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On Peking's Policy Towards Its Neighbours
in South-East Asia

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CONTENTS

DEGRADING OF CONFUCIUS AND THE CRISIS OF MAOISM	6
THE MAOIST MODEL OF THE WORLD	14
EXPANSION SOUTHWARDS	20
"BALANCE OF FORCES", PEKING STYLE	32

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Political observers in Asian countries have long noted that Peking's Asian policy is a reflection of developments within China's ruling quarters, which often assume a most dramatic and unpredictable form. Even the most experienced observers have often failed to decipher what goes on behind the high walls of Chung-nanhai, the Emperor's Palace that has been turned into a "restricted area" ever since it became Mao Tse-tung's residence. And in the absence of concrete facts on the basis of which a reasonably precise forecast of Peking's intentions can be made, and with Peking's declarations often running counter to China's actual policy in Asia, all indirect signs provide food for rumours and guesswork. The press in South and South-East Asia has often tried to guess what lies behind Peking's "diplomacy of smiles" towards China's neighbours, or Peking's "ping-pong diplomacy" towards several countries in South Asia. And often Peking's protestations of friendship and good-neighbourliness are not borne out by deeds.

There are several reasons for the acute changes in Maoist foreign policy. An important reason is the continuing struggle for power in China between representatives of groups holding different views, whose existence is not denied in Peking. This struggle, which

varies in intensity from one period to another, testifies to the lack of stability and a chronic crisis situation in the country which for many years now the Maoist leadership has tried to eliminate, but without success. Whatever concrete forms it takes, an aggravation of this struggle for power is invariably accompanied by greater adventurism and expansionism in China's foreign policy. For instance, when the "cultural revolution" campaign was launched outrages were committed by *huatsiao* (Chinese emigrants), under Peking's instigation, in Burma, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries in South-East Asia. And the "campaign of criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao" coincided with the invasion by Chinese troops of Northern Burma and the landing of Chinese troops in Paracel Islands, an act regarded in South-East Asia as an announcement by Peking of its intention to settle all future territorial issues by force of arms. A regular pattern can be discerned here: the present campaign launched under the far-fetched slogan of "protecting the dictatorship of the proletariat", while the "campaign of criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao" continues, has led to new excesses in Peking's foreign policy.

To understand the motives of this policy it is necessary to look into China's domestic politics to see what lies behind the various campaigns, using as an example the "campaign of criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao."

Degrading of Confucius and the Crisis of Maoism

Of late the residents of the quiet little town of Kufow in the southern part of Shantung province have found themselves in the centre of turbulent events. Kufow is the birthplace of Confucius, and it was here

that the ancient philosopher died. A temple has been built at the site of his home, and in the courtyard within its walls stands his tomb. The tumult began when a mob of schoolchildren instigated by the Maoists broke into the temple, defiled the philosopher's grave and rushed along the streets of Kufow shouting threats against all his worshippers. This incident gives a good idea of the atmosphere in which the new campaign is being launched, a campaign which can be regarded as the continuation of the "cultural revolution."

Those living beyond the borders of China find it puzzling that the present rulers in Peking should find it necessary to harass the memory of a philosopher who lived in the epoch of Sakyamuni. In what way could he have anything to do with China's present-day problems? The fact is that Mao and his closest followers like to use allegory in their struggle against their ideological adversaries. It is not really surprising that the "case" of Confucius is linked to criticism of the late Marshal Lin Piao though the two men lived 25 centuries apart.

Confucianism has proved to be particularly viable in China. From the 3rd century B.C. this doctrine was the official ideology of imperial China. It formed the basis of the country's system of education and determined to a great extent the moral and psychological make-up of the Chinese people, their habits, traditions and norms of behaviour. In many ways Confucianism hindered social progress and the development of democracy in China.

However, in their criticism of the "old man Kung" the Maoists readily make use of prejudices. And they are not anxious to adhere to historical facts. Recently *Jenmin jihpao* said that Confucius had defended the moribund slave-owning system. But it is common knowledge that in China slavery became widespread as a principal form of exploitation several centuries after

the philosopher's death. Thus the Maoists are not interested in historical accuracy. What they are interested in is the situation of turmoil that arose at the time when Confucius's followers came out against the legist "Fatfya" doctrine. Such a situation of turmoil is what the Maoists wish to revive in present-day China.

