretically speaking, is possible, and it may even be that the majority of the permanent members find themselves excluded from participation in settling an issue—could have dire consequences for the preservation of international security. This runs counter to the principle of agreement and unanimity in the decisions of the four leading Powers and may result in some of the Great Powers being played against others—a development which would be likely to undermine universal security. The small countries are interested in preventing that just as much as the Great Powers, for a split among the Great Powers who have united to safeguard peace and the security of all freedom-loving nations is fraught with the most dangerous consequences to all those states.

That is why I must insist on our former stand as to the voting in the Security Council. As I see it this attitude will ensure four-Power unity for the new International Organisation and help to prevent attempts at playing some of the Great Powers against others, which is vital to their joint struggle against future aggression. Such a situation would, naturally, safeguard the interests of the small nations in maintaining their security and would be in keeping with the interests of universal peace.

I hope that you will fully appreciate the importance of the considerations set forth above in support of the principle of unanimity of the four leading Powers and that we shall arrive

at agreed decisions on this point, as well as on certain other points still outstanding. On the basis of an agreed decision our representatives could work out a final draft and discuss the measures necessary for the early convening of a general United Nations conference.

December 26, 1944

No. 254

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message on Polish affairs reached me on December 20. As to Mr Stettinius' statement of December 18, I should prefer to comment on it when we meet. At any rate events in Poland have already gone far beyond that which is reflected in the said statement.

A number of things that have taken place since Mr Mikolajczyk's last visit to Moscow, in particular the wireless correspondence with the Mikolajczyk Government, which we found on terrorists arrested in Poland—underground agents of the émigré Government—demonstrate beyond all doubt that Mr Mikolajczyk's talks with the Polish National Committee served to cover up those elements who, behind Mr Mikolajczyk's back, had been engaged in terror against Soviet officers and soldiers in Poland. We cannot tolerate a situation in which terrorists, instigated by Polish émigrés, assassinate Red Army soldiers and officers in Poland, wage a criminal struggle against the Soviet forces engaged in liberating Poland and directly aid our enemies, with whom they are virtually in league. The substitution of Arciszewski for Mikolajczyk and the ministerial changes in the émigré Government in general have aggravated the situation and have resulted in a deep rift between Poland and the émigré Government.

Meanwhile the National Committee has made notable progress in consolidating the Polish state and the machinery of state power on Polish soil, in expanding and strengthening the Polish Army, in implementing a number of important government measures, primarily the land reform in favour of the peasants. These developments have resulted in the consolidation of the democratic forces in Poland and in an appreciable increase in the prestige of the National Committee among the Polish people and large sections of the Poles abroad.

As I see it, we must now be interested in supporting the National Committee and all who are willing to cooperate and

who are capable of cooperating with it, which is of special moment for the Allies and for fulfilment of our common task—accelerating the defeat of Hitler Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden of the struggle for freeing Poland from the German invaders, the problem of relations with Poland is, in present circumstances, a matter of everyday, close and friendly relations with an authority brought into being by the Polish people on their own soil, an authority which has already grown strong and has armed forces of its own, which, together with the Red Army, are fighting the Germans.

I must say frankly that in the event of the Polish Committee of National Liberation becoming a Provisional Polish Government, the Soviet Government will, in view of the foregoing, have no serious reasons for postponing its recognition. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union, more than any other Power, has a stake in strengthening a pro-Ally and democratic Poland, not only because it is bearing the brunt of the struggle for Poland's liberation, but also because Poland borders on the Soviet Union and because the Polish problem is inseparable from that of the security of the Soviet Union. To this I should add that the Red Army's success in fighting the Germans in Poland largely depends on a tranquil and reliable rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee is fully cognizant of this circumstance, whereas the émigré Government and its underground agents by their acts of terror threaten civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counter its successes.

On the other hand, in the conditions now prevailing in Poland there are no grounds for continuing to support the émigré Government, which has completely forfeited the trust of the population inside the country and which, moreover, threatens civil war in the rear of the Red Army, thereby injuring our common interest in the success of the struggle we are waging against the Germans. I think it would be only natural, fair and beneficial to our common cause if the Governments of the Allied Powers agreed as a first step to exchange representatives at this juncture with the National Committee with a view to its later recognition as the lawful government of Poland, after it has proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland. Unless this is done I fear that the Polish people's trust in the Allied Power may diminish. I think we should not countenance a situation in which Poles can say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland to those of a handful of émigrés in London.

December 27, 1944

*Received on December 31, 1944*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I must tell you that I am disturbed and deeply disappointed by your message of December 27 regarding Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold the question of recognition of the Lublin Committee<sup>78</sup> as the Provisional Government in abeyance until we have had an opportunity to discuss thoroughly the whole question at our meeting. I would have thought that no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you were to delay the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining until our meeting.

In my request there was no suggestion that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because of my feeling that you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale at this time in the war if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations<sup>14</sup> including Great Britain and the United States continue to recognize the Polish Government in London and maintain diplomatic relations with it.

With frankness equal to your own I must tell you that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Committee in its present form. In no sense is this due to any special ties or feelings for the Government in London. The fact is that as yet neither the Government nor the people of the United States have seen any evidence arising either from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line<sup>57</sup> has yet been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee has been afforded the people of Poland.

If there is established at some future date following the liberation of Poland a Provisional Government of Poland with



popular support, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the Polish people's decision.

I share fully your opinion that the situation has been worsened by the departure of Mr Mikolajczyk from the Government in London. I have always felt that Mr Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. From my personal knowledge of Mr Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow I find it most difficult to believe that he had knowledge of any instructions for acts of terrorism.

This message is sent to you so that you will know this Government's position regarding the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us meet we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a Government of Poland in abeyance until then. I cannot see any great objection to a month's delay from a military angle.

No. 256

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message of December 31 received.

I am very sorry that I have not succeeded in convincing you of the correctness of the Soviet Government's stand on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope events will convince you that the National Committee has always given important help to the Allies, and continues to do so, particularly to the Red Army, in the struggle against Hitler Germany, while the émigré Government in London is disorganising that struggle, thereby helping the Germans.

Of course I quite understand your proposal for postponing recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union for a month. But one circumstance makes me powerless to comply with your wish. The point is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., replying to a corresponding question by the Poles, declared that it would recognise the Provisional Government

of Poland the moment it was set up. This circumstance makes me powerless to comply with your wish.

Allow me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you good health and success.

January 1, 1945

No. 257

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Today, January 15, I had a talk with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. In my view the information we exchanged was complete enough. Both parties gave exhaustive answers to the questions. I must say that I was most impressed by Marshal Tedder.

After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German front I am now in a position to inform you that our offensive is making satisfactory progress despite unfavourable weather. The entire Central Front—from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea—is moving westwards. The Germans, though resisting desperately, are retreating. I feel sure that they will have to disperse their reserves between the two fronts and, as a result, relinquish the offensive on the Western Front. I am glad that this circumstance will ease the position of the Allied troops in the West and expedite preparations for the offensive planned by General Eisenhower.

As regards the Soviet troops, you may rest assured that, despite the difficulties, they will do all in their power to make the blow as effective as possible.

January 15, 1945

No. 258

*Received on January 18, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Many thanks for your encouraging message of January 15 regarding your conference with Air Marshal Tedder and the offensive of your armies on the Soviet-German front.

Your heroic soldiers' past performance and the efficiency they have already demonstrated in this offensive give high promise of an early success to our armies on both fronts. The time required to force surrender upon our barbarian enemies will be radically reduced by skillful coordination of our combined efforts.

America, as you know, is putting forth a great effort in the Pacific at a distance of seven thousand miles and my hope is that an early collapse Germany will permit the movement to the Pacific area of sufficient forces to destroy quickly the menace of Japan to all of our Allies.

**No. 259**

*Received on January 23, 1845*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**  
**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT**

I have decided to permit only a small group of uniformed service photographers from the American Navy to take the pictures that we will want at "Argonaut"<sup>80</sup> and not to have any press representatives. Prime Minister Churchill agrees with this.

ROOSEVELT

**No. 260**

**PERSONAL AND SECRET**  
**FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN**  
**TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your cable about the attendance of press representatives and photographers at "Argonaut."<sup>80</sup> I have nothing against your suggestions.

I have sent a similar reply to the Prime Minister's<sup>71</sup> query.

January 23, 1945

No. 261

*Received on January 26, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Allow me to express my deep personal regret at the death of the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico.

Mr Oumansky made many friends in Washington, and we knew him well during the period of his services as Ambassador here.

ROOSEVELT

No. 262

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Thank you for the condolences on the occasion of the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, K. A. Oumansky, whose work was highly valued by the Soviet Government.

January 29, 1945

No. 263

*Sent on January 30, 1945*

**FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Please accept, Mr President, my heartfelt congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of your birthday.

No. 264

*Received on February 2, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Allow me to express my appreciation for the kind message of congratulations which you were good enough to send me on the anniversary of my birthday.

No. 265

**MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

The following are two basic military questions to which the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate an early answer at this conference<sup>81</sup>:

(a) Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?

(b) Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolayevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?<sup>82</sup>

F.D.R.

February 5, 1945

No. 266

**MARSHAL J. V. STALIN**

Koreiz, the Crimea

My dear Marshal Stalin,

I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three Great Powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political set up in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the

British are recognizing another in London. I am sure the state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government<sup>83</sup> as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin Government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr Osubka Morawski from the Lublin Government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr Mikolajczyk, Mr Grabski and Mr Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

February 6, 1945

No. 267

**TOP SECRET**

**MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

The full potential of the United States air forces now based in South-eastern Italy is not being realized due to excessive distances from the only available bases to targets in enemy territory and bad weather that is frequently encountered over the Alps and the Northern Adriatic. The staging or basing of fighters in the Budapest area would be of particular importance in providing the heavy fighter escort which is now required on deep penetrations and which may be increasingly necessary with the recent revival of German fighter strength employing jet-propelled aircraft. Also, the staging of heavy bombers in the Budapest area would considerably increase the radius of action and bomb tonnage delivered against targets north of the Alps by United States air forces.

Therefore your agreement is requested to the provision of two airdromes in the Budapest area for use by United States air units. If you agree, our military staffs can begin work on this project at once.<sup>84</sup>

February 7, 1945

No. 268

**MARSHAL J. V. STALIN**

Koreiz, the Crimea

My dear Marshal Stalin,

In connection with the tragic death in an airplane accident of your Ambassador to Mexico, Mr Oumansky, his wife and three secretaries of the Soviet Embassy, it has occurred to me that you might wish to have their remains sent back by United States Army plane either to Fairbanks, Alaska, for transfer to a Soviet plane, or, if you prefer, the United States Army plane could proceed with these remains direct to Moscow.

If you will let me know which of these alternatives you consider most desirable, I will be glad to have your wishes carried out.

I make the above suggestion on behalf of the American Government and people, who have been deeply shocked by this tragic occurrence.

Most sincerely yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

February 7, 1945

No. 269

*Received on February 8, 1945*

**MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

An urgent need exists for the earliest possible survey of targets bombed by the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, similar to the survey made of Ploesti. To be effective, investigation must be instituted before tangible evidence is destroyed and personnel present during the bombing are removed from the area.

Details of the survey requirements are being passed to Marshal Khudyakov.

I request your agreement to the conduct of these surveys.<sup>84</sup>

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT



No. 270

**TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

“Livadia,” the Crimea

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Please accept my thanks for the sentiments expressed on behalf of the American people and the U.S. Government on the occasion of the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, K. A. Oumansky, his wife and the three members of the Embassy staff.

The Soviet Government gratefully accepts your offer to have their remains sent to Moscow by a U.S. Army plane.

Yours very sincerely,

J. STALIN

Koreiz, February 9, 1945

No. 271

**MARSHAL J. V. STALIN**

Koreiz, the Crimea

My dear Marshal Stalin,

I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations<sup>14</sup> Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forth-

coming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

February 10, 1945

**No. 272**

**TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**

“Livadia,” the Crimea

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Your letter of February 10 received. I fully agree with you that because the Soviet Union’s votes will increase to three owing to the admission of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia to Assembly membership, the number of U.S. votes should likewise be increased.

I think that the U.S. votes should be raised to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two main Republics. If necessary, I am prepared to give official endorsement to this proposal.

Most sincerely yours,

J. STALIN

Koreiz, February 11, 1945

**No. 273**

*Received on February 13, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I wish again, upon leaving the hospitable shores of the Soviet Union, to tell you how deeply grateful I am for the many kindnesses which you showed me while I was your guest in the Crimea. I leave greatly heartened as a result of the meeting between you, the Prime Minister<sup>71</sup> and myself. The peoples of the world, I am sure, will regard the achievements of this meeting not only with approval but as a genuine assurance that our three great nations can work in peace as well as they have in war.

No. 274

*Received on February 23, 1945*

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

In anticipation of our common victory against the Nazi oppressors I wish to take this opportunity to extend my heartiest congratulations to you as Supreme Commander on this, the twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Red Army. The far-reaching decisions we took at Yalta will hasten victory and the establishment of a firm foundation for a lasting peace. The continued outstanding achievements of the Red Army together with the all-out effort of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> forces in the South and the West assure the speedy attainment of our common goal—a peaceful world based upon mutual understanding and cooperation.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

No. 275

*Sent on February 27, 1945*

**TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

The White House, Washington

Please accept, Mr President, my gratitude for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the Red Army.

I am confident that the further strengthening of cooperation between our two countries, which found expression in the decisions of the Crimea Conference, will shortly lead to the complete defeat of our common enemy and to a lasting peace based on the principle of cooperation among all freedom-loving nations.

J. STALIN

*Received on March 4, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have reliable information regarding the difficulties which are being encountered in collecting, supplying, and evacuating American ex-prisoners of war and American aircraft crews who are stranded east of the Russian lines. It is urgently requested that instructions be issued authorizing ten American aircraft with American crews to operate between Poltava<sup>85</sup> and places in Poland where American ex-prisoners of war and stranded airmen may be located. This authority is requested for the purpose of providing supplementary clothing, medical and food supplies for all American soldiers, to evacuate stranded aircraft crews and liberated prisoners of war, and especially to transfer the injured and sick to the American hospital at Poltava. I regard this request to be of the greatest importance not only for humanitarian reasons but also by reason of the intense interest of the American public in the welfare of our ex-prisoners of war and stranded aircraft crews.

Secondly, on the general matter of prisoners of war still in German hands, I feel that we ought to do something quickly. The number of these prisoners of war, Russian, British and United States, is very large. In view of your disapproval of the plan we submitted, what do you suggest instead?

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

Your message of March 4 about prisoners of war received. I have again conferred with our local representatives in charge of this matter and can tell you the following:

The difficulties which arose during the early stages of the speedy evacuation of American prisoners of war from the zones of direct military operations have decreased substantially. At present the special agency set up by the Soviet Government to take care of foreign prisoners of war has adequate personnel, transport facilities and food supplies, and whenever new groups of American prisoners of war are discovered steps

are taken at once to help them and to evacuate them to assembly points for subsequent repatriation. According to the information available to the Soviet Government, there is now no accumulation of U.S. prisoners of war on Polish territory or in other areas liberated by the Red Army, because all of them, with the exception of individual sick men who are in hospital, have been sent to the assembly point in Odessa, where 1,200 U.S. prisoners of war have arrived so far and the arrival of the remainder is expected shortly. Hence there is no need at the moment for U.S. planes to fly from Poltava<sup>85</sup> to Polish territory in connection with U.S. prisoners of war. You may rest assured that appropriate measures will immediately be taken also with regard to American aircraft crews making a forced landing. This, however, does not rule out cases in which the help of U.S. aircraft may be required. In this event the Soviet military authorities will request the U.S. military representatives in Moscow to send U.S. aircraft from Poltava.

As at the moment I have no proposals to make concerning the status of the Allied prisoners of war in German hands, I should like to assure you that we shall do all we can to provide them with facilities as soon as they find themselves on territory captured by Soviet troops.

March 5, 1945

No. 278

*Received on March 4, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

In the matter of evacuation of American ex-prisoners of war from Poland I have been informed that the approval for General Deane to survey the United States prisoners of war situation in Poland has been withdrawn. You stated in your last message to me that there was no need to accede to my request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies to Poland and to evacuate the sick. I have information that I consider positive and reliable that there are still a considerable number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland and also that there have been, certainly up to the last days and possibly still are, large numbers of other liberated American prisoners either at Soviet assembly points awaiting en-

trainment to Odessa or wandering about in small groups not in contact with Soviet authorities looking for American contact officers.

I cannot, in all frankness, understand your reluctance to permit American contact officers, with the necessary means, to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you to meet mine in this particular matter. Please call Ambassador Harriman to explain to you in detail my desires.

No. 279

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of your message about the evacuation of former U.S. prisoners of war from Poland.

With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans in Poland or awaiting evacuation to Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Odessa, there were only 17 sick U.S. servicemen on Polish soil as of March 16. I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.

With reference to the request contained in your message I must say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But in the given instance the matter concerns the interests of Soviet armies at the front and of Soviet commanders who do not want to have around odd officers who, while having no relation to the military operations, need looking after, want all kinds of meetings and contacts, protection against possible acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and other things that divert the attention of the commanders and their subordinates from their direct duties. Our commanders bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their rights to any extent.

I must also say that U.S. ex-prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet camps—better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners of war in U.S. camps, where some of them were lodged with German war prisoners and were subjected to unfair

treatment and unlawful persecutions, including beating, as has been communicated to the U.S. Government on more than one occasion.

March 22, 1945

No. 280

*Received on March 25, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

The State Department has just been informed by Ambassador Gromyko concerning the composition of the Soviet Delegation to the San Francisco Conference.<sup>86</sup> We have the highest regard for Ambassador Gromyko's character and capabilities and know that he would ably represent the Soviet Union. Nevertheless I cannot help but be deeply disappointed that Mr Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr Molotov, Mr Eden and Mr Stettinius, I know that the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing at San Francisco in the same spirit the joint work for the eventual realization of our common goal—the establishment of an effective international organization to insure for the world a secure and peaceful future.

The Conference, without Mr Molotov's presence, will be deprived of a very great asset. If his pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to stay for the entire Conference, I hope very much that you will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital opening sessions. All sponsoring Powers and the majority of the other countries attending will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In these circumstances I am afraid that Mr Molotov's absence will be construed all over the world as a lack of comparable interest in the great objectives of this Conference on the part of the Soviet Government.

*Received on March 25, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Ambassador Harriman has communicated to me a letter which he has received from Mr Molotov regarding an investigation being made by Field Marshal Alexander into a reported possibility of obtaining the surrender of part or all of the German army<sup>87</sup> in Italy. In this letter Mr Molotov demands that, because of the non-participation therein of Soviet officers, this investigation to be undertaken in Switzerland should be stopped forthwith.

The facts of this matter I am sure have, through a misunderstanding, not been correctly presented to you. The following are the facts:

Unconfirmed information was received some days ago in Switzerland that some German officers were considering the possibility of arranging for the surrender of German troops that are opposed to Field Marshal Alexander's British-American Armies in Italy.

Upon the receipt of this information in Washington, Field Marshal Alexander was authorized to send to Switzerland an officer or officers of his staff to ascertain the accuracy of the report and if it appeared to be of sufficient promise to arrange with any competent German officers for a conference to discuss details of the surrender with Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters in Italy. If such a meeting could be arranged Soviet representatives would, of course, be welcome.

Information concerning this investigation to be made in Switzerland was immediately communicated to the Soviet Government. Your Government was later informed that it will be agreeable for Soviet officers to be present at Field Marshal Alexander's meetings with German officers if and when arrangements are finally made in Berne for such a meeting at Caserta to discuss details of a surrender.

Up to the present time the attempts by our representatives to arrange a meeting with German officers have met with no success, but it still appears that such a meeting is a possibility.

My Government, as you will of course understand, must give every assistance to all officers in the field in command of Allied forces who believe there is a possibility of forcing the surrender of enemy troops in their area. For me to take any other attitude or to permit any delay which must cause additional and avoidable loss of life in the American forces



would be completely unreasonable. As a military man you will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. The sending of a flag of truce to your General at Königsberg or Danzig would be in the same category.

There can be in such a surrender of enemy forces in the field no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender and no political implications whatever.

I will be pleased to have at any discussion of the details of surrender by our commander of American forces in the field the benefit of the experience and advice of any of your officers who can be present, but I cannot agree to suspend investigation of the possibility because of objection by Mr Molotov for some reason completely beyond my comprehension.

Not much is expected from the reported possibility, but for the purpose of preventing misunderstanding between our officers, I hope you will point out to the Soviet officials concerned the desirability and necessity of our taking prompt and effective action without any delay to effect the surrender of any enemy military forces that are opposed to American forces in the field.

I feel certain that you will have the same attitude and will take the same action when a similar opportunity comes on the Soviet front.

No. 282

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

We highly value and attach great importance to the San Francisco<sup>86</sup> Conference to lay the foundations of an international organisation for peace and security of the nations, but present circumstances preclude V. M. Molotov's attendance. I and Molotov are very sorry about this, but the convening, at the instance of Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in April, at which Molotov's attendance is imperative, makes it impossible for him to attend even the opening session of the Conference.

You are aware that Ambassador Gromyko successfully coped with his task at Dumbarton Oaks,<sup>88</sup> and we are certain that he will ably head the Soviet Delegation at San Francisco.

As to the different interpretations, you will appreciate that they cannot determine the decisions to be taken.

March 27, 1945

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have analysed the matter raised in your letter of March 25, and find that the Soviet Government could not have given any other reply after its representatives were barred from the Berne negotiations with the Germans for a German surrender and opening the front to the Anglo-American troops in Northern Italy.

Far from being against, I am all for profiting from cases of disintegration in the German armies to hasten their surrender on one or another sector and encourage them to open the front to Allied forces.

But I agree to such talks with the enemy only in cases where they do not lead to an easing of the enemy's position, if the opportunity for the Germans to manoeuvre and to use the talks for switching troops to other sectors, above all to the Soviet front, is precluded.

And it was solely with an eye to providing this guarantee that the Soviet Government found it necessary to have representatives of its Military Command take part in such negotiations with the enemy wherever they might take place—whether in Berne or in Caserta. I cannot understand why the representatives of the Soviet Command have been excluded from the talks and in what way they could have handicapped the representatives of the Allied Command.

I must tell you for your information that the Germans have already taken advantage of the talks with the Allied Command to move three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front.

The task of coordinated operations involving a blow at the Germans from the West, South and East, proclaimed at the Crimea Conference, is to hold the enemy on the spot and prevent him from manoeuvring, from moving his forces to the points where he needs them most. The Soviet Command is doing this. But Field Marshal Alexander is not. This circumstance irritates the Soviet Command and engenders distrust.

“As a military man,” you write to me, “you will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. The sending of a flag of truce to your General at Königsberg or Danzig would be in the same category.” I am afraid the analogy does not fit the case. The German troops at Danzig and at Königsberg are encircled. If they surrender they will do so to escape extermination, but they cannot open the front

to Soviet troops because the front has shifted as far west as the Oder. The German troops in Northern Italy are in an entirely different position. They are not encircled and are not faced with extermination. If, nevertheless, the Germans in Northern Italy seek negotiations in order to surrender and to open the front to the Allied troops, then they must have some other, more far-reaching aims affecting the destiny of Germany.

I must tell you that if a similar situation had obtained on the Eastern Front, somewhere on the Oder, providing an opportunity for a German surrender and for the opening of the front to the Soviet troops, I should have immediately notified the Anglo-American Military Command and asked it to send its representatives to take part in the talks, for in a situation of this kind Allies should have nothing to conceal from each other.

March 29, 1945

No. 284

*Received on April 1, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the developments of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta. The decisions we reached there were good ones and have for the most part been welcomed with enthusiasm by the peoples of the world who saw in our ability to find a common basis of understanding the best pledge for a secure and peaceful world after this war. Precisely because of the hopes and expectations that these decisions raised, their fulfillment is being followed with the closest attention. We have no right to let them be disappointed. So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the conference particularly those relating to the Polish question I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having understood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed since then. I intend, therefore, in this message to lay before you with complete frankness the problem as I see it.


Although I have in mind primarily the difficulties which the

Polish negotiations have encountered, I must make a brief mention of our agreement embodied in the Declaration on Liberated Europe.<sup>89</sup> I frankly cannot understand why the recent developments in Roumania<sup>90</sup> should be regarded as not falling within the terms of that Agreement. I hope you will find time personally to examine the correspondence between our Governments on this subject.


However, the part of our agreements at Yalta which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that the Commission<sup>91</sup> which we set up has made no progress. I feel this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the Crimea decisions. In order that there shall be no misunderstanding I set forth below my interpretations of the points of the Agreement which are pertinent to the difficulties encountered by the Commission in Moscow.

In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government<sup>83</sup> is to be reorganized and its members play a prominent role, it is to be done in such a fashion as to bring into being a new government. This point is clearly brought out in several places in the text of the Agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw régime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed.

It is equally apparent that for the same reason the Warsaw Government cannot under the Agreement claim the right to select or reject what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by the Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is up to the Commission to select the Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult in the first instance and invitations be sent out accordingly. If this could be done I see no great objection to having the Lublin group come first in order that they may be fully acquainted with the agreed interpretation of the Yalta decisions on this point. It is of course understood that if the Lublin group come first no arrangements would be made independently with them before the arrival of the other Polish leaders called for consultation. In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for the consideration of the Commission. We have not



The leaders of the three powers at the Tehran Conference



The Crimea Conference  
Plenary session

and would not bar or veto any candidate for consultation which Mr Molotov might propose, being confident that he would not suggest any Poles who would be inimical to the intent of the Crimea decision. I feel that it is not too much to ask that my Ambassador be accorded the same confidence and that any candidate for consultation presented by any one of the Commission be accepted by the others in good faith. It is obvious to me that if the right of the Commission to select these Poles is limited or shared with the Warsaw Government the very foundation on which our agreement rests would be destroyed.

While the foregoing are the immediate obstacles which in my opinion have prevented our Commission from making any progress in this vital matter, there are two other suggestions which were not in the agreement but nevertheless have a very important bearing on the result we all seek. Neither of these suggestions has been as yet accepted by your Government. I refer to:

(1) That there should be the maximum of political tranquility in Poland and that dissident groups should cease any measures and counter-measures against each other. That we should respectfully use our influence to that end seems to me eminently reasonable.

(2) It would also seem entirely natural in view of the responsibilities placed upon them by the Agreement that representatives of the American and British members of the Commission should be permitted to visit Poland. As you will recall Mr Molotov himself suggested this at an early meeting of the Commission and only subsequently withdrew it.

I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development of our program of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decisions at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute form. You are, I am sure, aware that the genuine popular support in the United States is required to carry out any government policy, foreign or domestic. The American people make up their own mind and no government action can change it. I mention this fact because the last sentence of your message about Mr. Molotov's attendance at San Francisco<sup>86</sup> made me wonder whether you give full weight to this factor.

*Received on April 1, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

In the exchange of messages we have had on possible future negotiations with the Germans for surrender of their forces in Italy, it seems to me that, although both of us are in agreement on all the basic principles, the matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.

No negotiations-for surrender have been entered into, and if there should be any negotiations they will be conducted at Caserta with your representatives present throughout. Although the attempt at Berne to arrange for the conduct of these negotiations has been fruitless, Marshal Alexander has been directed to keep you informed of his progress in this matter.

I must repeat that the meeting in Berne was for the single purpose of arranging contact with competent German military officers and not for negotiations of any kind.

There is no question of negotiating with the Germans in any way which would permit them to transfer elsewhere forces from the Italian front. Negotiations, if any are conducted, will be on the basis of unconditional surrender. With regard to the lack of Allied offensive operations in Italy, this condition has in no way resulted from any expectation of an agreement with the Germans. As a matter of fact, recent interruption of offensive operations in Italy has been due primarily to the recent transfer of Allied forces, British and Canadian divisions, from that front to France. Preparations are now made for an offensive on the Italian front about April 10, but while we hope for success, the operation will be of limited power due to the lack of forces now available to Alexander. He has seventeen dependable divisions and is opposed by twenty-four German divisions. We intend to do everything within the capacity of our available resources to prevent any withdrawal of the German forces now in Italy.

I feel that your information about the time of the movements of German troops from Italy is in error. Our best information is that three German divisions have left Italy since the first of the year, two of which have gone to the Eastern Front. The last division of the three started moving about February 25, more than two weeks before anybody heard of any possibility of a surrender. It is therefore clearly evident that the approach made of German agents in Berne occurred after the last move-



ment of troops began and could not possibly have had any effect on the movement.

This entire episode has arisen through the initiative of a German officer reputed to be close to Himmler and there is, of course, a strong possibility that his sole purpose is to create suspicion and distrust between the Allies. There is no reason why we should permit him to succeed in that aim. I trust that the above categorical statement of the present situation and of my intentions will allay the apprehension which you express in your message of March 29.

No. 286

**PERSONAL, MOST SECRET**

**FROM MARSHAL J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT**

I am in receipt of your message on the Berne talks.

You are quite right in saying, with reference to the talks between the Anglo-American and German Commands in Berne or elsewhere, that "the matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust."

You affirm that so far no negotiations have been entered into. Apparently you are not fully informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on the basis of information in their possession, are sure that negotiations did take place and that they ended in an agreement with the Germans, whereby the German Commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, is to open the front to the Anglo-American troops and let them move east, while the British and Americans have promised, in exchange, to ease the armistice terms for the Germans.

I think that my colleagues are not very far from the truth. If the contrary were the case the exclusion of representatives of the Soviet Command from the Berne talks would be inexplicable.

Nor can I account for the reticence of the British, who have left it to you to carry on a correspondence with me on this unpleasant matter, while they themselves maintain silence, although it is known that the initiative in the matter of the Berne negotiations belongs to the British.

I realise that there are certain advantages resulting to the Anglo-American troops from these separate negotiations in Berne or in some other place, seeing that the Anglo-American troops are enabled to advance into the heart of Germany almost without resistance; but why conceal this from the Russians,

and why were the Russians, their Allies, not forewarned?

And so what we have at the moment is that the Germans on the Western Front have in fact ceased the war against Britain and America. At the same time they continue the war against Russia, the Ally of Britain and the U.S.A.

Clearly this situation cannot help preserve and promote trust between our countries.

I have already written in a previous message, and I think I must repeat, that I and my colleagues would never in any circumstances have taken such a hazardous step, for we realise that a momentary advantage, no matter how great, is overshadowed by the fundamental advantage of preserving and promoting trust between Allies.

April 3, 1945

No. 287

*Received on April 5, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

I have received with astonishment your message of April 3 containing an allegation that arrangements which were made between Field Marshals Alexander and Kesselring at Berne "permitted the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East and the Anglo-Americans promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms."

In my previous messages to you in regard to the attempts made in Berne to arrange a conference to discuss a surrender of the German army in Italy I have told you that: (1) No negotiations were held in Berne, (2) The meeting had no political implications whatever, (3) In any surrender of the enemy army in Italy there would be no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender, (4) Soviet officers would be welcomed at any meeting that might be arranged to discuss surrender.

For the advantage of our common war effort against Germany, which today gives excellent promise of an early success in a disintegration of the German armies, I must continue to assume that you have the same high confidence in my truthfulness and reliability that I have always had in yours.

I have also a full appreciation of the effect your gallant army has had in making possible a crossing of the Rhine by the forces under General Eisenhower and the effect that your

forces will have hereafter on the eventual collapse of the German resistance to our combined attacks.

I have complete confidence in General Eisenhower and know that he certainly would inform me before entering into any agreement with the Germans. He is instructed to demand and will demand unconditional surrender of enemy troops that may be defeated on his front. Our advances on the Western Front are due to military action. Their speed has been attributable mainly to the terrific impact of our air power resulting in destruction of German communications, and to the fact that Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of the German forces on the Western Front while they were still west of the Rhine.

I am certain that there were no negotiations in Berne at any time and I feel that your information to that effect must have come from German sources which have made persistent efforts to create dissension between us in order to escape in some measure responsibility for their war crimes. If that was Wolff's purpose in Berne, your message proves that he has had some success.

With a confidence in your belief in my personal reliability and in my determination to bring about, together with you, an unconditional surrender of the Nazis, it is astonishing that a belief seems to have reached the Soviet Government that I have entered into an agreement with the enemy without first obtaining your full agreement.

Finally I would say this, it would be one of the great tragedies of history if at the very moment of the victory, now within our grasp, such distrust, such lack of faith should prejudice the entire undertaking after the colossal losses of life, material and treasure involved.

Frankly I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates.

No. 288

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

I have received your message of April 5.

In my message of April 3 the point was not about integrity or trustworthiness. I have never doubted your integrity or trustworthiness, just as I have never questioned the integrity or trustworthiness of Mr Churchill. My point is that in the course of our correspondence a difference of views has arisen

over what an Ally may permit himself with regard to another and what he may not. We Russians believe that, in view of the present situation on the fronts, a situation in which the enemy is faced with inevitable surrender, whenever the representatives of one of the Allies meet the Germans to discuss surrender terms, the representatives of the other Ally should be enabled to take part in the meeting. That is absolutely necessary, at least when the other Ally seeks participation in the meeting. The Americans and British, however, have a different opinion—they hold that the Russian point of view is wrong. For that reason they have denied the Russians the right to be present at the meeting with the Germans in Switzerland. I have already written to you, and I see no harm in repeating that, given a similar situation, the Russians would never have denied the Americans and British the right to attend such a meeting. I still consider the Russian point of view to be the only correct one, because it precludes mutual suspicions and gives the enemy no chance to sow distrust between us.

2. It is hard to agree that the absence of German resistance on the Western Front is due solely to the fact that they have been beaten. The Germans have 147 divisions on the Eastern Front. They could safely withdraw from 15 to 20 divisions from the Eastern Front to aid their forces on the Western Front. Yet they have not done so, nor are they doing so. They are fighting desperately against the Russians for Zemlenice, an obscure station in Czechoslovakia, which they need just as much as a dead man needs a poultice, but they surrender without any resistance such important towns in the heart of Germany as Osnabrück, Mannheim and Kassel. You will admit that this behaviour on the part of the Germans is more than strange and unaccountable.

3. As regards those who supply my information, I can assure you that they are honest and unassuming people who carry out their duties conscientiously and who have no intention of affronting anybody. They have been tested in action on numerous occasions. Judge for yourself. In February General Marshall made available to the General Staff of the Soviet troops a number of important reports in which he, citing data in his possession, warned the Russians that in March the Germans were planning two serious counter-blows on the Eastern Front, one from Pomerania towards Thorn, the other from the Moravská Ostrava area towards Łódź. It turned out, however, that the main German blow had been prepared, and delivered, not in the areas mentioned above, but in an entirely different area, namely, in the Lake Balaton area, southwest of Budapest. The Germans, as we now know, had concentrated 35 divisions in the area, 11 of them armoured. This, with its great concentra-

tion of armour, was one of the heaviest blows of the war. Marshal Tolbukhin succeeded first in warding off disaster and then in smashing the Germans, and was able to do so also because my informants had disclosed—true, with some delay—the plan for the main German blow and immediately apprised Marshal Tolbukhin. Thus I had yet another opportunity to satisfy myself as to the reliability and soundness of my sources of information.

For your guidance in this matter I enclose a letter sent by Army General Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, to Major-General Deane.

April 7, 1945

Copy.

**S E C R E T**

**TO MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE,  
HEAD OF THE MILITARY MISSION OF THE U.S.A.  
IN THE U.S.S.R.**

Dear General Deane,

Please convey to General Marshall the following:

On February 20 I received a message from General Marshall through General Deane, saying that the Germans were forming two groups for a counter-offensive on the Eastern Front: one in Pomerania to strike in the direction of Thorn and the other in the Vienna-Moravská Ostrava area to advance in the direction of Łódź. The southern group was to include the 6th S.S. Panzer Army. On February 12 I received similar information from Colonel Brinkman, head of the Army Section of the British Military Mission.

I am very much obliged and grateful to General Marshall for the information, designed to further our common aims, which he so kindly made available to us.

At the same time it is my duty to inform General Marshall that the military operations on the Eastern Front in March did not bear out the information furnished by him. For the battles showed that the main group of German troops, which included the 6th S.S. Panzer Army, had been concentrated, not in Pomerania or in the Moravská Ostrava area, but in the Lake Balaton area, whence the Germans launched their offensive in an attempt to break through to the Danube and force it south of Budapest.

Thus, the information supplied by General Marshall was at variance with the actual course of events on the Eastern Front in March.

It may well be that certain sources of this information wanted to bluff both Anglo-American and Soviet Headquarters and divert the attention of the Soviet High Command from the area where the Germans were mounting their main offensive operation on the Eastern Front.

Despite the foregoing, I would ask General Marshall, if possible, to keep me posted with information about the enemy.

I consider it my duty to convey this information to General Marshall solely for the purpose of enabling him to draw the proper conclusions in relation to the source of the information.

Please convey to General Marshall my respect and gratitude.

Truly yours,

Army General ANTONOV  
Chief of staff of the Red Army

March 30, 1945

No. 289

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT**

With reference to your message of April 1st I think I must make the following comments on the Polish question.

The Polish question has indeed reached an impasse.

What is the reason?

The reason is that the U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission<sup>91</sup>—have departed from the instructions of the Crimea Conference, introducing new elements not provided for by the Crimea Conference.

Namely:

(a) At the Crimea Conference the three of us regarded the Polish Provisional Government as the government now functioning in Poland and subject to reconstruction, as the government that should be the core of a new Government of National Unity. The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, have departed from that thesis; they ignore the Polish Provisional Government, pay no heed to it and at best place individuals in Poland and London on a par with the Provisional

Government. Furthermore, they hold that reconstruction of the Provisional Government should be understood in terms of its abolition and the establishment of an entirely new government. Things have gone so far that Mr Harriman declared in the Moscow Commission that it might be that not a single member of the Provisional Government would be included in the Polish Government of National Unity.

Obviously this thesis of the U.S. and British Ambassadors cannot but be strongly resented by the Polish Provisional Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot accept a thesis that is tantamount to direct violation of the Crimea Conference decisions.

(b) At the Crimea Conference the three of us held that five people should be invited for consultation from Poland and three from London, not more. But the U.S. and British Ambassadors have abandoned that position and insist that each member of the Moscow Commission be entitled to invite an unlimited number from Poland and from London.

Clearly the Soviet Government could not agree to that, because, according to the Crimea decision, invitations should be sent not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, as a body. The demand for no limit to the number invited for consultation runs counter to what was envisaged at the Crimea Conference.