To draw a parallel between Confucianism and 20th century right-wing opportunism, as the official Chinese press does, is absurd. This testifies to the vulgar character of the Maoists' sociologism. They mechanically apply 2,500-year old maxims to the present situation. Thus *Kuangming jihpao* said that "worship of Confucius and the struggle against 'Fatfya' constitute a struggle against contemporary China." The Maoists' use of history to their own advantages gives them extensive scope for political speculation and defamation of their opponents.

What determines the Maoists' position in the argument between the Confucianists and the legists? What makes the Maoists acknowledge their genetic kinship with "Fatfya"? The point is that representatives of this school such as Shang Yang and Han Fei had justified the use of the most brutal methods of government. In their opinion people could be kept under control only by means of force. These "Fatfya" views were widely used by Emperor Shih Huang Ti in dealing with his enemies and in consolidating the system of absolute power. And it is these aspects of the "Fatfya" doctrine and methods, employed by ancient despotic rulers in China in dealing with the people, that attracted the Peking leaders at the time of the "cultural revolution", a campaign aimed at doing away with all who were suspected of opposition to Mao. And the number of such people had greatly increased after the economic failures of the "great leap" and the "people's communes."

Shih Huang Ti had ordered the burning of books

related to Confucianism, being guided by the following precept of the "Legist" Shang Yang: "When people are stupid one can rule them with the help of wit." Similar methods have been adopted by the Maoists who have closed down schools, driven scholarship out of universities and forced writers to wear fool's caps.

The Maoists are attracted by the "Fatfya" cult of force, which regards war as a natural means of protecting state interests and subjugating one's neighbours. They have declared their intentions to restore the borders of China that existed at the time of the Ching Empire whose rulers had regarded as their vassals all countries where their horsemen had been. Quite recently the Peking magazine *Hsin chianshe* said that "territorial expansion cannot be regarded as aggression." The army newspaper *Tsetang chunpao* said that "the Chinese people are morally ready to fight tooth and nail to retrieve the lost territories that once belonged to China."

Many such parallels can be drawn. The explanation for this is to be sought in Maoism. Maoism is a strictly Chinese phenomenon, one that emerged in China owing to that country's specific historical background. The views of "Chairman Mao" took shape at the time of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism, when under the impact of the socialist revolution of 1917 in Russia and owing to the international assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese people's struggle for liberation, Marxism-Leninism was winning an increasing number of adherents in China. Thus in the course of many years Mao Tse-tung was able to propagate his ideas by using Marxist terms, while actually exploiting this revolutionary teaching for his own ends.

Mao's views, however, do not form a clear-cut systematic world outlook or even a more or less well-rounded theory. They are an eclectic mixture of va-

rious ideas borrowed from the most diverse sources, among them anarchism, taoism, and Tai Ping ideas. And to all this there have been added distorted theses of Marxism of which Mao Tse-tung has always had a vague knowledge, if for no other reason than that not all of Marx's works have been translated into Chinese and Mao Tse-tung knows no foreign languages.

The fact that Mao Tse-tung speaks of "sinocizing Marxism" shows that he considers China a "special" case to which scientific socialism and its objective laws of social development do not apply. The actual result of "sinocizing Marxism" is the replacement of Marxism by Maoism which is a malicious caricature of socialism. Maoism is nurtured by nationalism—the notion that the Chinese are superior to all other nations—and has thus developed into great-power chauvinism.

China is the only country in the world that has set forth such large and groundless territorial claims against the neighbouring countries. Moreover, the Maoists make no secret of their intention of establishing their domination by military means, to which they attach great importance. "The proletariat needs war", the Chinese newspapers say. Throughout China today the state and Party apparatus is under the control of the military. The present regime in the People's Republic of China can be rightly characterized as a military bureaucratic dictatorship. History has known cases where wide use was made of the concept of "socialism" for demagogical purposes. The Maoists' demagoguery is particularly harmful for it seeks to convince other nations that socialism and war are inseparable.

It is not surprising, therefore, that militarism has become an integral feature of Maoism. "Where there's an army, there's power," says Mao. The military-bureaucratic regime in Peking has destroyed all democratic institutions in the country and persecutes all

who object Mao's usurpation of the people's power. This, in effect, is the essence of the "cultural revolution", which is being continued under the slogan of "criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao and defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat." But if the Maoists accuse Lin Piao of all the sins attributed to Confucius, what then is the role allotted to the other characters in this drama? Do they draw a parallel between Mao and Shih Huang Ti? For has not Mao himself lauded the emperor in his articles?

A few years ago *The Degradation of Hai Jui*, a play by Wu Han, was staged in Shanghai. It met with serious disapproval from the authorities and has not been performed since. It should be noted that Hai Jui, the main character, an official and a Confucian, lived four centuries ago and was reduced in rank by an emperor of the Ming dynasty. It seems strange that the play should incur the wrath of the Maoists. But the conflict between the official, who adhered to the Confucian principle of "jen" (humaneness), and the despotic emperor, was interpreted as an allusion to life in present-day China. The audience had applauded but Mao had been vexed. On his instruction Yao Wen-yuan, who now holds a high place in the Peking hierarchy, published in 1965 an article criticizing Wu Han. This proved to be the prologue to the "cultural revolution."

This incident points to the allegorical manner in which fierce political clashes take place in China. Thus, when ta tsu pao posters announcing a new wave of the "cultural revolution" were recently plastered on the walls, the Chinese people, being well-acquainted with the language of allegory used by the Maoists, were not surprised that this time it was Confucius who was "degraded." Confucius was denounced by reformers at the time of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1911, but from different positions. The reformers

pointed out that Confucianism with its system of class division was an obstacle to social progress.

Incredible as it may seem at first, prior to the "cultural revolution" the ancient philosopher was in rather high favour with the Maoists. The organizers of the new campaign need not look very far in their search for Confucians. Mao himself had been among his adherents. In his youth Mao had studied in a Confucian school. For six years he had crammed the "Four Books" and "Five Books", among other canonical books. Mao once admitted that at that time he "had been a fervent admirer of Confucius." In later years he had often fallen back on the authority of Confucius when writing his articles including "On New Democracy" and "Methods of Work of a Party Committee."

What then is the determining factor in the Maoist attitude to Confucius? To answer this question in full it is necessary to keep in mind that Confucianism is in many ways a contradictory doctrine, for which there is no simple definition. The matter is further complicated when proponents of vulgar sociology try to drag Confucianism into the 20th century. What do the Maoists retain and what do they reject from this doctrine? First of all, they do not accept the ethical norms and certain aspects of the limited humanism inherent in Confucianism. In the "cultural revolution" orgy with its brutal repressions of all citizens who think differently from the Maoists, the hungweipings could hardly agree to the Confucian commandment: "Do not do unto others as you would not have done unto you". The principle of "hsiao" (respect for one's parents) also ran counter to their tastes, for denunciation of one's parents is a praiseworthy act with the Maoists.

But despite their attacks against Confucius the Maoists do not hesitate to borrow from his teachings a whole system of views owing to which Confucianism has long been regarded as "shackles that destroy free-

dom." According to Confucianism the initial division of Chinese society into classes with fixed norms of behaviour for each class was considered immutable. It ruled out equality in relations between people and implied blind submission to the supreme ruler. The idea of personal freedom is alien to Confucianism.

One looks in vain for even the slightest hint of criticism of these aspects of Confucianism in the *Hung Chi* magazine, *Jenmin jihpao* or any other Maoist publication. They are wholly in keeping with Mao's ambition to be the absolute ruler in the country by trampling upon all the elective democratic institutions. In the 3rd century B.C. Confucius's follower Hsün Tzu defended the principle of the despotic rule of the supreme ruler and the people's unconditional submission to his will, the people being mere "grass under the wind of the ruler." Here the approach to the nature of political power in society is the same as that of the Maoists who say that each inhabitant in China is merely an "obedient buffalo of Chairman Mao." To both Hsün Tzu and the Maoists, power does not mean government of the people but control over the people. "There is only one sun in the sky and one ruler for the people," said Men-chi, a disciple of Confucius. Today Mao wants to be known as "the reddest sun in the heart of every Chinese."

As recent events in China have shown, the implementation of these ideas has led to an acute deformation of the entire social superstructure. The destruction of Party and trade union organizations, and denial of the principle of elective government were the chief aims of the "cultural revolution" unleashed by the Maoists. Today, after the secret session of the National People's Congress the delegates to which were appointed from above, China remains a country where the legislative and judicial bodies have been replaced by the arbitrary rule of Mao's military-bu-

reaucratic regime. These changes, which are tragic for the Chinese people, have become a threat to the gains of the popular democratic revolution.