(c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption that, by virtue of the Crimea decisions, those invited for consultation should be in the first instance Polish leaders who recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the one on the Curzon Line,<sup>57</sup> and, secondly, who actually want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government insists on this because the blood of Soviet soldiers, so freely shed in liberating Poland, and the fact that in the past 30 years the territory of Poland has twice been used by an enemy for invading Russia, oblige the Soviet Government to ensure friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.

The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, ignore this and want to invite Polish leaders for consultation regardless of their attitude to the Crimea decisions and to the Soviet Union.

Such, to my mind, are the factors hindering a settlement of the Polish problem through mutual agreement.

In order to break the deadlock and reach an agreed decision, the following steps should, I think, be taken:

(1) Affirm that reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government implies, not its abolition, but its reconstruction by enlarging it, it being understood that the Provisional Gov-

ernment shall form the core of the future Polish Government of National Unity.

(2) Return to the provisions of the Crimea Conference and restrict the number of Polish leaders to be invited to eight persons, of whom five should be from Poland and three from London.

(3) Affirm that the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government shall be consulted in all circumstances, that they be consulted in the first place, since the Provisional Government is much stronger in Poland compared with the individuals to be invited from London and Poland whose influence among the population in no way compares with the tremendous prestige of the Provisional Government.

I draw your attention to this because, to my mind, any other decision on the point might be regarded in Poland as an affront to the people and as an attempt to impose a government without regard to Polish public opinion.

(4) Only those leaders should be summoned for consultation from Poland and from London who recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and who in practice want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

(5) Reconstruction of the Provisional Government to be effected by replacing a number of Ministers of the Provisional Government by nominees among the Polish leaders who are not members of the Provisional Government.

As to the ratio of old and new Ministers in the Government of National Unity, it might be established more or less on the same lines as was done in the case of the Yugoslav Government.

I think if these comments are taken into consideration the Polish question can be settled in a short time.

April 7, 1945

**No. 290**

*Received on April 13, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT**

Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of view on the Berne incident which it now appears has faded into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose.

In any event, there must not be mutual distrust, and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the



future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi armies will disintegrate.

**No. 291**

*Sent on April 13, 1945*

**FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Washington

On behalf of the Soviet Government and on my own behalf I express to the Government of the United States of America deep regret at the untimely death of President Roosevelt. The American people and the United Nations<sup>14</sup> have lost in the person of Franklin Roosevelt a great statesman of world stature and champion of post-war peace and security.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its heartfelt sympathy with the American people in their grievous loss and its confidence that the policy of cooperation between the Great Powers who have borne the brunt of the war against the common foe will be promoted in the future as well.

J. STALIN

**No. 292**

*Received on April 18, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

I appreciate your kind and true statement of the contribution which the late President Franklin Roosevelt made to the cause of civilization and your assurances with respect to the efforts which we will make in common in this same cause.

*Received on April 18, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER**

We are sending this joint reply to your messages of April 7 in regard to the Polish negotiations for the sake of greater clarity and in order that there will be no misunderstanding as to our position on this matter. The British and the United States Governments have tried most earnestly to be constructive and fair in their approach and will continue to do so. Before putting before you the concrete and constructive suggestion which is the purpose of this message we feel it necessary, however, to correct the completely erroneous impression which you have apparently received in regard to the position of the, British and United States Governments as set forth by our Ambassadors under direct instructions during the negotiations.

It is most surprising to have you state that the present government functioning in Warsaw has been in any way ignored during these negotiations. Such has never been our intention nor our position. You must be cognizant of the fact that our Ambassadors in Moscow have agreed without question that the three leaders of the Warsaw Government should be included in the list of Poles to be invited to come to Moscow for consultation with the Polish Commission.<sup>91</sup> We have never denied that among the three elements from which the new Provisional Government of National Unity is to be formed the representatives of the present Warsaw Government will play unquestionably a prominent part. Nor can it be said with any justification that our Ambassadors are demanding the right to invite an unlimited number of Poles. The right to put forward and have accepted by the Commission individual representative Poles from abroad and from within Poland to be invited to Moscow for consultation cannot be interpreted in that sense. Indeed in his message of April 1 President Roosevelt specifically said: "In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for consideration by the Commission." The real issue between us is whether or not the Warsaw Government has the right to veto individual candidates for consultation. No such interpretation in our considered opinion can be found in the Crimea decision. It appears to us that you are reverting to the original position taken by the Soviet delegation at the Crimea which was sub-

sequently modified in the agreement. Let us keep clearly in mind that we are now speaking only of the group of Poles who are to be invited to Moscow for consultation.

You mention the desirability of inviting eight Poles—five from within Poland and three from London—to take part in these first consultations and in your message to the Prime Minister you indicate that Mikolajczyk would be acceptable if he issued a statement in support of the Crimea decision. We, therefore, submit the following proposals for your consideration in order to prevent a breakdown, with all its incalculable consequences, of our endeavors to settle the Polish question. We hope that you will give them your most careful and earnest consideration.

1. That we instruct our representatives on the Commission to extend invitations immediately to the following Polish leaders to come to Moscow for consultation: Bierut, Osubka Morawski, Rola-Zymierski, Bishop Sapieha; one representative Polish political party leader not connected with the present Warsaw Government (if any of the following were agreeable to you he would be agreeable to us: Witos, Zulawski, Chacinski, Jasiukowicz), and from London Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Stanczyk.

2. That once the invitations to come for consultation have been issued by the Commission the representatives of the Warsaw Government could arrive first if desired.

3. That it be agreed that these Polish leaders called for consultation could suggest to the Commission the names of a certain number of other Polish leaders from within Poland or abroad who might be brought in for consultation in order that all the major Polish groups be represented in the discussions.

4. We do not feel that we could commit ourselves to any formula for determining the composition of the new Government of National Unity in advance of consultation with the Polish leaders and we do not in any case consider the Yugoslav precedent<sup>92</sup> to be applicable to Poland.

We ask you to read again carefully the American and British messages of April 1 since they set forth the larger considerations which we still have very much in mind and to which we must adhere.

TRUMAN

No. 294

*Received on April 20, 1945*

**HIS EXCELLENCY J. V. STALIN,  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

My countrymen join with me in sincerely thanking you for your message of sympathy which is a source of great comfort in our loss. It is my conviction that President Roosevelt's sacrifice for the cause of freedom will serve to strengthen the determination of all peoples that the goal, for which he so faithfully strove, shall not have been in vain.

Harry S. TRUMAN

No. 295

*Received on April 21, 1945*

**TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

With respect to the arrangements for the announcement of the meeting of our armies in Germany, I will see that instructions are given to General Eisenhower to inform the Soviet, British and United States Governments as soon as possible of the day on which the linking up of the Soviet-Anglo-American armies in Germany may be announced by the three Chiefs of Government.

In order that the announcement may be made simultaneously in all three capitals, I wish to propose that the hour of the day recommended by Eisenhower be twelve o'clock noon Washington Time, and would be glad to have your agreement to this proposal.

An identic message is being sent to Churchill.

TRUMAN

No. 296

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Your message about announcing the link-up of our armies in Germany reached me on April 21.

I have nothing against your proposal for accepting the hour for the announcement suggested by Gen. Eisenhower, that is, twelve o'clock noon Washington Time.

I am sending a similar message to Mr Churchill.

April 23, 1945

No. 297

**FOR INFORMATION OF MARSHAL STALIN**

There was an agreement at Yalta in which President Roosevelt participated for the United States Government to reorganize the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw in order to establish a new Government of National Unity in Poland by means of previous consultation between representatives of the Provisional Polish Government of Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad.

In the opinion of the United States Government the Crimean decision on Poland can only be carried out if a group of genuinely representative democratic Polish leaders are invited to Moscow for consultation. The United States Government cannot be party to any method of consultation with Polish leaders which would not result in the establishment of a new Provisional Government of National Unity genuinely representative of the democratic elements of the Polish people. The United States and British Governments have gone as far as they can to meet the situation and carry out the intent of the Crimean decisions in their joint message delivered to Marshal Stalin on April 18th.

The United States Government earnestly requests that the Soviet Government accept the proposals set forth in the joint message of the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. And that Mr Molotov continue the conversations with the Secretary of State and Mr Eden in San Francisco on that basis.

The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the

unity of the three Governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past.

Harry S. TRUMAN

April 23, 1945<sup>93</sup>

No. 298

### J. V. STALIN TO H. TRUMAN\*

I have received from you and Prime Minister Churchill the joint message of April 18 and the message transmitted to me through V. M. Molotov on April 24.


The messages indicate that you still regard the Polish Provisional Government, not as the core of a future Polish Government of National Unity, but merely as a group on a par with any other group of Poles. It would be hard to reconcile this concept of the position of the Provisional Government and this attitude towards it with the Crimea decision on Poland. At the Crimea Conference the three of us, including President Roosevelt, based ourselves on the assumption that the Polish Provisional Government, as the Government now functioning in Poland and enjoying the trust and support of the majority of the Polish people, should be the core, that is, the main part of a new, reconstructed Polish Government of National Unity.

You apparently disagree with this understanding of the issue. By turning down the Yugoslav example<sup>92</sup> as a model for Poland, you confirm that the Polish Provisional Government cannot be regarded as a basis for, and the core of, a future Government of National Unity.


2. Another circumstance that should be borne in mind is that Poland borders on the Soviet Union, which cannot be said about Great Britain or the U.S.A.

Poland is to the security of the Soviet Union what Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.

You evidently do not agree that the Soviet Union is entitled to seek in Poland a Government that would be friendly to it, that the Soviet Government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a Government hostile to it. This is rendered imperative, among other things, by the Soviet people's blood freely shed on the fields of Poland for the liberation of that country. I do not know whether a genuinely representative Government has been established in Greece, or whether the Belgian Government is a genuinely democratic one. The Soviet Union was



The Potsdam Conference in session



The house where the Potsdam Conference was held



not consulted when those Governments were being formed, nor did it claim the right to interfere in those matters, because it realises how important Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.

I cannot understand why in discussing Poland no attempt is made to consider the interests of the Soviet Union in terms of security as well.

3. One cannot but recognise as unusual a situation in which two Governments—those of the United States and Great Britain—reach agreement beforehand on Poland, a country in which the U.S.S.R. is interested first of all and most of all, and place its representatives in an intolerable position, trying to dictate to it.

I say that this situation cannot contribute to agreed settlement of the Polish problem.

4. I am ready to accede to your request and to do all in my power to reach an agreed settlement. But you are asking too much. To put it plainly, you want me to renounce the interests of the security of the Soviet Union; but I cannot proceed against the interests of my country.

I think there is only one way out of the present situation and that is to accept the Yugoslav precedent as a model for Poland. That, I believe, might enable us to arrive at agreed settlement.

April 24, 1945

No. 299

*Received on April 25, 1945*

**TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

I wish to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your message of April 23.

The text of the announcement which I propose to release at the date and time to be indicated by General Eisenhower is as follows:

“The Anglo-American Armies under the command of General Eisenhower have met the Soviet Forces where they intended to meet—in the heart of Nazi Germany. The enemy has been cut in two. This is not the hour of final victory in Europe, but the hour draws near, the hour for which all the American people, all the British peoples and all the Soviet people have toiled and prayed so long. The union of our arms in the heart

of Germany has a meaning for the world which the world will not miss. It means, first, that the last faint, desperate hope of Hitler and his gangster government has been extinguished. The common front and the common cause of the Powers allied in this war against tyranny and inhumanity have been demonstrated in fact as they have long been demonstrated in determination. Nothing can divide or weaken the common purpose of our veteran armies to pursue their victorious purpose to its final Allied triumph in Germany. Second, the junction of our forces at this moment signalizes to ourselves and to the world that the collaboration of our nations in the cause of peace and freedom is an effective collaboration which can surmount the greatest difficulties of the most extensive campaign in military history and succeed. Nations which can plan and fight together, shoulder to shoulder, in the face of such obstacles of distance and of language and of communications as we have overcome, can live together and can work together in the common labor of the organization of the world for peace. Finally, this great triumph of Allied arms and Allied strategy is such a tribute to the courage and determination of Franklin Roosevelt as no words could ever speak, and that could be accomplished only by the persistence and the courage of the fighting soldiers and sailors of the Allied Nations. But, until our enemies are finally subdued in Europe and in the Pacific, there must be no relaxation of effort on the home front in support of our heroic soldiers and sailors as we all know there will be no pause on the battle fronts.”

No. 300

*Received on April 26, 1945*

### TRUMAN TO J. V. STALIN\*

The United States Minister to Sweden has informed me that Himmler, speaking in the name of the German Government in the absence of Hitler who is said to be incapacitated, has approached the Swedish Government with an offer to surrender all the German forces on the Western Front, including Norway, Denmark and Holland.

2. In keeping with our agreement with the British and Soviet Governments it is the view of the United States Government that the only acceptable terms of surrender are unconditional surrender on all fronts to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.

3. If the Germans accept the terms of paragraph 2 above

they should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders in the field.

4. If you are in agreement with paragraphs 2 and 3 above I will direct my Minister in Sweden to so inform Himmler's agent.

An identical message is being sent to Prime Minister Churchill.

No. 301

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message of April 26 received. Thank you for informing me of Himmler's intention to surrender on the Western Front. I think that your contemplated reply to Himmler, which calls for unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, is absolutely sound. Please act in the spirit of your proposal, and as for us Russians, we undertake to continue our attacks upon the Germans.

For your information I have sent a similar reply to Prime Minister Churchill who had made the same inquiry.

April 26, 1945

No. 302

*Received on April 27, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

I have sent the following message today to Mr Johnson at Stockholm:

"With reference to your message of April 25, 3 a.m. inform Hitler's agent that the only acceptable terms of surrender by Germany are unconditional surrender to the Soviet Government, Great Britain and the United States, on all fronts.

"If the terms of surrender set forth above are accepted, the German forces should surrender at once on all fronts to the local commander in the field.

"In all theaters where resistance is continued the Allied attack will be vigorously prosecuted until complete victory is achieved."

TRUMAN

No. 303

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Your message concerning the instructions you have given to Mr Johnson reached me on April 27. Thank you for the news.

The decision to seek unconditional surrender of the German armed forces, adopted by you and Mr Churchill, is to my mind the right reply to the German proposals.

April 28, 1945

No. 304

*Received on April 28, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT**

I have received from Prime Minister Churchill a message dated April 27, addressed to you and to myself, with respect to an orderly procedure for the occupation by our forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria.

I am in full agreement with the message referred to above, addressed to both of us by Prime Minister Churchill, and I will inform the Prime Minister likewise of my agreement thereto.

No. 305

*Received on April 30, 1945*

**TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

The following is the text of a message I have sent to Prime Minister Churchill:

“I suggest, with reference to Marshal Alexander’s NAF 934,<sup>94</sup> that the announcement of the local surrender of German armies in Italy to combined Anglo-American forces be made by Alexander at a time that is in his opinion suitable and

correct, and that the first announcement be not made elsewhere.

“If you agree, please instruct Alexander accordingly.”

TRUMAN

No. 306

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

I received on April 28 your message expressing agreement with the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, concerning the procedure of the occupation of Germany and Austria.<sup>95</sup>

The Soviet Supreme Command has given instructions that whenever Soviet troops contact Allied troops the Soviet Command is immediately to get in touch with the Command of the U.S. or British troops, so that they, by agreement between themselves, (1) establish a temporary tactical demarcation line and (2) take steps to crush within the bounds of their temporary demarcation line all resistance by German troops.

May 2, 1945

No. 307

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Thank you for communicating to me the text of your message to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, concerning the German surrender in Italy. I have nothing against Field Marshal Alexander publishing the announcement of the surrender as proposed by you.

May 2, 1945

*Sent on May 4, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

In view of your interest in the Polish question and because you are bound to be familiar with Mr Churchill's message to me on the subject, dated April 28, I think it proper to send you the full text of my reply to Mr Churchill, despatched on May 4.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO PRIME MINISTER W. CHURCHILL**

I am in receipt of your message of April 28 on the Polish question.

I must say that I cannot accept the arguments put forward in support of your stand.

You are inclined to regard the proposal that the Yugoslav precedent<sup>92</sup> be accepted as a model for Poland as renunciation of the procedure agreed between us for setting up a Polish Government of National Unity. I cannot agree with you. I think that the Yugoslav precedent is important first of all because it points the way to the most suitable and practical solution of the problem of forming a new United Government based on the governmental agency at present exercising state power in the country.

It is quite obvious that, unless the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and enjoying the support and trust of a majority of the Polish people is taken as a basis for a future Government of National Unity, it will be impossible to count on successful fulfilment of the task set us by the Crimean Conference.

2. I cannot subscribe to that part of your considerations on Greece where you suggest three-Power control over the elections. Such control over the people of an allied country would of necessity be assessed as an affront and gross interference in their internal affairs. Such control is out of place in relation to former satellite countries which subsequently declared war on Germany and ranged themselves with the Allies, as demonstrated by electoral experience, for example, in Finland,

where the election was held without outside interference and yielded positive results.

Your comments on Belgium and Poland as war theatres and communication corridors are perfectly justified. As regards Poland, it is her being a neighbour of the Soviet Union that makes it essential for a future Polish Government to seek in practice friendly relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R., which is also in the interests of the other freedom-loving nations. This circumstance, too, speaks for the Yugoslav precedent. The United Nations are interested in constant and durable friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Hence we cannot acquiesce in the attempts that are being made to involve in the forming of a future Polish Government people who, to quote you, "are not fundamentally anti-Russian," or to bar from participation only those who, in your view, are "extreme people unfriendly to Russia." Neither one nor the other can satisfy us. We insist, and shall continue to insist, that only people who have demonstrated by deeds their friendly attitude to the Soviet Union, who are willing honestly and sincerely to cooperate with the Soviet state, should be consulted on the formation of a future Polish Government.

3. I must deal specially with paragraph 11 of your message concerning the difficulties arising from rumours about the arrest of 15 Poles, about deportations, etc.

I am able to inform you that the group of Poles mentioned by you comprises 16, not 15, persons. The group is headed by the well-known General Okulicki. The British information services maintain a deliberate silence, in view of his particular odiousness, about this Polish General, who, along with the 15 other Poles, has "disappeared." But we have no intention of being silent about the matter. This group of 16, led by General Okulicki, has been arrested by the military authorities of the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki's group, in the first place General Okulicki himself, is charged with preparing and carrying out subversive activities behind the lines of the Red Army, subversion which has taken a toll of over a hundred Red Army soldiers and officers; the group is also charged with keeping illegal radio-transmitters in the rear of our troops, which is prohibited by law. All, or part of them—depending on the outcome of the investigation—will be tried. That is how the Red Army is forced to protect its units and its rear lines against saboteurs and those who create disorder.

The British information services are spreading rumours about the murder or shooting of Poles in Siedlce. The report is a fabrication from beginning to end and has, apparently, been concocted by Arciszewski's agents.

4. It appears from your message that you are unwilling to consider the Polish Provisional Government as a basis for a future Government of National Unity, or to accord it the place in that Government to which it is entitled. I must say frankly that this attitude precludes the possibility of an agreed decision on the Polish question.

May 4, 1945

**No. 309**

*Received on May 5, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

It has been arranged that General Eisenhower will give us sufficient advance notice of his proclamation of V.-E. Day so that we may coordinate our announcement with his proclamation. I shall inform you immediately upon receiving his notification in order that it may be possible for us to make simultaneous announcements. Do you not agree that it is most important that the statements to be made by you and Churchill and myself should be made at the same time?

A similar message is being sent to Churchill.

**No. 310**

*Received on May 5, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

In reply to your message of April 24, on the Polish question, I wish to say the following.

I have received from Prime Minister Churchill a copy of his message to you of April 28. Since you are well acquainted with the position of the United States Government from the messages you have received from President Roosevelt and myself I need hardly tell you that I agree with the views set forth in Mr Churchill's message of April 28 in regard to the reorganization of the Polish Government. This Government still considers that the Crimea decisions constitute a fair basis of settlement for the Polish question and should be carried out at this time.



The three foreign secretaries in their meetings on the Polish matter have not yet succeeded in producing a satisfactory formula. I consider it of the utmost importance that a satisfactory solution of this problem be worked out at the earliest possible moment.

I must tell you that any suggestion that the representatives of the present Warsaw Provisional Government be invited to San Francisco,<sup>96</sup> conditionally or otherwise, is wholly unacceptable to the Government of the United States. For the United States to agree to such an invitation would mean to accept the present Warsaw Provisional Government as representative of Poland. This would be equivalent to abandoning the agreement reached in the Crimea.

No. 311

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A.,  
Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message about announcing V.-E. Day reached me on May 5.

I agree with your proposal for the three of us—you, Mr Churchill and myself—simultaneously making an appropriate statement. Mr. Churchill suggests 3 p.m. British Double Summer Time, which corresponds to 4 p.m. Moscow Time and 9 a.m. Washington Time. I have notified Mr Churchill that this hour suits the U.S.S.R.

May 6, 1945

No. 312

*Received on May 7, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

The following refers to General Eisenhower's telegram of today's date concerning the timing of the announcement of surrender. Assuming that it is agreeable to you, I will announce surrender, as recommended by Eisenhower, at 9 a.m. Washington Time on Tuesday, May 8.

This is a momentous occasion for the United Nations<sup>14</sup> and for the world.

A similar message is going forward to Prime Minister Churchill.

TRUMAN

No. 313

**SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr TRUMAN**

I am in receipt of your message of May 7 about announcing Germany's surrender.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army is not sure that the order of the German High Command on unconditional surrender will be executed by the German armies on the Eastern Front. We fear, therefore, that if the Government of the U.S.S.R. announces today the surrender of Germany we may find ourselves in an awkward position and mislead the Soviet public. It should be borne in mind that the German resistance on the Eastern Front is not slackening but, judging by intercepted radio messages, a considerable grouping of German troops have explicitly declared their intention to continue the resistance and to disobey Dönitz's surrender order.

For this reason the Command of the Soviet troops would like to wait until the German surrender takes effect and to postpone the Government's announcement of the surrender till May 9, 7 p.m. Moscow Time.<sup>97</sup>

May 7, 1945

No. 314

*Received on May 8, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Now that the Soviet-Anglo-American Forces have beaten the armies of the Fascist aggressors into unconditional surrender, I wish to express to you and through you to your heroic armies the fervent congratulations of our people and their Government. We fully appreciate the magnificent contribution

made by the mighty Soviet Union to the cause of civilization and liberty.

You have demonstrated the ability of a freedom-loving and supremely courageous people to crush the evil forces of barbarism, however powerful. On this occasion of our common victory, we salute the people and armies of the Soviet Union, and their superlative leadership.

I will be pleased if you wish to transmit these sentiments to your appropriate commanders in the field.

Harry S. TRUMAN

No. 315

**MESSAGE FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr TRUMAN**

I thank you with all my heart for your friendly congratulations on the unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany. The peoples of the Soviet Union greatly appreciate the part played by the friendly American people in this liberation war. The joint effort of the Soviet, U.S. and British Armed Forces against the German invaders, which has culminated in the latter's complete rout and defeat, will go down in history as a model military alliance between our peoples.

On behalf of the Soviet people and Government I beg you to convey my warmest greetings and congratulations on the occasion of this great victory to the American people and the gallant U.S. Armed Forces.

J. STALIN

May 9, 1945

No. 316

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message of May 5 on the subject of Poland received.

On the previous day I sent you the text of my reply to Mr Churchill's message of April 28 on the same subject. I hope you have received that text.

I think, therefore, that I need not return to the matter. I should merely like to add this:

I have a feeling that you are unwilling to consider the Polish Provisional Government as a basis for the future Government of National Unity and object to the Polish Provisional Government occupying in that Government the place to which it is entitled. I am obliged to say that this attitude rules out an agreed decision on the Polish question.

May 10, 1945

No. 317

*Received on May 17, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT  
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

On April 13 you made to Ambassador Harriman the good suggestion that American and Allied representatives go to Vienna to study the Vienna zones of occupation, in order that agreements on the occupation of Austria now pending in the European Advisory Commission<sup>98</sup> may be completed. I am unable to understand why the Soviet authorities are now refusing to permit such representatives to proceed to Vienna, contrary to your suggestion.

An examination and discussion on the spot by the military authorities who will later be responsible for the smooth operation of the inter-allied administration of Austria would greatly facilitate an intelligent arrangement of the Vienna zones. The Soviet representative in the European Advisory Commission, for example, has recently proposed that the needs of the American forces in the line of air communications be met by placing under American administration the airport at Tulln, twenty kilometers north-west of Vienna, in lieu of an airport in Vienna itself. However, neither he nor we know the precise dimensions or conditions of this airport, and if we are to give his proposal proper consideration we should be permitted to survey the airport.

In view of the fact that the area to be zoned is no longer occupied by the enemy, it seems only reasonable to examine it, as you suggested, in order to facilitate completion of the agreements in the European Advisory Commission. The American public would not understand the continued refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit this, in spite of your original suggestion.

I hope, consequently, that you will yourself let me know whether you will issue to Marshal Tolbukhin the instructions

necessary to facilitate a survey by the Allied representatives of those areas of Vienna which are now under discussion in the European Advisory Commission.

TRUMAN

No. 318

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message of May 17 about the visit of U.S. and Allied military representatives to Vienna received. Actually I had agreed in principle to their coming but, of course, I had done so on the understanding that by the time they arrived proper agreement would have been reached as to the occupation zones of Austria and the zones themselves determined by the European Advisory Commission.<sup>98</sup> As agreed between Mr Churchill, President Roosevelt and myself, these matters are wholly under the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission. That is still my point of view. Hence we could not agree to the point about the occupation zones and other points concerning Austria being referred to Vienna for consideration.

I have no objection, however, to U.S. and Allied representatives going to Vienna to see for themselves the condition of the city and to draft proposals for its occupation zones. Marshal Tolbukhin will be instructed accordingly. The understanding is that the U.S. military representatives should come to Vienna at the end of May or the beginning of June, when Marshal Tolbukhin, now en route to Moscow, returns.

May 18, 1945

No. 319

*Received on May 20, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

I feel certain that you are as cognizant as I am of the difficulties of dealing with the complicated and important question with which we are faced by exchanges of messages. Pending the possibility of our meeting, I am therefore sending to

Moscow Mr. Harry Hopkins with Ambassador Harriman in order that they may have an opportunity of discussing these matters with you personally. Mr Hopkins will return immediately to Washington following his talks in order that he may report to me personally. Mr Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman plan to arrive in Moscow about May 26. I would appreciate it if you would advise me whether this time meets with your convenience.

No. 320

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

I have received your message about the arrival of Mr Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow by May 26. I readily agree to your suggestion for a meeting with Mr Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman. May 26 suits me perfectly.

May 20, 1945

No. 321

*Received on May 21, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

I have received your message of May 18 concerning the dispatch of Allied representatives to Vienna for the purpose of acquainting themselves with the situation there and preparing proposals regarding zones of occupation, and I have informed our representatives of the dates you suggested.

TRUMAN

*Received on May 21, 1945*

**TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN**

I have been keeping you informed through the Embassy in Moscow of the United States position with respect to the interim administration of Venezia Giulia. Your Government, in particular, was furnished with copies of the recent United States and British Notes to Marshal Tito which proposed, in accordance with the previous understanding arrived at between Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito in February of this year, that the Supreme Allied Commander, in order not to prejudice any final disposition of the territory by either of the claimants, should exercise control in an area to include Trieste, Monfalcone, Gorizia and Pola.

We have now had a reply from Marshal Tito. This reply is entirely unsatisfactory in that he states that his Government is not prepared "to renounce the right of the Yugoslav Army holding the territory up to the Isonzo River." With regard to the administration of the area he offers a solution which cannot be reconciled with the principles we have set forth. Meanwhile, the problem of the forces of Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito in undefined areas of occupation and the dual nature of the control which is thus created are fraught with danger. You will have seen from the communication of Ambassador Harriman to Mr Molotov of last March, as well as from our recent public statement and from the communication to Marshal Tito, that we cannot view this simply as a boundary dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy but must look upon it as a question of principle which involves the pacific settlement of territorial disputes, and the foundation of a lasting peace in Europe. Neither now nor in the future will we take or permit any action in respect to this territory which does not fully take into account the legitimate claims of Yugoslavia and the contribution which Yugoslav forces made to the victory over Germany, which was won at such great cost to all of us. We cannot, however, accept any compromise upon the principles of an orderly and rapid settlement, and Marshal Tito is being informed to this effect.

You will agree, I know, that we must stand firm on the issue of principle, and I hope that we can likewise count on your influence to assist in bringing about the provisional settlement outlined in our recent Note to Marshal Tito. Once Field Marshal Alexander's authority has been extended in the section

of Venezia Giulia indicated in our Note and tranquility has thus been restored, we could then continue to work toward further adjustments of the problem in the spirit of the understandings reached at Yalta.

TRUMAN

No. 323

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message on the Istria-Trieste area reached me on May 21. A little earlier I received from you, through Mr Kennan, the text of a message on the same subject,<sup>99</sup> transmitted by the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade to the Yugoslav Government. Thank you for the information.

My views on the substance of the matter are as follows.

I think you are quite correct in saying that the matter is one of principle and that in relation to the Istria-Trieste territory no action should be permitted that does not take full account of Yugoslavia's rightful claims and of the contribution made by the Yugoslav armed forces to the common Allied cause in fighting against Hitler Germany. It goes without saying that the future of that territory, the population of which is mostly Yugoslav, will have to be determined at the peace settlement. However, the point at issue at the moment is its temporary military occupation. In this respect account should be taken, I believe, of the fact that it was the allied Yugoslav troops who drove the German invaders out of the Istria-Trieste territory thereby rendering an important service to the common Allied cause. By virtue of this circumstance alone, it would be unfair and would be a gratuitous insult to the Yugoslav Army and people to deny Yugoslavia the right to occupy a territory won from the enemy, after their great sacrifice in the struggle for the national rights of Yugoslavia and for the common cause of the United Nations.<sup>14</sup>

The right solution of this problem, in my view, would be for the Yugoslav troops and administration now functioning in the Istria-Trieste area to stay there. At the same time the area should be placed under the control of the Allied Supreme Commander and a demarcation line established by mutual agreement between Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito. If these proposals were accepted the problem of administra-



tion in the Istria-Trieste area would likewise find the right solution.

And since Yugoslavs are a majority in the territory and even during the German occupation a local Yugoslav administration, now enjoying the trust of the local population, began to function there, these things should be taken into account. The problem of administrative government of the territory could be properly solved by subordinating the existing Yugoslav civil administration to the Yugoslav Military Command.

I do hope that the misunderstandings over the status of the Istria-Trieste region, which have arisen between the U.S. and British Governments, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav Government, on the other, will be removed and a happy solution found.

May 22, 1945

No. 324

*Received on May 23, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Your wire concerning Mr Hopkins' visit has been received, and I was most pleased to have it. I think it is wiser that I announce publicly his proposed visit to Moscow following his departure from the United States rather than risk having it leak out and become the subject of speculation in the press. Mr Hopkins is planning to leave tomorrow morning, May 23, and later in the day I propose to announce to the press that he is proceeding to Moscow in company with Ambassador Harriman to talk over with you matters now under discussion between our two Governments.

No. 325

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Military and Naval Commands, Germany, in keeping with the instrument of surrender, has delivered her navy and merchant marine to the British and Americans. I must inform you that

the Germans have refused to surrender a single warship or merchant vessel to the Soviet armed forces, and have sent the whole of their navy and merchant marine to be handed over to the Anglo-American armed forces.

In these circumstances the question naturally arises of assigning the Soviet Union its share of German warships and merchant vessels, as was done with regard to Italy. The Soviet Government holds that it can with good reason and in all fairness count on a minimum of one-third of Germany's navy and merchant marine. In addition I think it necessary for the naval representatives of the U.S.S.R. to be enabled to acquaint themselves with all the materials pertaining to the surrender of Germany's navy and merchant marine, and with their actual condition.

The Soviet Naval Command has appointed Admiral Levchenko and a group of assistants to take care of the matter.

I am sending a similar message to Prime Minister Churchill.

May 23, 1945

No. 326

*Received on May 25, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT**

I have received your message of May 22 on the question of Istria-Trieste and wish to thank you for your expression of opinion on this subject.

No. 327

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

More than eight months have passed since Roumania and Bulgaria broke off relations with Hitler Germany, signed an armistice with the Allied countries and entered the war on the Allied side, against Germany, assigning their armed forces for the purpose. They thereby contributed to the defeat of Hitlerism and to the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe. The Governments of Bulgaria and Roumania have during this time

demonstrated by deeds their readiness to cooperate with the United Nations.<sup>14</sup> Consequently the Soviet Government deems it proper and timely right away to resume diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria and exchange envoys with them.

The Soviet Government also considers it advisable to resume diplomatic relations with Finland, which, fulfilling the terms of the armistice agreement, is now taking the democratic way. I think it will be possible a little later to adopt a similar decision with regard to Hungary.

I am simultaneously sending a similar message to Mr W. Churchill.

May 27, 1945

No. 328

*Received on May 30, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Thanks for your suggestion regarding surrendered German ships contained in your message of May 23rd.

This appears to me to be an appropriate subject for discussion by the three of us at the forthcoming meeting at which time I am sure a solution which will be fully acceptable to all of us can be reached.

With regard to the available records of the German naval surrender, it is my understanding that examination of the German files is now being considered by our appropriate commanders in the areas concerned.

No. 329

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Mr Hopkins conveyed to me today your proposal for a tripartite meeting. I have no objection to the date—July 15—suggested by you.

May 30, 1945

*Received on May 31, 1945*

**FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I have received your message of May 23 and am glad you share my conviction that the future of the Venezia Giulia territory should be determined during the peace adjustment. Only by the maintenance of these principles which take into account legitimate aspirations of the peoples concerned can we insure for the future peaceful and orderly development.

Subsequent to the dispatch of my message to you on May 20 Marshal Tito has informed both the United States and British Governments that he agrees to the establishment of Allied Military Government under the authority of the Allied Supreme Command in the Mediterranean. In order that the Allied Commander may fulfill the responsibility we have placed upon him in this respect he must have adequate authority to enable him to carry out this task and to safeguard the interests of all concerned. We must therefore leave to him the determination of the method in which civil administration will be carried out and the number of Yugoslav troops under his command which may be maintained in the area. He is prepared to utilize Yugoslav civil administration which in his opinion is working satisfactorily but, particularly in centers which are predominantly Italian, he must have authority to change administrative personnel in his discretion.

We can, I am confident, work out a solution along these lines and I am instructing the American Ambassador in Moscow to furnish your Government with the details of the proposal which the British and American Governments are presenting to Marshal Tito in the confident assurance that we can arrive at a satisfactory settlement.

No. 331

*Received on June 2, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Thanks for your message of May 30 with regard to the date of our forthcoming tripartite meeting.

I have informed Prime Minister Churchill that you and I are agreeable to meeting about July 15 in the vicinity of Berlin.

No. 332

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message of June 2 received.

I have already written to you that I agree to July 15 as a perfectly suitable date for the tripartite meeting.

June 3, 1945

No. 333

*Received on June 7, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I have given considerable thought to your message of May 27 in which you propose that our Governments should establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania and Bulgaria at this time and with Hungary at a later time.

The suggestion you have made shows that you feel, as I do, that we should endeavor to make the period of the armistice regimes as short as possible and also give prompt recognition to all efforts which may be made by those countries formerly our enemies to align themselves with the democratic principles of the allied nations. I agree, therefore, that at the earliest feasible time normal relations with these countries should be established.

Accordingly, I am prepared to proceed with the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Finland at once because the Finnish people, through their elections and other political adjustments, have demonstrated their genuine devotion to democratic procedures and principles.

However, I have not found in Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria the same encouraging signs. Particularly in the latter two countries, I have been disturbed to find governments which do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the rights of free expression and which in their system of administration are, in my opinion, neither representative of or responsive to the will of the people. From Ambassador Harriman's note of March 14<sup>100</sup> you already know the reasons why the United States Government considers that the political situation in Roumania should be made the subject of consultation among the three principal Allied Governments. You are also aware of American concern over the proposed electoral procedures and certain other political manifestations in Bulgaria.

It is my sincere hope that the time may soon come when I can accredit formal diplomatic representatives to these countries. To this end I am ready at any moment to have my representatives meet with Soviet and British representatives in order to concert more effectively our policies and actions in this area. This would, I think, be a constructive move towards the restoration of normal peacetime relations with them as independent states ready to assume the responsibilities and to share the benefits of participation in the family of nations.

Prime Minister Churchill is being informed of this message.

No. 334

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Thank you for your second message about the Istria-Trieste area. I have also read Mr Harriman's Note setting forth the proposals of the U.S. and British Governments to the Government of Yugoslavia for a settlement.<sup>101</sup>

I gather from your communication that agreement has been reached in principle between the U.S. and British Governments, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav Government, on the other, concerning the establishment in the Trieste-Istria territory of an Allied Military Administration under the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. I think, however,

that a complete settlement of the situation in Trieste-Istria necessitates agreement with the Yugoslav Government also on the concrete proposals made by the U.S. and British Governments.

Now that the Yugoslav Government has consented to the establishment of an Allied Military Administration in the Trieste-Istria territory it is my hope that nothing will be put in the way of Yugoslav interests being fully met and that a happy solution will be found to the entire problem of the present strained situation in the Trieste-Istria area.

June 8, 1945

No. 335

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

I have received your message in reply to my suggestions for resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary.

It appears from your message that you, too, consider it desirable to establish normal diplomatic relations with these countries at the earliest possible date. However, I see no reason to show any preference in the matter to Finland which, unlike Roumania or Bulgaria, did not participate on the Allied side in the war against Hitler Germany. Public opinion in the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet command would find it hard to understand if Roumania and Bulgaria, the armed forces of which have played an active part in the defeat of Hitler Germany, were to be placed in a less favourable position compared with Finland.

As regards political regimes, the opportunities for the democratic elements in Roumania and Bulgaria are not less than, say, in Italy, with which the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have already resumed diplomatic relations. On the other hand, one cannot but notice that in recent times political development in Roumania and Bulgaria has pursued a tranquil course, and I see no signs that could give grounds for disquiet over the future development of democratic principles in these countries. And so, as I see it, there is no need for special Allied measures as far as these countries are concerned.

Hence the Soviet Government holds that resumption of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland should not be delayed any longer and that the question of Hungary might be considered somewhat later.

June 9, 1945

No. 336

*Sent on June 11, 1945*

**TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

The White House, Washington

On the third anniversary of the Soviet-American Agreement on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War against Aggression,<sup>102</sup> I beg you and the Government of the United States of America to accept this expression of gratitude on behalf of the Soviet Government and myself.

The Agreement, under which the United States of America throughout the war in Europe supplied the Soviet Union, by way of lend-lease,<sup>5</sup> with munitions, strategic materials and food, played an important role and to a considerable degree contributed to the successful conclusion of the war against the common foe—Hitler Germany.

I feel entirely confident that the friendly links between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, strengthened in the course of their joint effort, will continue to develop for the benefit of our peoples and in the interests of durable co-operation between all freedom-loving nations.

J. STALIN



No. 337

*Received on June 12, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I appreciate deeply your message of June 10 and thank you for your attentive interest in our effort to come to a friendly agreement with Marshal Tito on the question of military government in the Trieste area.

The agreement signed at Belgrade on June 9 covered the concrete proposals of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.<sup>103</sup> I agree fully that there should be no delay in coming to a firm settlement of the military government question and it is to this end that Marshal Alexander's Chief of Staff will meet next week with Marshal Tito's Chief of Staff to work out the details, both military and technical.

No. 338

*Received on June 15, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I propose, now that Germany's unconditional defeat has been announced and the Control Council<sup>104</sup> for Germany has had its first meeting, that we should issue at once definite instructions which will get forces into their respective zones and will initiate orderly administration of the defeated territory. As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal into their own zone on June 21 in accordance with arrangements between the respective commanders, including in these arrangements simultaneous movement of the national garrisons into Greater Berlin and provision of free access for United States forces by air, road and rail to Berlin from Frankfurt and Bremen.

The settlement of the Austrian problem I consider of equal urgency to the German matter. The redistribution of forces into occupation zones which have been agreed in principle by the European Advisory Commission,<sup>98</sup> the movement of the national garrisons into Vienna and the establishment of the Allied Commission for Austria should take place simultaneously with these developments in Germany. I attach, therefore,

utmost importance to settling the outstanding Austrian problems in order that the whole arrangement of German and Austrian affairs can be put into operation simultaneously. The recent visit of American, British and French missions to Vienna will, I hope, result in the European Advisory Commission being able without delay to take the necessary remaining decisions to this end.

I propose, if you agree with the foregoing, that our respective commanders be issued appropriate instructions at once.

**No. 339**

*Received on June 15, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

T. V. Soong has left today by plane to proceed to Moscow viâ Chungking.

By the end of June he will arrive in Moscow to discuss the details of the arrangements for Soviet-Chinese agreements.

Instructions have been given Ambassador Hurley to inform Chiang Kai-shek on June 15 of the Soviet conditions and to make every effort to obtain his agreement therewith. Ambassador Hurley is directed to inform the Generalissimo<sup>49</sup> that the United States Government will support the Yalta Agreement.<sup>105</sup>

**No. 340**

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

I am in receipt of your message about preparations for a Soviet-Chinese agreement and your instructions to Mr Hurley. Thank you for the steps you have taken.

June 15, 1945

*Received on June 15, 1945*

**H. TRUMAN TO J. V. STALIN\***

Please accept from me and on behalf of the Government of the United States appreciation of your kind message of June 12.

I have every confidence that continuation in the future of our friendly understanding cooperation will meet the same success in preserving peace and international goodwill as did our common effort in the war against the Nazis.

I am looking forward with much pleasure to meeting you in the near future and discussing fully our common problems.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message about the withdrawal of Allied troops in Germany and Austria into their respective zones received.

Regretfully I must tell you that your proposal for beginning the withdrawal of U.S. troops into their zone and moving U.S. troops into Berlin on June 21 is meeting with difficulties, for Marshal Zhukov and other military commanders have been summoned to the Supreme Soviet session which opens in Moscow on June 19, and also to arrange and take part in a parade on June 24. Moreover, some of the districts of Berlin have not yet been cleared of mines, nor can the mine-clearing operations be finished until late June. Since Marshal Zhukov and the other Soviet military commanders will not be able to return to Germany before June 28-30, I should like the beginning of the withdrawal to be put off till July 1, when the commanders will be back at their posts and the mine-clearing finished.

As regards Austria, what I have said about summoning the Soviet commanders to Moscow and the time of their return to their posts applies to that country as well. It is essential, furthermore, that in the next few days the European Advisory Commission<sup>98</sup> should complete its work on establishing the occupation zones in Austria and in Vienna. In view of the foregoing the stationing of the respective forces in the zones assigned to them in Austria should likewise be postponed till July 1.

Besides, in respect of both Germany and Austria we must establish occupation zones right away for the French troops.

We for our part shall take proper steps in Germany and Austria according to the plan set out above.

June 16, 1945

**No. 343**

*Received on June 19, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I have received your message of June 16 with regard to Allied occupation of agreed zones in Germany and Austria.

I have issued to the American commander instructions to begin the movement on July 1st as you requested. It is assumed that American troops will be in Berlin at an early date in sufficient numbers to carry out their duties in preparation for our meeting.

**No. 344**

*Received on June 19, 1945*

**H. TRUMAN TO J. V. STALIN\***

I fully agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, to which you revert in your telegram of June 9, would be a constructive step. Our exchange of messages on this subject shows that our Governments may not be approaching the matter in quite the same way because the state of our respective relations with these various states is not identical. For example, there would be no obstacle to the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland and, as regards Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, while our general interests are the same all around we find that the present situation has different aspects in each country.

I am giving this matter further study. As the most practical way of coming to a uniform agreement I therefore propose that we discuss it at our forthcoming meeting.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Although the Yugoslav Government has accepted the U.S. and British Governments' proposal concerning the Istria-Trieste area, the Trieste negotiations seem to be deadlocked. The main reason is that the representatives of the Allied Command in the Mediterranean refuse to entertain even the minimum wishes of the Yugoslavs, to whom credit is due for liberating the area from the German invaders, an area, moreover, where the Yugoslav population predominates. This situation cannot be considered satisfactory from the Allied point of view.

Being loath to aggravate relations, I have so far in my correspondence refrained from mentioning the conduct of Field Marshal Alexander, but now I must stress that in the course of the negotiations the haughty tone to which Field Marshal Alexander sometimes resorts in relation to the Yugoslavs is inadmissible. It is simply intolerable that Field Marshal Alexander has, in an official public address, permitted himself to compare Marshal Tito with Hitler and Mussolini. That is unfair and insulting to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Government was also surprised by the peremptory tone of the statement which the Anglo-American representatives made to the Yugoslav Government on June 2. How can one expect to get lasting and positive results by using such methods?

The foregoing compels me to draw your attention to the situation. I still hope that as far as Trieste-Istria is concerned, the Yugoslavs' rightful interests will be respected, particularly in view of the fact that on the main point the Yugoslavs have met the Allies half-way.

June 21, 1945

No. 346

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

I am in receipt of your message of June 19 about resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

I see that you are still studying the matter. As for me I maintain as heretofore that there is no justification for further delay in resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria.

June 23, 1945

No. 347

*Received on June 26, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Subsequent to the receipt of your message of June 21 with reference to the negotiations at Trieste I have been informed by the Supreme Allied Commander that these discussions in Trieste have been concluded and a supplementary military accord signed. The sole purpose of these discussions was to implement the military aspects of the political agreement reached between the United States, British and Yugoslav Governments on June 9. The June 9 agreement embodied the principle that the future disposition of the Venezia Giulia territory should be reserved for orderly adjustment as a part of the eventual peace settlement, and that nothing in the agreement would prejudice or affect the ultimate disposal of this territory.

It was conceded, after agreement had been reached on this point, that Yugoslav administration could be established in the disputed area up to the limit of the territory necessary to meet Allied military requirements. Due regard has been given throughout the discussions, both on the government and military level, to legitimate interests of both Yugoslav and Italian populations as well as to the contribution made by Yugoslavia to the elimination of German military power.

The Allied Commander, as I said in my previous message to you on this subject, must have adequate authority in the area

entrusted to him to enable him to carry out his task and to safeguard the interests of all concerned. In a like fashion responsibility of the Yugoslav Commander has been recognized and there has been no effort to interfere with the exercise of his responsibility in the region of Venezia Giulia entrusted to him east of the agreed line. The Allied Governments must therefore insist, particularly since both commanders have agreed that they will refrain from any action prejudicing the final settlement, that there be no interference with the exercise of their responsibility west of the line.

During the conversations at Trieste it is true difficulties arose since it appeared that the Yugoslav authorities did not fully appreciate that the fundamental principle of the agreement of June 9 was that no action could be permitted which would prejudice the ultimate disposal of the area. The Yugoslav military commander declined at first to recognize the Allied Commander's authority which was established by Article 3 of the Belgrade Agreement<sup>103</sup> over administration west of the line. This and other acts on the part of local commanders subsequent to June 9 have given rise to the impression that the full extent of the agreement reached with Marshal Tito and the Belgrade Government had not been communicated to these local commanders.

If there should be any further aspects of the agreement which you feel should be considered, we shall have an opportunity at our early meeting to discuss this.

No. 348

*Received on July 5, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I am today announcing, in conformity with our understanding, that the press will not be allowed at "Terminal"<sup>106</sup> and that all that will be issued from "Terminal" will be such official communiqués as may from time to time be decided upon.

I am sending Prime Minister Churchill a similar message.

No. 349

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message of June 26 concerning Trieste-Istria and Yugoslavia to hand.

In this matter there are of course points that warrant joint discussion by us. I am prepared to discuss them when we meet in Germany.

July 6, 1945

No. 350

**TOP SECRET**

**GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

Headquarters Soviet Delegation  
International Conference  
Babelsberg, Germany

My dear Generalissimo,

At the present time American air traffic between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is accomplished via Tehran. From the United States point of view this is an extremely wasteful use of critically needed air transport, in addition to the time lost in travel.

The U.S. has now established a military transport service into Berlin for handling official U.S. traffic which could be made available for official Soviet traffic as well. I therefore seek your approval to diverting American and Soviet traffic now carried through Tehran to a route through Berlin.

Harry S. TRUMAN

20 July, 1945



TOP SECRET

**GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

Headquarters Soviet Delegation  
International Conference  
Babelsberg, Germany

My dear Generalissimo,

It has become highly desirable because of increasing operations of naval and air forces adjacent to Japan and Siberia to augment the facilities for the collection and dissemination of weather information in Eastern Siberia. The increased services should be equally beneficial to the Soviet Union. Weather in the Japan and Japan Sea Area is affected not only by weather movement from west to east over Eastern Siberia but also by the movement associated with typhoons which pass from the Western Pacific northward over Japan.

It is considered that the above urgent needs can best be met through expansion of the United States communications net by providing equipment and liaison personnel for establishment of radio stations and weather controls at Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk. United States personnel would consist of approximately 60 officers and men at Khabarovsk and 33 officers and men at Petropavlovsk. Details of this proposal have been previously communicated to the Soviet General Staff.

Because of the important bearing of weather on current and future operations, early accomplishment of these proposed improvements is most important. I, therefore, urge your approval and the issuance of the necessary instructions for the early completion of the detailed arrangements by our respective staffs.<sup>107</sup>

Harry S. TRUMAN

21 July, 1945

**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

An acute coal famine threatens Europe this winter unless German coal in substantial quantities can be made available for export. Despite our own shortages of coal, internal transportation and ocean shipping, we are now shipping coal to Europe

as an emergency measure in order to provide some relief in the present crisis. It is obvious, however, that with our large commitment of industrial and military resources in the war against Japan, the quantities of coal which we can make available to Europe will be inadequate to cover pressing European needs. To meet these needs all possible measures should immediately be taken to increase coal production in Germany and to make the maximum quantities available for export.

In order to avoid delay, I have directed the United States Commander-in-Chief to take the necessary measures in his zone of occupation. I understand that the British and French Governments have issued similar directives to their respective commanders in Germany. A copy of the directive to General Eisenhower is attached.

I am most anxious that a common policy in respect to coal should be followed by the four occupying Powers, and I have therefore instructed General Eisenhower to discuss the policy set forth in the above directive at the Allied Control Council<sup>104</sup> at the earliest possible date. I trust that the Soviet Government will see their way to joining with us in this policy. It is my hope that they will be prepared to instruct their Commander-in-Chief to take similar action in the portions of Germany occupied by Soviet forces, and to proceed with the formulation in the Control Council of a coal production and export program for Germany as a whole.

Harry TRUMAN

27 July, 1945

### **DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER OF U. S. FORCES IN GERMANY**

Unless large quantities of coal are made available to liberated Europe in forthcoming months, there is grave danger of such political and economic chaos as to prejudice the redeployment of Allied troops and to jeopardize the achievement of the restoration of economic stability which is the necessary basis for a firm and just peace. Adequate quantities of coal for the greater part of Europe cannot, as a practical matter, be obtained from any source other than Germany. It is a matter of great urgency that Germany be made to produce for export to other European nations the coal which they must have to support economic life on at least a minimum basis.

You are therefore directed in your capacity of Commanding General of United States Forces in Germany and as United

States member of the Allied Control Council, to take all steps necessary to achieve the following objectives:

1. To make available for export out of the production of the coal mines in Western Germany a minimum of 10 million tons of coal during 1945, and a further 15 million tons by the end of April 1946.

2. To the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal at the rate directed, to assign the highest priority to all matters pertaining to maximizing the production and transportation of German coal, in particular the provisioning of mining supplies, transportation facilities, and food supplies adequate to maintain mining labor at the requisite level of efficiency. This requirement should be subordinate only to the civil and military requirements necessary to insure the safety, security, health, maintenance, and operation of the occupying forces and to insure the speedy redeployment of Allied forces from Germany.

3. To recommend to the Control Council (a) an assignment to the production and export of coal from Eastern Germany of an urgency as great as that implied in the required export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany by the end of April 1946, and (b) the formulation of a coordinated program for Germany as a whole covering the production, distribution, and export of coal.

4. To assist in every reasonable way, efforts to maximize the production of coal in other zones of occupation than your own.

5. To recommend to the Control Council, and to follow in your zone of occupation, the principle that in allocating coal within Germany, the export of coal is to take precedence over the use of coal for industrial production and civilian purposes within Germany to the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany at the rate suggested and to comply with paragraph 3, above, subject only to the requirements set out in paragraph 2, above.

It is recognized that the following of this policy during the period of critical coal shortage will delay the resumption of industrial activity in Germany. It is also recognized that the carrying out of the above policies with respect to German coal may cause unemployment, unrest, and dissatisfaction among Germans of a magnitude which may necessitate firm and rigorous action. Any action required to control the situation will be fully supported.

6. To make available to the European Coal Organization full and complete details of coal production and coal allocations within Germany, in order that the member nations of the Euro-

pean Coal Organization may know the relationship that prevails between the level of coal consumption in Germany and the level of coal consumption in liberated Europe.

7. To assign a high priority to the production and export of brown coal briquettes and of additional quantities of other coal in excess of the 25 million tons specified in paragraph 1.

8. A similar directive is being issued to the United Kingdom and French zonal commanders by their respective Governments.

**No. 353**

**TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Berlin

My dear Mr President,

I have received your message of July 20 about diverting the route of U.S. and Soviet traffic from Tehran to Berlin.

The Soviet Government takes a favourable view of your proposal. The appropriate Soviet authorities have been instructed to discuss with U.S. representatives the technical problems arising out of the proposal.

J. STALIN

Berlin, July 29, 1945

**o. 354**

**TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Berlin

My dear Mr President,

Your Memorandum of July 27 about German coal, and the copy of your instructions to Gen. Eisenhower, have reached me.

The important matter of using German coal to meet European requirements, raised in your Memorandum, will be duly studied. The Government of the United States of America will be informed of the Soviet Government's view on the subject.

I must say, however, that care should be taken to ensure that the measures for exporting the coal do not give rise to disturb-

ances of any kind in Germany, to which you draw attention in your instructions to Gen. Eisenhower, and I think this is quite feasible and essential from the standpoint of the interests of the Allied countries.

J. STALIN

Berlin, July 29, 1945

**No. 355**

**TO GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

Berlin

My dear Generalissimo Stalin,

I regret very much to hear of your illness. I hope it is not of a serious nature and that you will fully recover at an early date.

You have my very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Harry TRUMAN

Berlin, July 30, 1945

**No. 356**

**TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Berlin

My dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of July 30. I feel better today, and expect to be able to attend the Conference tomorrow, July 31.

Very sincerely yours,

J. STALIN

Berlin, July 30, 1945

No. 357

**TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Berlin

My dear Mr President,

Thank you for sending me your portrait. I shall not fail to send you mine the moment I return to Moscow.

Sincerely yours,

J. STALIN

Berlin, July 30, 1945

No. 358

**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

In response to your suggestion that I write you a letter as to the Far Eastern situation, I am attaching a form of letter which I propose to send you at your convenience after you notify me you have reached an agreement with the Government of China. If this is satisfactory to you, you can let me know immediately when you have reached such agreement and I will wire you the letter, to be used as you see fit. I will also send you by fastest courier the official letter signed by me. If you decide to use it it will be all right. However, if you decide to issue a statement basing your action on other grounds or for any other reason prefer not to use this letter it will be satisfactory to me. I leave it to your good judgment.

Harry TRUMAN

Berlin, July 30, 1945

**GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN**

The Soviet Delegation

Dear Generalissimo Stalin

Paragraph 5 of the Declaration signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China,<sup>60</sup> provides:

“5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.”

Article 106 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations provides:

“Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”

Article 103 of the Charter provides:

“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”

Though the Charter has not been formally ratified, at San Francisco it was agreed to by the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet Government will be one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration and the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it would be proper for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to consult and cooperate with other Great Powers now at war with Japan with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations to maintain peace and security.

Sincerely yours

July 31, 1945

*Received on August 12, 1945*

**TOP SECRET FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

In accordance with the message dated August 11, addressed by the United States to the Swiss Government for transmission to the Japanese Government in reply to the Note received from the Swiss Government on August 10, 1945,<sup>108</sup> I propose that General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, be designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.

If you will notify me of the designation of the officer you wish to act as your representative, I will instruct General MacArthur to make the arrangements necessary for your representative at the time and place of surrender.

It is also contemplated that General MacArthur will direct the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to have Japanese forces in your area of operations surrender unconditionally to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East or to his subordinate commanders. I am assuming that you are in general accord with the above procedure and am issuing preliminary instructions to General MacArthur to this effect. Request you advise me immediately of your designated representative so that I may notify General MacArthur. I suggest that direct communication with General MacArthur on each arrangement be initiated at once.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE  
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Mr H. TRUMAN**

I have received your message of August 12 about designating General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.

The Soviet Government accepts your proposal and is in agreement with the procedure suggested by you which provides that General MacArthur shall issue to the Japanese Imperial



General Headquarters instructions concerning unconditional surrender of the Japanese troops to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East as well. Lieutenant-General Derevyanko has been appointed the representative of the Soviet Military High Command, and has received appropriate directions.

August 12, 1945

No. 361

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET  
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

The following message has been sent today to the American commanders in the Pacific and Western Pacific areas:

“The Government of Japan having on 14 August accepted the Allied Governments’ demand for surrender, you are hereby directed to suspend offensive operations against Japanese military and naval forces in so far as is consistent with the safety of Allied forces in your area.”

August 14, 1945

No. 362

**TOP SECRET FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I have approved the following general order to General of the Army MacArthur covering details of the surrender of Japanese Armed Forces:

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1.

1. *Military and Naval.*

I. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese Armed Forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, The Republic of China, The

United Kingdom and the British Empire, and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

a. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

b. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

c. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks, and the Solomons, shall surrender (to the Supreme Allied Commander, South-east Asia Command, or the Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).

d. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese mandated islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its Senior Commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific.

f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders, and all surrenders of Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament

provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms for such a police force will be prescribed.)

II. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control, as follows:

a. Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths officers and men.

b. Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.

c. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.

d. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations<sup>14</sup> that are now in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.

e. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing locations and layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to movement by land, sea, or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

f. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including air fields, sea-plane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

g. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

III. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

IV. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

V. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:

a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to move-

ment by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

b. All aids to navigation be re-established at once.

c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of a. above.

VI. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in Section IV of this order).

b. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

c. All military installations and establishments, including air fields, sea-plane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organization in connection with its operations.

VII. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all items specified in paragraphs a, b, and d of Section VI, above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

VIII. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

IX. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved, to include the administrative and supply services essential to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms, and ammunition will be delivered

immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoners of war and civilian internees;

c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by Allied authorities;

d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their locations.

X. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

XI. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instructions from Allied occupation commanders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

XII. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces or other Allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of Allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.

This order is approved by me with the understanding that it is subject to change, both by further instructions issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by changes in matters of detail made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in light of the operational situation as known by him. The action on portions of the order in parentheses is a matter for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

August 15, 1945

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, H. TRUMAN**

Your message enclosing General Order Number 1 received I have nothing against the substance of the order. It is understood that the Liaotung Peninsula is an integral part of Manchuria. However, I suggest amending General Order Number 1 as follows:

1. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops all the Kurile Islands which according to the three-Power decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of the Soviet Union.

2. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops the northern half of the Island of Hokkaido adjoining in the north La Perouse Strait, which lies between Karafuto and Hokkaido. To draw the demarcation line between the northern and southern halves of Hokkaido along a line running from the town of Kushiro on the east coast of the island to the town of Rumoe on the west coast of the island, including the said towns in the northern half of the island.

This last point is of special importance to Russian public opinion. As is known, in 1919-21 the Japanese occupied the whole of the Soviet Far East. Russian public opinion would be gravely offended if the Russian troops had no occupation area in any part of the territory of Japan proper.

I am most anxious that the modest suggestions set forth above should not meet with any objections.

August 16, 1945

*Received on August 18, 1945*

**TOP SECRET**

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Replying to your message of August 16, I agree to your request to modify General Order Number 1 to include all the Kurile Islands in the area to be surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. However, I should like it to be understood that the United States Government desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some one of the Kurile Islands, preferably in the central group, for military purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement, the location and other details to be worked out through the appointment of special representatives of our two Governments for this purpose.

Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese forces on the Island Hokkaido to Soviet forces, it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese forces on all the islands of Japan proper, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, to General MacArthur.

General MacArthur will employ Allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of Japan proper as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our Allied surrender terms.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your message of August 18 to hand.

I understand your message to imply refusal to accede to the Soviet Union's request that the northern half of Hokkaido be included in the area of surrender of Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops. I must say that I and my colleagues had not anticipated that such would be your reply.

2. As regards your demand for a permanent air base on one of the Kurile Islands, which, in keeping with the three-Power decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of

the Soviet Union, I consider it my duty to say the following. First, I must point out that no such measure was envisaged by the tripartite decision either in the Crimea or at Berlin, nor does it in any way follow from the decisions adopted there. Second, demands of this kind are usually laid either before a vanquished country or before an allied country that is unable to defend a particular part of its territory and expresses, therefore, readiness to grant its ally an appropriate base. I do not think the Soviet Union can be classed in either category. Third, since your message furnishes no reasons for the demand that a permanent base be granted, I must tell you in all frankness that neither I nor my colleagues understand the circumstances in which this claim on the Soviet Union could have been conceived.

August 22, 1945

No. 366

*Received on August 27, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET  
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

In response to your message of August 22, 1945, as far as the base of the Kurile Islands is concerned, my idea was that use of landing rights in the central Kuriles during the occupation of Japan would be an important contribution to the cooperative action we will be taking in connection with the carrying out of the Japanese surrender terms as it would afford another route for air connection with the United States for emergency use during the period of occupation of Japan.

I also felt no hesitancy in bringing up the matter of landing facilities for commercial use. You evidently misunderstood my message because you refer to it as a demand usually laid before a conquered state or an allied state unable to defend parts of its territory. I was not speaking about any territory of the Soviet Republic. I was speaking of the Kurile Islands, Japanese territory, disposition of which must be made at a peace settlement. I was advised that my predecessor agreed to support in the peace settlement the Soviet acquisition of those islands. I did not consider it offensive when you asked me to confirm that agreement. When you expect our support for your desire for permanent possession of all the Kurile Islands, I cannot see why



you consider it offensive if I ask for consideration of a request for landing rights on only one of those islands. I consider the request for discussion all the more reasonable because of the close and cordial relations existing between our two Governments and between us personally. While I believe early discussion of these matters would be helpful, I will not press it if you do not wish to discuss them now.

No. 367

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr TRUMAN**

I am in receipt of your message of August 27. I am glad that the misunderstandings that had crept into our correspondence have been dispelled. While not in the least offended by your proposal, I was taken aback by it, for, as is now plain, I had misunderstood you.

Of course, I agree to your suggestion for granting the United States the right to land on our air fields on one of the Kuriles in emergency cases during the period of occupation of Japan.

I am also in agreement with commercial aircraft being granted landing facilities on a Soviet air field on one of the Kuriles. In this matter the Soviet Government counts on U.S. reciprocity with regard to the right of Soviet commercial planes to land on a U.S. air field on one of the Aleutians. The fact is that the present air route from Siberia to the United States viâ Canada is not satisfactory on account of its great length. We prefer to have a shorter route between the Kuriles and Seattle by way of the Aleutians as an intermediate point.

August 30, 1945

No. 368

**TO THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Mr TRUMAN**

On the day of the signing of the instrument of surrender by Japan allow me to congratulate you, the Government of the United States of America and the American people on the great victory over Japan.

I salute the Armed Forces of the United States of America on the occasion of their brilliant victory.

J. STALIN

September 2, 1945

No. 369

*Received on September 6, 1945*

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Please accept this expression of appreciation by the American people and by me of your thoughtful message of congratulations on our Allied victory over Japan.

All the Allies contributed their part to the victory to the extent made possible by their available resources and we may now all of us look forward to a durable peace and a new prosperity in all the peace-loving nations.

No. 370

*Received on September 10, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET**

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Thank you for your message dated August 30, receipt of which is acknowledged.

No. 371

**HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN,  
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

My dear Generalissimo Stalin,

Please accept my thanks for that autographed photograph which has now arrived safely. I appreciate more than I can say the cordiality of the inscription and shall always treasure the picture as a happy reminder of very pleasant associations at Potsdam.

Very sincerely yours,  
Harry TRUMAN

September 14, 1945

No. 372

*Received on September 22, 1945*

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

I am informed that Mr Molotov is considering withdrawing from the Council of Foreign Ministers in London<sup>109</sup> because of difficulty in reaching an agreement as to the participation of France and China in discussions of the Balkan situation.

I urgently request that you communicate with Mr Molotov telling him that because of the bad effect it would have on world peace he should not permit the Council to be broken up.

No. 373

*Sent on September 23, 1945*

**FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., Mr TRUMAN**

Your message received.

I have made inquiries of Molotov but so far have not received a reply. After studying the matter I have arrived at the conclusion that if it is a question of France and China taking part in a Balkans settlement, then, in conformity with the exact meaning of the Berlin Conference decision, the two countries should not be invited to attend.

No. 374

*Received on September 23, 1945*

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Referring to my earlier message. The Secretary of State has fully informed me of the difficulty encountered at the Council of Foreign Ministers.<sup>109</sup>

I agree that under a strict interpretation of the language of the Potsdam Agreement, France and China have not the right to participate in the consideration of peace treaties unless they are signatories to the surrender terms or unless they are invited under paragraph 3(2) of the Potsdam Agreement which provides that members of the Council other than the signatories may by agreement be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

It is my recollection that at the conference table at Potsdam it was agreed during the discussion that members not signatory could be present and participate in the discussion but could not vote. It seems the first day that the Council met, it was unanimously agreed that members not signatories could participate in the discussion, but could not vote. If we now change this rule and deny France and China because they are not signatories to the surrender the right even to discuss a matter in which they state they are interested, I fear it will create a bad impression. It will be charged that the three Big Powers are denying other members of the Council an opportunity even to present their views.

Can we not agree to regard the unanimous action of the Council on the opening day as an invitation to France and China to participate under the Potsdam Agreement? This is too small a matter to disrupt the work of the Council and delay progress towards peace and better understanding.

No. 375

*Sent on September 23, 1945*

**FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Your second message about the Council of Ministers<sup>109</sup> has reached me.

Today I have received V. M. Molotov's reply, which says that he adheres to the Berlin Conference resolution and considers that that resolution should not be violated. For my part I must stress that at the Berlin Conference we neither resolved nor agreed that members of the Council who had not signed the surrender terms could participate in discussions but not vote. I think that Molotov's stand in the sense of strict adherence to the Berlin Conference decision cannot make a bad impression or offend anyone.

No. 376

**HIS EXCELLENCY J. V. STALIN,  
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL  
OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Moscow

My dear Premier Stalin,

One of President Roosevelt's fondest desires was to have a painting of you, Mr Churchill and himself placed in the Capitol here in Washington as a testimony of the historical importance of the meetings at Tehran and Yalta.

He had discussed the project with Mr Douglas Chandor, an artist, who he felt possessed the peculiar kind of gift for doing this particular painting better than anyone else.

Knowing how desirous President Roosevelt was that such a painting be made as a worthy addition to the historical me-

mentos of this country, I should like to ask if you would be willing to sacrifice some of your valued time to allow Mr Chandor to come to Moscow to do this painting.

I have also written to Mr Churchill asking if he, too, could spare sufficient time to permit Mr Chandor to paint his picture in order to complete this historic work symbolizing the unity of our three nations.

You may be sure that your acquiescence in helping to consummate this cherished desire of President Roosevelt would be greatly appreciated by me.

Sincerely yours,

Harry TRUMAN

October 11, 1945

No. 377

*Received on October 24, 1945*

**PERSONAL AND SECRET**

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Mr Byrnes has reported to me upon his return from London. I was pleased to learn that on a number of subjects the Council of Foreign Ministers<sup>109</sup> was in general agreement. I feel that at this first meeting the Ministers have made substantial progress.

I was surprised to learn, however, that not only in private conversations between Mr Molotov and Mr Byrnes but also at the Council table, Mr Molotov suggested that the United States' policy in regard to the recognition of the Governments of Roumania and Bulgaria appeared to be motivated by an unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union.

I cannot believe that your Government seriously believes that American policy is so motivated. Our policy in regard to the recognition of the Provisional Governments of Finland, Poland, Hungary and Austria indicates that we are anxious, and are willing to go far, to concert our policy with that of the Soviet Union. As I endeavored to make clear at the Berlin Conference, our Government is only trying to carry out the policy sponsored by President Roosevelt and accepted by the three Governments at the Yalta Conference.

Mr Byrnes has also reported to me of the procedural difficulties which brought the London Conference to an impasse. It

appears that on September 11 the Council invited members not parties to the surrender terms to participate in the discussions of the treaties without vote. The procedure, which at the time of its adoption was not questioned by any member of the Council, was to my mind clearly a proper and permissible procedure under the Berlin Agreement.

Mr Byrnes felt unable to agree to the change in this procedure suggested by Mr Molotov on September 22. He rightly felt that our Government would not humiliate France and China by withdrawing in the midst of the Conference the invitation extended to them to participate in the treaty discussion after they had already participated in sixteen sessions.

In an effort to find a solution acceptable to all members of the Council, Mr Byrnes stated that he would accept a narrowing of the drafting procedure provided it was agreed that the Council would call a peace conference of the principally interested states as authorized by Article 2 (4) (II) of the Berlin Agreement.

I hope that you will find it possible to accept Mr Byrnes' proposal. I feel that since all of us extended to China and France an invitation to participate in the discussion of these treaties we should work out a procedure which will insure the convocation by the full Council of a peace conference for the consideration of the treaties.

I hope we can reach early agreement on this matter in order that the deputies may proceed under clear instructions as to their procedure with the important work<sup>110</sup> that has been referred to them.

Early settlement of disagreement on peace machinery is essential to prevent misunderstanding among the people of both our countries which might make future cooperation more difficult. I am sure that you will agree with me that the common interests of both our countries in the peace are far more important than any possible differences among us.

I am asking Ambassador Harriman, who has been at London and is fully acquainted with my views, to bring this personally to you so that you will have an opportunity to discuss any points about it that are in your mind.

No. 378

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., Mr TRUMAN**

On October 24 Mr Harriman handed me your message. I had two talks with him on matters discussed at the Foreign Ministers' conference in London.<sup>109</sup> In the course of the talks I replied to all the questions which he, on your directions, raised with me.

October 26, 1945

No. 379

*Received on November 2, 1945*

**PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

As you know, ever since the time when the late President Wilson intimately associated himself with the liberation of Czechoslovakia from Hapsburg rule, my country has followed with deep and sympathetic interest the struggle of the Czechoslovak people for national independence and economic security. We have always admired the diligence displayed by the Czechoslovak state in constructing democratic institutions and in contributing to the peaceful international life in the European family of states.

In the last days of the war, the American army crossed the western frontier of Czechoslovakia in the pursuit of our common enemy and advanced to a line north of Plzen, while the Red Army, fighting valiantly from the East, entered the city of Praha. The armies of the Soviet Union and the United States thus carried out the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Since the close of hostilities, the armed forces of our two countries have remained on Czechoslovak territory in order to assist the Czechoslovak people in the elimination of the remnants of the Nazi forces.

The continued presence of Allied troops, however, is proving to be a great drain on Czechoslovak economic resources and is delaying the normal recovery and rehabilitation of this allied state which remained longer under Nazi domination than any other member of the United Nations.<sup>14</sup> I therefore desire to



withdraw the American forces from Czechoslovak territory by December 1, 1945. In the absence of a similar intention on the part of the Soviet Government, there will still remain in Czechoslovakia a large number of Red Army soldiers. I should therefore like to propose to you that the Red Army be withdrawn simultaneously with our forces.

Since there is no longer any necessity to protect the Czechoslovak people against any Nazi depredations, and since the presence of our troops undoubtedly constitutes a drain on their economy, I also feel that the American forces should be withdrawn as soon as practicable in order to permit the Czechoslovak people to reap the full benefits of the assistance being given to them by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration<sup>59</sup> and by other agencies. By the simultaneous withdrawal of both Soviet and American forces from Czechoslovakia, the American people would be assured that the drain on Czechoslovak resources had ceased.

I hope that you can give consideration to my proposal and that, in withdrawing our forces simultaneously, we can announce to the world our intention of removing an obstacle which delays the recovery of the Czechoslovak state.

No. 380

**PERSONAL AND SECRET  
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A.,  
Mr H. TRUMAN**

I have received your message concerning the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. I am sorry to say delivery was delayed because of the irregular functioning of the airline between Moscow and Sochi due to weather conditions.

I welcome your proposal for withdrawing the troops in November, all the more as it is in full accord with the Soviet plan for demobilisation and withdrawal of troops. Consequently we may consider that the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from Czechoslovakia will be completed by December 1.

November 7, 1945

No. 381

*Received on December 9, 1945*

**FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN  
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

In approving Mr Byrnes' suggestion to Mr Molotov that a meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries be convened before the close of the year, I was not unmindful of the view that no meeting should be held until there was greater assurance of progress toward agreement on outstanding questions. But I felt that at this critical time continued drift and delay would be exceedingly unwise.

I sincerely hope that you will cooperate with me to make the meeting a success and to give renewed assurance of the ability of the Great Powers to work together.

I wish very much to have Mr Byrnes convey to you a personal message from me. I earnestly hope that you will be able to see and talk frankly with him at an early date while he is in Moscow. Please let me know whether this will be possible.

No. 382

**SECRET AND PERSONAL  
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN  
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN**

Thank you for your message of December 8, 1945.<sup>111</sup>

You may rest assured that I, too, should like to cooperate with you so that the forthcoming conference of the three Ministers in Moscow will yield the results desired for the benefit of our common cause.

I shall shortly be in Moscow and am willing to talk with Mr Byrnes in all candour.

December 9, 1945

*Received on December 19, 1945*

**HIS EXCELLENCY, GENERALISSIMO STALIN**

Moscow

Dear Generalissimo,

It is natural that approaching our common problems from different starting points we should at the outset encounter some difficulties. But it is becoming increasingly evident that these difficulties are assuming exaggerated proportions in the minds of our respective peoples and are delaying in many ways the progress, which we both desire to expedite, towards peace and reconstruction

I repeat my assurance to you that it is my earnest wish, and I am sure it is the wish of the people of the United States, that the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States should work together to restore and maintain peace. I am sure that the common interest of our two countries in keeping the peace far outweighs any possible differences between us.

Secretary Byrnes and I have sought to go as far as we have felt able to meet your views with reference to the Allied Council for Japan<sup>112</sup> and to the Far Eastern Commission,<sup>113</sup> and I sincerely hope that your Government will accept the proposals which we have made. If these proposals are accepted I assure you that in carrying them out it is my intention to insist on the fullest possible collaboration with the Soviet Union in the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and the Surrender Terms for Japan.

Secretary Byrnes and I have also gone far in an effort to meet your views on the future procedure for handling the peace treaties, and the difference between us now on this matter is not great. In view of our willingness to accept your suggestions as to the handling of the preparatory work by the Deputies,<sup>110</sup> I hope very much that your Government can accept our proposals regarding the formal peace conference which will, I am sure, help greatly in securing the general acceptance of the work of our Deputies by other countries.

Prompt agreement between us on the procedure for making the European peace settlements and on the machinery to govern Allied relations with Japan will stop the undermining of confidence in the ability of the Great Powers to work together and will give renewed hope to a world longing for peace.

This hope will also be greatly strengthened if your Government will join in the proposals to have a commission created

under the United Nations Organization to inquire into and make recommendations for the control of atomic energy in the interest of world peace.

If we can agree on these general points of procedure without further delay, we should be able to start discussions on other matters as to which it is important in our common interest for us to concert our policies.

I hope very much you will see and talk frankly with Secretary Byrnes. He is thoroughly familiar with my purposes and I feel certain that if you had a full and frank talk with him it would be most helpful.<sup>114</sup>

Sincerely yours,

Harry TRUMAN

No. 384

**J. V. STALIN TO H. TRUMAN\***

**MOST SECRET**

My dear Mr President,

I was glad to receive your message, transmitted to me by Mr Byrnes, in which you dwell on the highly important subjects that we are now discussing. I agree with you that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States should strive to work together in restoring and maintaining peace, and that we should proceed from the fact that the common interests of our two countries far outweigh certain differences between us.

The conference of the Ministers now in session in Moscow has already yielded good results. The steps taken by you and Mr Byrnes with regard to both Japan and the peace treaties have helped in a big way. We may take it that agreement on these important points has been reached<sup>115</sup> and that the conference has done work that will play a prominent part in establishing proper mutual understanding between our countries in this period of transition from war to peace.

The subject of atomic energy is still under discussion. I hope that on this matter, too, we shall establish unity of views and that by joint effort a decision will be reached that will be satisfactory to both countries and to the other nations.<sup>116</sup>

I take it that you have been informed of my first talk with Mr Byrnes. We shall meet for further talks. But even now I feel I can say that on the whole I am optimistic as to the results of the exchange of views now taking place between us on urgent

international problems, and this, I hope, will provide further opportunities for coordinating the policies of our countries on other issues.

I take this opportunity to answer the letter which I recently received from you concerning the arrival of the artist Chandor in Moscow. I have been away from Moscow for a long time and regret to say that in the immediate future I should find it hard, in view of my numerous duties, to give any time to Mr Chandor. I am, of course, ready to send him my portrait if you think that would be suitable in this instance.

J. STALIN

December 23, 1945



# NOTES





The figures at the end of each note indicate  
the pages to which the note refers

<sup>1</sup> This Stalin message was followed by talks on August 19, 1941, between K. A. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., and Mr Sumner Welles, U.S. Under Secretary of State. Oumansky reported the talks to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. as follows:

"On behalf of the President Mr Welles gave this reply to my secret letter to the President on Comrade Stalin's behalf, delivered while Mr Roosevelt was on the ocean, concerning Finland.

"On instructions from the President he, Mr Welles, had a few days before invited the Finnish Minister, Procopé, and informed him that, according to the information available to the U.S. Government, the U.S.S.R. was determined to fight relentlessly against aggression, including aggression in the northern sector, and that the Finnish Government should have no doubts on the matter. The U.S. Government considered, furthermore, that the U.S.S.R. was certain to win in this struggle. (Mr Welles made it clear that he, acting on instructions from Mr Roosevelt, had expressed himself in these terms to the Finnish Minister so that the Finns should not construe the U.S. démarche as an indication of Soviet weakness.) Mr Welles went on to tell Procopé that continuation of war by Finland against the U.S.S.R. on the side of Germany was not in keeping with the interests of Finland and her independence, would be fatal for U.S.-Finnish relations, and would deliver an irreparable blow to Finnish popularity in the U.S.A. But if the Finnish Government were to revert to the way of peace, then, as far as the U.S. Government was aware, the Soviet Government would be willing to conclude a new peace treaty with territorial modifications. When I asked whether he had mentioned to the Finn the danger of the U.S.A. severing diplomatic relations with Finland, Mr Welles said that, in concurrence with the President, he had reserved that until the Finnish Government's reply was received, and that the threat of a rupture, already decided on in principle, would be the U.S. Government's next step." p. 7

<sup>2</sup> In Placentia Bay (Newfoundland) on August 9-12, 1941, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill held a meeting known as the At-

lantic Conference. They discussed further United States and British plans in connection with the radical change in the international situation following the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Hitler Germany. They coordinated the foreign policies of their two countries, and declared their war aims. On August 14, 1941, they adopted and made known a joint declaration (the Atlantic Charter), containing "certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries". On September 24, 1941, the Soviet Government announced its concurrence with the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter.

At their Atlantic Conference the two leaders discussed the question of supplying arms and materiel to the Soviet Union. The joint message by Roosevelt and Churchill given between these covers was a result of this discussion. p. 7

- <sup>3</sup> Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in July 1941 as President Roosevelt's personal representative and was received by J. V. Stalin. pp. 7, 9
- <sup>4</sup> That is, the conference between Soviet, British and U.S. representatives held in Moscow over September 29-October 1, 1941, to discuss reciprocal deliveries of war materials. pp. 9, 10, 11, 12
- <sup>5</sup> The writer refers to the Lend-Lease Act, adopted by the U.S. Congress on March 11, 1941. The Act empowered the U.S. Government to lend or lease to other countries various articles and materials essential to their defence, provided their defence was, according to the definition of the President, vital to U.S. defence. In November 1941 the Lend-Lease Act was extended to include the Soviet Union. pp. 10, 16, 18, 232
- <sup>6</sup> Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war on the USA by Germany and Italy, the USA became a belligerent in the Second World War. p. 13
- <sup>7</sup> Negotiations were held in Moscow between Joseph Stalin and Britain's Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on December 16-20, 1941 relating to Anglo-Soviet treaties of wartime alliance against Germany and postwar cooperation. The negotiations were broken off due to Britain's refusal to recognise the Soviet western frontier of 1941. p. 14
- <sup>8</sup> President Roosevelt had not replied to this Stalin message. p. 14
- <sup>9</sup> On June 11, 1942, M. M. Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A. and U.S. Secretary of State Hull exchanged Notes to the effect that the Agreement Between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, signed on June 11, 1942, replaced and invalidated the previous agreements between the Soviet and U.S. Governments on the same subject, concluded by exchanging messages between Roosevelt and Stalin in November 1941 and February 1942. pp. 16, 17
- <sup>10</sup> The reference is to J. V. Stalin's message, sent on February 18, 1942 (see Document No. 14 on pp. 16-17). p. 17
- <sup>11</sup> On March 16, 1942, the U.S. Embassy in the U.S.S.R. telephoned the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., advising that this letter from President Roosevelt had been sent by U.S. diplomatic mail, via Tehran, in November 1941. The letter, which had

been delayed en route, was delivered on March 15, 1942, to Kuibyshev, where the U.S. Embassy was in temporary residence. p. 18

<sup>12</sup> See Document No. 4. (p. 9). p. 18

<sup>13</sup> On June 12, 1942, a Soviet-U.S. Communique was released on the Washington visit of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.:

“Complete agreement was reached during the negotiations concerning the urgent tasks of opening a second front in Europe in 1942. Also discussed were measures to increase and expedite deliveries to the Soviet Union of aircraft, tanks and other types of arms from the U.S.A. Further, the main problems of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States were discussed in ensuring peace and security for the freedom-loving peoples after the war. Both sides were gratified to note that their views coincided on all these questions.” p. 21

<sup>14</sup> This term was applied to the countries which had signed the Declaration of Twenty-Six States in Washington on January 1, 1942, and those which later acceded to the Declaration. pp. 24, 30, 48, 67, 116, 122, 123, 126, 128, 163, 168, 172, 181, 183, 203, 218, 224, 227, 247, 251, 264

<sup>15</sup> The reference is to a protocol on U.S. and British deliveries of war equipment, ammunition and raw materials to the Soviet Union, signed on October 6, 1942, and covering the period from July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943. pp. 25, 33, 65

<sup>16</sup> The “visitor” was Prime Minister Churchill, who came to Moscow in August 1942 for talks with J. V. Stalin. pp. 26, 27

<sup>17</sup> U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi islands of the Solomon group, on August 1942, and consolidated their positions. p. 28

<sup>18</sup> General Hurley delivered this message to J. V. Stalin on November 14, 1942. pp. 30, 34

<sup>19</sup> See under No. 41 (pp. 30-31) Stalin's message of October 7, 1942, to Roosevelt. p. 33

<sup>20</sup> The Soviet submarine *L-16* was sunk in the Pacific on October 11, 1942, by a submarine of unknown nationality. p. 42

<sup>21</sup> The allusion is to President Roosevelt's and Winston Churchill's conference in Casablanca (North-West Africa) on January 14-23, 1943. p. 46

<sup>22</sup> Rabaul, a town in New Britain, an Island of the Bismarck Archipelago. p. 47

<sup>23</sup> The reason for this document being included in the collection is that it says it is a joint message from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt. p. 49

<sup>24</sup> The allusion is to the Combined Anglo-American Staffs formed in Washington on February 6, 1942, to work on the problems of Anglo-American military cooperation. pp. 50, 61, 73, 82, 107, 108, 154

<sup>25</sup> The allusion is to Stalin's message of May 26, 1943 (see Document No. 88, pp. 60-61). p. 64

- <sup>26</sup> The writer refers to V. M. Molotov, who during his visit to Washington in May and June 1942 was, for security reasons, known as "Mr Brown". p. 64
- <sup>27</sup> See Document No. 70, pp. 46-47. p. 64, 68
- <sup>28</sup> The arrangement in force at that time was the protocol mentioned in Note 15 above.  
On October 19, 1943, the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.A. Canada and the Soviet Union signed a new protocol on reciprocal deliveries, covering one year—from July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944. p. 66
- <sup>29</sup> See Document No. 95, p. 66. p. 67
- <sup>30</sup> On July 12, 1943, U.S. Secretary of State Hull informed A. A. Gromyko the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, that the U.S. submarine *Permit* had sunk a Soviet trawler in the area of the Aleutians, having mistaken it for an enemy ship. Two members of the crew were killed the rest were picked up by the Americans. On his own behalf and on behalf of the U.S. Navy Department Mr Hull expressed deep regret at the accident. p. 71
- <sup>31</sup> The Italian General Castellano, who on instructions from Marshal Badoglio signed the "short terms" for the surrender of Italy on September 3, 1943. pp. 72, 78, 80
- <sup>32</sup> Code name for the Allied invasion of Italy in the Naples area, carried out in September 1943. pp. 73, 80
- <sup>33</sup> The text of the message from F. D. Roosevelt and W. S. Churchill to J. V. Stalin, dated August 19, 1943, was received in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. with the following remark by British Ambassador Kerr: "The armistice terms referred to in paragraph 1(a) above are those of which I informed you in my letter of the 3rd August. The terms to be communicated later will follow the political, economic and financial terms which were communicated by Mr Eden to Monsieur Sobolev on the 30th July."  
In a letter of August 3, 1943, Mr Kerr communicated the "short terms" for the surrender of Italy. The document setting forth the "comprehensive terms" for the Italian surrender was transmitted to the Soviet Government on July 30, 1943, through the Soviet Embassy in London (it was handed by Mr Eden to A. A. Sobolev, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Britain). On July 31, 1943, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. informed the British Ambassador that the Soviet Government did not object to the terms and that it had instructed the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Britain to notify Mr Eden accordingly. p. 73
- <sup>34</sup> The reference should apparently have been made to paragraph I (c). p. 74
- <sup>35</sup> Code name for the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, which took place in Washington in May 1943. p. 75
- <sup>36</sup> Code name for the Azores. p. 75
- <sup>37</sup> That is, at Quebec. p. 76

<sup>38</sup> The reference is to a joint message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, dated August 19, 1943 (see Document No. 102, pp. 72-76). It was sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by British Ambassador Kerr on August 20, 1943, with some omissions. The supplements and corrections to the text came in on August 22. The full text of the message appears under No. 102. p. 77

<sup>39</sup> The allusion is to the "short" and "comprehensive" terms for the surrender of Italy. The "short terms" consisted of eleven articles bearing chiefly on military matters. On August 3, 1943, British Ambassador Kerr communicated the text of the "short terms" to the Soviet Government, advising it that they had already been sent to General Eisenhower against the eventuality of the Italian Government directly approaching him with a request for armistice.

On August 26, 1943, the British and U.S. Ambassadors handed to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. the full text of the "comprehensive terms" for the Italian surrender, consisting of forty-four articles which contained not only military provisions, but also political, economic and financial stipulations bound up with the surrender. On August 27, 1943, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. notified the British and U.S. Ambassadors that the Soviet Government agreed to the "comprehensive terms" for the surrender of Italy and empowered General Eisenhower to sign those terms on behalf of the Soviet Government.

On September 1, 1943, the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. that the "short terms"—with the addition of Article 12, which read: "Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature, with which Italy would be bound to comply, will be transmitted at a later date"—had been communicated to the Italian Government. The Ambassador pointed out that the Italian Government could send a representative authorised to sign only the "short terms". He asked to be advised whether the Soviet Government's agreement to the signing of the "comprehensive terms" for the surrender of Italy applied to the "short terms" as well. On September 2, 1943, the Soviet Government answered in the affirmative. On September 3, 1943, the "short terms" were signed in Sicily by General Castellano on behalf of Italy and General Bedell Smith acting on behalf of the United Nations. The "comprehensive terms" were signed on Malta on September 29, 1943, by Marshal Badoglio and General Eisenhower on behalf of Italy and the United Nations respectively. p. 80

<sup>40</sup> Article 10 of the "short terms" for the surrender of Italy read:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measures which, in his opinion, may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government bind themselves to take such administrative or other actions as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish an Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied nations." p. 81

<sup>41</sup> On August 31, 1943, Stalin wrote to Churchill, then staying with Roosevelt as follows: "I am for having the French Committee of National Liberation represented on the commission for negotiations

with Italy. If you consider it advisable you may say so on behalf of our two Governments.” p. 83

42 The reference is to the message received from President Roosevelt on September 11, 1943 (see Document No. 114 on p. 85) and the one from Prime Minister Churchill, dated September 10, 1913. p. 86

43 The allusion is to the “Instrument of Surrender of Italy”, received in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. from the British and U.S. Embassies on August 26, 1943. In President Roosevelt’s message of October 5, 1943, it was a question of changing the following passage in the “Instrument”:

“Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian Supreme Command acknowledge that the Italian forces have been totally defeated and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension of hostilities; and whereas the United States and the United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are willing to lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments; the following terms have been presented by . . . . . duly authorised to that effect; and have been accepted by . . . . . representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces, and duly authorised to that effect by the Italian Government:

“1. (a) The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender unconditionally.” p. 88

44 On October 2, 1943, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., transmitted to the U.S. State Department the Soviet Government’s proposals for the agenda of the forthcoming conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A and Britain in Moscow. The Soviet Government proposed in particular “measures to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe.

“What is meant here are pressing measures by the Governments of Great Britain and the U.S.A. already in 1943 to ensure the invasion of Western Europe by the Anglo-American armies across the Channel, measures which, together with the powerful blows to be delivered by the Soviet troops to the main German forces on the Soviet-German front, would effectively sap Germany’s military-strategic position and drastically shorten the duration of the war.” pp. 89, 90

45 The reference is to the following letter:

“The British Ambassador, Mr Kerr, has informed the Soviet Government that the British Government would like the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain on the military-political commission to hand to the French Committee of National Liberation on behalf of their Governments, identical Notes formally inviting a representative of the Committee to take part in the work of the commission. The draft Note submitted by the British Government says concerning the terms of reference of the military political commission that the representatives of the three Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation would give joint or separate advice to the three Governments or the Liberation Committee, but would not be empowered to take final action, it being under-

stood as a matter of course that they would not interfere with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

"This is to advise you for your information that in its reply to the British Government, dated October 14, the Soviet Government signified its agreement to a representative of the French Committee being formally invited to participate in the military-political commission.

"As regards specifying the terms of reference of the military-political commission, the Soviet Government has proposed amending the British formula for the formal invitation in the sense that the military-political commission shall direct and coordinate the activity of all military agencies and any civil authorities of the Allies concerned in armistice matters and implementation of the armistice and, accordingly, the military-political commission may also from time to time issue instructions and directions for the Italian Government and, in similar circumstances, for the Governments of other Axis countries, it being understood that military-operational matters come fully within the jurisdiction of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief."

p. 93

<sup>46</sup> The allusion is to the following Memorandum, which Mr. Hamilton, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, handed to A. Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., on October 14, 1943: "Recently, the Government of the United States has received requests from the Chinese Government and from the Brazillian Government that they be accorded representation on the Political and Military Commission which is being set up at Algiers. The Government of the United States has likewise received similar requests from the Greek Government and from the Yugoslav Government. While certain disadvantages might be presented by such expansion in the size of the Commission, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that it is desirable to have these Governments represented on the Commission and the Government of the United States suggests that favorable consideration be given to their requests. The Government of the United States would appreciate receiving the views of the Soviet Government on the question of granting the requests made by the four Governments mentioned.

"The foregoing is communicated to the Soviet Government by direction of the President."

p. 93

<sup>47</sup> The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain held in Moscow between October 19 and 30, 1943.  
p. 94 , 101, 107 111, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122

<sup>48</sup> This message was handed to J. V. Stalin by U.S. Secretary of State Hull.  
p. 95

<sup>49</sup> Chiang Kai-shek. pp. 100, 160, 234

<sup>50</sup> The allusion is to the letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to Mr Hamilton, the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in the U.S.S.R., of November 22, 1943. It ran:

"Just now Marshal Stalin is at the front, but he has informed me that he will be at the appointed place not later than November 28 or 29. Kindly convey this to the President."

p. 101

<sup>51</sup> This document was handed to Stalin by Roosevelt at Tehran on November 29, 1943.  
pp. 102, 103

<sup>52</sup> The writer is referring to F. D. Roosevelt's message to J. V. Stalin of December 3, 1943, which appears in this volume under No. 146 (pp. 103-104). p. 106

<sup>53</sup> Code name for the crossing of the Channel and the invasion of France, carried out by Allied forces in June 1944. pp. 108, 109, 110, 121, 131, 132, 136

<sup>54</sup> Code name for the landing on the south coast of France, carried out by the Allies on August 15, 1944. pp. 108, 109, 110

<sup>55</sup> The reference is to the Statement of the Soviet Government Concerning Soviet-Polish Relations, published on January 11, 1944, and the TASS Communication on the statement of the Polish Government in London, published on January 17, 1944.

The Soviet Government statement on Soviet-Polish relations said the following on the question of Polish frontiers:

"Poland's eastern frontiers may be worked out with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government does not regard the 1939 frontiers as immutable. Corrections may be introduced in Poland's favour in the sense that districts where Poles are in the majority should go to Poland. The Soviet-Polish frontier could run approximately along the so-called Curzon Line adopted in 1919 by the Supreme Council of Allied Powers, with the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia going to the Soviet Union. Poland's western frontiers must be extended to include the old Polish lands formerly seized by Germany, for without this the Polish people will not be united in their own state. Furthermore, the Polish state will then get a much needed outlet to the Baltic sea. The Polish people's just desire to be fully united in a strong and independent state must be recognised and supported." p. 112

<sup>56</sup> The allusion is to the following letter, dated January 23, 1944: "Your Note of January 19 reached me through Soviet Ambassador Gromyko on January 22.

"I have already conveyed my reply to Mr Harriman orally, and now advise you in writing that, while thanking you for your readiness to mediate, I must say to my regret that conditions for mediation are not ripe yet.

"Judge for yourself.

"The Soviet Government made concessions by declaring the 1939 frontier to be subject to revision and proposed the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish frontier. Yet the Polish Government in London reacted by evading the question of the Curzon Line and is using official documents to propagate the idea that the frontier established under the Riga Treaty is immutable.

"The Soviet Government severed relations with the Polish Government in London because of the latter's participation in the Hitlerite slander over the 'Katyn massacre'. At that time the Polish Government was headed by General Sikorski. The Mikolajczyk Government, instead of dissociating itself from the fascist act of the Sikorski Government, declared that it would continue Sikorski's policy, and the Mikolajczyk Government far from disavowing its Ambassadors in Mexico and Canada and its supporters in the U.S.A. (the Matuszewski group), who are engaged in a campaign openly hostile to the Soviet Union, is actually abetting them.

"It will be seen from these facts that the Polish Government in London has called on the U.S. and British Governments to mediate,



not with a view to reaching agreement with the Soviet Government, but in order to aggravate the conflict and involve the Allies in it, for it is obvious that in the absence of a common basis for agreement negotiation and mediation are doomed to fail.

“The Soviet Government would not like the friendly mission of mediation to be exposed to the threat of inevitable failure.

“That is why I believe conditions are not yet ripe for negotiation and mediation.

“As I see it, a radical improvement of the composition of the Polish Government, one that would exclude the pro-fascist imperialist elements and include democratic elements, a point that I made to Mr Harriman orally, could provide a favourable basis both for the re-establishment of Soviet-Polish relations and settlement of the frontier question and for fruitful mediation.” p. 112

<sup>57</sup> The Curzon Line, conventional name for the line recommended by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers on December 8, 1919, as Poland's eastern frontier. The Curzon Line derived from the decision of the delegations of the principal Allied Powers, who considered it necessary to include only ethnographically Polish regions in the territory of Poland. On July 12, 1920, the British Foreign Secretary, Curzon, sent a Note to the Soviet Government proposing a line approved by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in 1919 as the eastern frontier of Poland. In the Note it said: “This line runs approximately as follows: Grodno-Jalovka-Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorohusk-Ustilug, east of Grobeshov-Krilov and thence west of Rava-Ruska, east of Pryemysl to Carpathians.” On August 16, 1945, a treaty signed in Moscow defined the Soviet-Polish frontier, according to its terms the frontier as a whole was established along the Curzon Line, with certain departures in favour of Poland. pp. 112, 119, 124, 139, 172, 201

<sup>58</sup> The Soviet-Polish peace treaty was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921. Under it the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were ceded to Poland. p. 112

<sup>59</sup> The agreement constituting the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was signed by representatives of 44 countries in Washington on November 9, 1943. A. A. Gromyko signed it on behalf of the Soviet Union. UNRRA was to render relief to countries that had suffered in the Second World War, and was to assist them in rehabilitating their economy. UNRRA was dissolved in 1947. pp. 116, 265

<sup>60</sup> The writer is referring to the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, by representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and China and saying that the four Governments recognised the necessity of establishing at the earliest possible date a universal international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security. pp. 117, 246

<sup>61</sup> See Document No. 158. pp. 110-111

<sup>62</sup> The writer has in mind the memorandum “Fundamentals of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation”, which U.S. Secretary of State Hull submitted to the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain on October 22, 1943. p. 122

- <sup>63</sup> The reference is to the statement which the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. made on March 19, 1944, insisting, on instructions from Prime Minister Churchill, that the Soviet Government should reach agreement with the Polish emigre Government along the lines proposed by Mr Churchill, that is, by postponing settlement of the Soviet-Polish frontier till the armistice conference. The Ambassador contended that if the Soviet Government's point of view, stated in the course of the Anglo-Soviet discussions of the Polish question namely, that the Polish-Soviet frontier should follow the Curzon Line, became known to public opinion there would be general disillusionment both in Britain and in the United States. Soviet rejection of the Churchill proposal he said might give rise to difficulties in Anglo-Soviet relations, cast a shadow on the carrying out of the military operations agreed at Tehran and complicate the prosecution of the war by the United Nations as a whole. p. 124
- <sup>64</sup> The reference is to the letter which the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. sent to the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. on March 7, 1944. It ran:  
 "I hereby consider it necessary to communicate to you the reply of the Soviet Government with regard to the conference to be convened by the International Labour Organisation next April.  
 "The International Labour Organisation, being an institution of the League of Nations, comes under the latter's political and administrative control. Since for some time past the Soviet Union has not been in relationship with the League of Nations, the Soviet Government does not find it possible for Soviet representatives to attend the conference to be convened by the International Labour Organisation. Moreover, the Soviet Government holds that the said International Organisation lacks the authority needed to fulfil the tasks arising from international cooperation in the sphere of labour, a matter which in present circumstances calls for more democratic forms of organisation of international cooperation in that sphere." p. 127
- <sup>65</sup> On February 21, 1944, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., asked President Roosevelt's aid in obtaining visas for a visit to the Soviet Union for Rev. Orlemański, a Catholic priest, Chairman of the Kościuszko Polish Patriotic League, who wished to visit Polish patriots in the Soviet Union and the Kościuszko Polish Division, and for Professor Oskar Lange of Chicago and Columbia Universities who wanted to travel to the Soviet Union in connection with Polish affairs. Both Orlemański and Lange had applied to the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. in New York for visas. pp. 127, 128, 131
- <sup>66</sup> On April 10, 1944, General Deane, head of the U.S. Military Mission and General Burrows, head of the British Military Mission, notified Marshal Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, that the British and U.S. High Commands planned to launch a cross-Channel operation on May 31, 1944, it being understood that the date might be shifted two or three days one way or the other depending on weather and tide. p. 129
- <sup>67</sup> Code name for the date of the Allied invasion of Europe across the Channel. p. 132
- <sup>68</sup> The scroll reads as follows:  
 "In the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this scroll to the City of Stalingrad to commemorate our admiration for its gallant defenders whose courage, fortitude, and devotion during the siege of September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943 will inspire forever the hearts of all free people. Their glorious vic-

tory stemmed the tide of invasion and marked the turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

May 17th, 1944

Washington, D.C.”

p. 133

<sup>69</sup> The scroll reads as follows:

“In the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this scroll to the City of Leningrad as a memorial to its gallant soldiers and to its loyal men, women and children who, isolated from the rest of their nation by the invader and despite constant bombardment and untold sufferings from cold, hunger and sickness, successfully defended their beloved city throughout the critical period September 8, 1941 to January 18, 1943, and thus symbolized the undaunted spirit of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of all the nations of the world resisting forces of aggression.

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

May 17th, 1944

Washington, D.C.”

pp. 133, 165

<sup>70</sup> On June 26, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Harriman handed this message from President Roosevelt and the scrolls to J. V. Stalin to be presented to Stalingrad and Leningrad in commemoration of the heroic defence of the two cities.  
p. 134

<sup>71</sup> That is, Winston Churchill. pp. 144, 175, 182

<sup>72</sup> Oskar Lange lived in the U.S.A. at the time. p. 145

<sup>73</sup> The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks of delegates of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain from August 21 to September 29, 1944, was concerned with establishing the United Nations Organisation.  
pp. 149, 150, 151, 154, 163, 168

<sup>74</sup> The joint message from Stalin and Churchill, dated October 10, 1944 (see No. 232 pp. 154-155) was handed under this number to Roosevelt by the British Diplomatic Service. p. 155

<sup>75</sup> The writer is referring to the plan for establishing under international control a zone comprising the Ruhr, Westphalia and the Saar. The plan was put forward by Mr Churchill and Mr Eden during discussions with J. V. Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. p. 161

<sup>76</sup> The reference is to the “Proposals for the Establishment of General International Organization”, a document drawn up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944.

Section A of Chapter VIII of the document ran:

“PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

“1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

"2. Any state, whether member of the Organization or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.

"3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

"4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.

"5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

"6. Justifiable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the court, for advice, legal questions connected with other disputes.

"7. The provisions of paragraph 1 to 6 of Section A should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned."

Paragraph 1 of Section C of Chapter VIII read:

"1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council." p. 163

<sup>77</sup> On December 20, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Harriman informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. that this message had been sent by President Roosevelt on December 16 but had not been delivered to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow until December 20 owing to disturbances during transmission.

The words in parentheses (second paragraph of Document No. 248) were added by the U.S. Embassy to the U.S.S.R., whose Note contained the text of the message. p. 165

<sup>78</sup> That is, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, whose seat was in Lublin, Poland. pp. 165, 172

<sup>79</sup> The reference is to Section D, Chapter VI, of the "Proposals for the Establishment of General International Organization," drafted at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The section reads as follows:  
"PROCEDURE

"1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the

Organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgement may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.

"2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.

"3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

"4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organization are specially affected.

"5. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute."

p. 169

<sup>80</sup> Code name for the conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain—held in the Crimea in February 1945. p. 175

<sup>81</sup> The allusion is to the conference mentioned in Note 80 above. p. 177

<sup>82</sup> The Soviet Government reacted favourably to the request for permission to base U.S. air force on Komsomolsk and Nikolayevsk. p. 177

<sup>83</sup> That is, the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, which at that time had its seat in Lublin, Poland. pp. 178, 192

<sup>84</sup> The Soviet Government replied favourably to the request contained in the Memorandum. pp. 179, 180

<sup>85</sup> There were landing fields in the Poltava area which the U.S. Air Force used in 1944 and 1945 for bomb raids on enemy territory. pp. 184, 185

<sup>86</sup> The San Francisco Conference was held between April 25 and June 26, 1945, to elaborate the Charter of the future international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security. pp. 187, 189, 193

<sup>87</sup> On March 16, 1945, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador, which read as follows:

"With reference to your letter concerning the Berne negotiations, which reached me on March 16, please be advised of the following:

"On March 12 last you informed me that the German General Wolff, and Dolmann and Simmer who were accompanying him, had arrived in Berne on March 9 to discuss with United States and British Army representatives the surrender of the German armed forces in Northern Italy. You also informed me that Field Marshal Alexander had been instructed to send his officers to Berne to meet the persons mentioned, and you asked for the Soviet Government's views on the matter.

"On the same day, March 12, I informed you that the Soviet Government had no objections to negotiations with General Wolff at Berne, provided Soviet officers representing the Soviet Military Com-

mand took part. In giving this reply, the Soviet Government had no doubt that the United States Government would react positively to its proposal for the participation of Soviet officers in the negotiations with the German General Wolff at Berne, and there and then named its representatives.

"Today, March 16, I am in receipt of a letter from you which shows that the United States Government is barring the Soviet representatives from the Berne negotiations. The U.S. Government's refusal to admit Soviet representatives to the Berne negotiations came as a complete surprise to the Soviet Government and is inexplicable in terms of the relations of alliance existing between our two countries. In view of this the Soviet Government finds it impossible to assent to discussions at Berne between representatives of Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and of the German commander, on the other, and insists on the discussions already begun at Berne being discontinued.

"The Soviet Government insists, furthermore, that henceforward separate negotiations by one or two of the Allied Powers with German representatives without the participation of the third Allied Power be precluded."

On March 22, 1945, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. sent to the U.S. Ambassador a letter reading as follows:

"Acknowledging receipt of your letter of March 21, 1945, regarding the Berne meeting between the German General Wolff and staff officers of Field Marshal Alexander, I hereby declare that I see no justification for your statement to the effect that the Soviet Government has a wrong view of the purpose of the contact at Berne between the German General Wolff and Field Marshal Alexander's representatives, for what we have in this case is not an erroneous notion of the purpose of the contact nor a misunderstanding, but something worse.

"It appears from your letter of March 12 that the German General Wolff and those accompanying him came to Berne to negotiate with representatives of the Anglo-American Command the capitulation of the German forces in Northern Italy. The Soviet Government's proposal that representatives of the Soviet Military Command should take part in the negotiations was rejected.

"The result is that negotiations have been going on for two weeks at Berne, behind the back of the Soviet Union which is bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, between representatives of the German Military Command, on the one hand, and those of the British and U.S. Commands, on the other. The Soviet Government considers this absolutely impermissible and insists on its statement, set forth in my letter of March 16 last." p. 188

<sup>88</sup> The Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., A. A. Gromyko, headed the Soviet Delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the U.S.S.R. the U.S.A. and Britain, held in August and September 1944 to discuss the establishment of the United Nations Organisation. p. 189

<sup>89</sup> The Declaration of Liberated Europe was adopted at the Crimea Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—the Soviet Union the U.S.A. and Britain—in February 1945. p. 192

<sup>90</sup> The allusion is to the government crisis in Roumania in February 1945, occasioned by the terror policy of the Radescu Government which was incompatible with the principle of democracy. The crisis was overcome by forming a new government under P. Groza on March 6, 1945. p. 192

<sup>91</sup> The reference is to the commission set up at the Crimea Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Britain—in February 1945. The commission was composed of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and British Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. It was empowered to consult in Moscow primarily with members of the Polish Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders both from Poland and abroad with an eye to reorganising the Polish Provisional Government on a broader democratic basis to include democratic leaders from Poland proper and Poles from abroad. pp. 192, 200, 204

<sup>92</sup> See paragraph 5 of the Stalin message of April 7, 1945 (Document No. 289, pp. 200-202). pp. 205, 208, 214

<sup>93</sup> This document was handed to V. M. Molotov by H. S. Truman in Washington. p. 208

<sup>94</sup> Field Marshal Alexander's reports were thus franked.p. 212

<sup>95</sup> The reference is to the following message from W. S. Churchill to J. V. Stalin:

"The Anglo-American armies will soon make contact in Germany with Soviet forces, and the approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of zones which they will occupy in Germany and in Austria.

"2. Our immediate task is the final defeat of the German army. During this period the boundaries between the forces of the three Allies must be decided by the Commanders in the field and will be governed by operational considerations and requirements. It is inevitable that our armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones.

"3. When the fighting is finished, the next task is for the Allied Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be re-disposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of zones in Germany has already been decided upon and it is necessary that we shall without delay reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna.

"4. It appears now that no signed instrument of surrender will be forthcoming. In this event the governments should decide to set up at once the Allied Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the task of making detailed arrangements for the withdrawal of forces to their agreed occupational zones.

"5. In order to meet the requirements of the situation referred to in paragraph 2 above, namely the emergency and temporary arrangements for tactical zones, instructions have been sent to General Eisenhower. These are as follows:

"a) To avoid confusion between the two armies and to prevent either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as and where they meet, subject to such adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion of local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition.

"b) As to adjustments of forces after the cessation of hostilities in an area, your troops should be disposed in accordance with military requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as

permitted by the urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to any major adjustment in contrast to local adjustments for operational and administrative reasons.'

"6. I request that you will be so good as to issue similar instructions to your commanders in the field.

"7. I am sending this message to you and President Truman simultaneously.

"27th April, 1945."

p. 213

<sup>96</sup> The allusion is to the possibility of inviting Poland to the conference for drafting the Charter of the future international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security, which took place in San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. p. 217

<sup>97</sup> In connection with this message A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., received a letter from President Truman dated May 8, 1945, and reading as follows:

"Please inform Marshal Stalin that his message to me was received in the White House at one o'clock, this morning. However, by the time the message reached me, preparations had proceeded to such an extent that it was not possible to give consideration to a postponement of my announcement of the German surrender." p. 218

<sup>98</sup> The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was constituted by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain under a decision of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference (October 19-30, 1943). It consisted of representatives of the three Powers. The purpose of the EAC was to study European problems designated by the three governments relating to termination of hostilities, and to give the three governments joint advice on these problems. On November 11, 1944 the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain invited the Provisional Government of the French Republic to participate in the work of the European Advisory Commission with headquarters in London as its fourth permanent member. The EAC was dissolved in August 1945. pp. 220, 233, 235

<sup>99</sup> The reference is to a letter from the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in the U.S.S.R. to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated May 15, 1945, conveying the text of the instructions which the U.S. Government had given to its Ambassador in Belgrade. The latter was instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government that the United States Government expected it to agree immediately to the Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean establishing control over the area which was to include Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Pola, the lines of communication running through Gorizia and Monfalcone to Austria, as well as the area extending east of that line far enough to make possible the exercise of proper administrative control, and also that the Yugoslav Government would issue appropriate instructions to the Yugoslav forces in that area to cooperate with the Allied Commanders in establishing military administration in that area under the Allied Commander. pp. 221, 224

<sup>100</sup> A letter written by the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on March 14, 1945 proposed that the representatives of the Soviet, U.S. and British Government should discuss the situation in Roumania with a view to arriving at genuinely concerted policies and procedures "in assisting the Roumanians to solve their pressing political problems." p. 230



- <sup>101</sup> The reference is to the letter which the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. sent to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on May 30, 1945. It contained the texts of a Note and of a military agreement between the Anglo-American Command in the Mediterranean and Tito, sent to the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade for the Yugoslav Government. p. 230
- <sup>102</sup> The Agreement between the Soviet and United States Governments on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression was signed in Washington on June 11, 1942. p. 232
- <sup>103</sup> On June 9, 1945, an agreement was signed in Belgrade between the U.S., British and Yugoslav Governments for a provisional military administration in Venezia Giulia. pp. 233, 238
- <sup>104</sup> The Allied Control Council was constituted under agreements relating to the administration of Germany concluded by representatives of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain and France in Berlin on June 5, 1945. The purpose of the Council, which consisted of representatives of the four Powers, was the practical exercise in Germany of a single and agreed Allied policy in the period of occupation. pp. 233, 241
- <sup>105</sup> The writer has in mind the Crimea Conference agreement on Far Eastern matters, reached between the three Great Powers on February 11, 1945. p. 234
- <sup>106</sup> Code name for the Berlin Conference of the leaders of the three Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain—held in July-August 1945. p. 239
- <sup>107</sup> The U.S. President's request, outlined in his message of July 21, 1945, was granted by the Soviet Government. U.S. aerological stations were set up in Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk. The purpose of the stations was to transmit weather reports to the U.S. naval and air forces operating against Japan. Both stations were dismantled in December 1945, after the war against Japan. p. 241
- <sup>108</sup> On August 10, 1945, the Japanese Government submitted to the Governments of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., Britain and China the following statement:  
"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945 by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.  
"The Japanese Government hope sincerely that this understanding is warranted and desire keenly that an explicit indications to that effect will be speedily forthcoming."  
On August 11, 1945, the U.S. Department of State sent the reply of the Governments of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China to the Japanese Government's statement of August 10. It read as follows:  
"With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement

‘with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as Sovereign Ruler’, our position is as follows:

“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

“The Emperor will be required to authorise and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and Japanese Imperial G.H.Q. of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval, and air authorities, and to all the forces under their control wherever located, to cease active operations and surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

“Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transport.

“The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

“The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.”

The reply was transmitted to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government.

p. 248

<sup>109</sup> The reference is to the first session of the Foreign Ministers’ Council of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain, France and China held in London on September 11-October 2, 1945. The Council was formed by decision of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain (July 17-August 2, 1945). pp. 259, 260, 261, 262, 264

<sup>110</sup> The allusion is to the preparation of the draft peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland by the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Britain, the U.S.A. and France. pp. 263, 267

<sup>111</sup> The reference is to the message received on December 9, 1945 (see Document No. 381 on p. 266). It was conveyed to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by the U.S. Embassy in the U.S.S.R. in a Note dated December 8, 1945. p. 266

<sup>112</sup> The Allied Council for Japan—an international body constituted under an agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain (December 16-26, 1945). The Council consisted of four members (one each from the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China, and one member representing Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India). The Supreme Commander of the allied occupation troops in Japan was obliged to consult with the Allied Council on occupation policy in Japan. The Council became inoperative in April 1953. p. 267

<sup>113</sup> The Far Eastern Commission—an international body formed to work out agreed decisions ensuring the fulfilment by Japan of its commitments under the surrender terms signed on September 2, 1945. The Commission was constituted under an agreement reached at the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference (December 16-26, 1945). It consisted of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. It was joined by representatives of Pakistan and Burma in 1949.

On April 25, 1952, the United States unilaterally announced the dissolution of the Commission. p. 267

- <sup>114</sup> This message was handed to J. V. Stalin by U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes. p. 268
- <sup>115</sup> The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain, which sat in Moscow from December 16 to 26, took decisions concerning a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Council for Japan, and the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. p. 268
- <sup>116</sup> The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain, held in Moscow between December 16 and 26, 1945, resolved to submit to the United Nations General Assembly recommendations for a United Nations commission to explore problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. p. 268



**ПЕРЕПИСКА  
ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЯ СОВЕТА МИНИСТРОВ СССР  
С ПРЕЗИДЕНТАМИ США  
И ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРАМИ  
ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ  
ВО ВРЕМЯ  
ВЕЛИКОЙ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ ВОЙНЫ  
1941-1945 гг.**

**В 2-х т.**

**Т. II.**

**ПЕРЕПИСКА С Ф. РУЗВЕДЬТОМ И Г. ТРУМЗНОМ  
(август 1941—декабрь 1945)**

*На английском языке*



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