Anyone who is acquainted with Chinese history and traditions cannot fail to see that Mao is not only imitating Shih Huang Ti and other Chinese emperors but is adhering to all the ideas of late medieval Confucianism which served the interests of the feudals.

The Maoists go so far as to copy the Confucian form and manners of behaviour. What was the chief method of education in a Confucian school? The unthinking repetition of postulates from *Lunyu*, each one beginning with the words: "Confucius says..." These postulates were written in *wenyan*, a dead language which was incomprehensible to the people. When young Sun Yat-sen once admitted to his teacher that he did not understand a word of what he had learned by rote, the latter reacted in a manner typical of an instructor in a Confucian school: he took up a bamboo rod and "taught him a lesson."

The same methods are now being used by the Maoists who force people to recite Mao's words without any thought for their meaning. Once when I was in China I asked an official what was meant by "encircling the city by the village". He immediately replied with a quotation from Mao but failed to explain its practical significance. By borrowing educational methods from feudal China and preventing the people from taking part in government the Maoists have made themselves absolute rulers in the country. These are the circumstances that have given rise to the political crisis in China.

The Maoist Model of the World

It was believed in ancient China that the sky was round and the earth was square with the Middle King-

dom in the centre. This concept of the world is reflected in the architectural layout of the Celestial Temple which can still be seen in Peking. In our time, when man has flown in outer space, such notions are interesting only as a gauge of progress mankind has achieved. I was reminded of this ancient concept of the world by some statements made by the Peking leaders which distort the political map of the contemporary world beyond recognition. The reader can judge this for himself.

Mao's followers reject the scientifically founded and long proved thesis that the basic contradiction in the contemporary world is the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. Instead, they speak of a contradiction between "two superpowers" and all the other countries of the world. The Maoists thus show that they attach no importance to the objectively existing class struggle and the class character of world politics. The Maoists have not only "excommunicated" the Soviet Union from socialism, and "placed" it in the imperialist camp, but deny the very existence of the socialist community of nations.

At the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on April 10, 1974, Vice Premier of the PRC State Council Teng Hsiao-ping set out to give a detailed picture of the contemporary world, to describe the character of international relations and contradictions. He said that the world was "made up of three interconnected and mutually contradictory worlds." The first included the USA and the Soviet Union. The developing countries formed the "third world," and the developed countries, holding an intermediate place between the two, constituted the "second world." It is obvious that the arbitrary placing of the Soviet Union and the USA into one world is a variation of the Maoists' favourite theme of "collusion between two superpowers."

According to Teng Hsiao-ping's scheme, the socialist community of nations is a "non-existent" category. There are no class poles, no socialism, no capitalism—only the struggle, so ardently wished for by Peking, of the "second" and "third" world against the "first," under the Maoists' leadership naturally. The theme of Teng Hsiao-ping's entire argument is that in today's world the Soviet Union and not imperialism should be the main and perhaps sole target for struggle. Peking ignores the fact that such an approach leads people away from a real struggle against imperialism and colonialism, isolates the "third world" from its natural ally—the socialist countries—and objectively plays into the hands of imperialism.

But we shall not dwell on such vain attempts to obliterate class differences in the social structures of states and the radical distinctions in their foreign policies springing from these differences. Let us consider here the place which the Maoists have allotted to China. According to Teng Hsiao-ping China is a "socialist developing country" belonging to the "third world." This definition evidently has a special meaning and sheds light on the Maoists' far-reaching aims. For if, according to the erroneous view of the Peking theorists, the socialist world no longer exists, and China remains a socialist country which nevertheless belongs to the "third world," then in keeping with Peking's logic it must become the guiding force of the developing countries of the "third world."

However, even in the Maoists' opinion such sophistry lacks conviction. Otherwise they would not be thinking up new reasons for including China in the "third world," such as racial community or similarity of historical destinies, which the Peking leaders repeatedly refer to in their meetings with visitors from Asia. What are we to make of this? Attempts to bring racialist views into politics are not new, and in this

respect the Maoists are not original. One may recall that racialism was employed by Japanese militarists who tried to turn Asia into their colonial empire—the "great sphere of East-Asian co-prosperity." The Maoists' attempts to substitute the socio-class approach to international events and phenomena for racial characteristics are not to their credit. They are merely following in the footsteps of the unlucky character from a story by Lu Hsin who gave himself a lashing.

Another argument used by Peking to justify China's place in the "third world" involves references to history. It is common knowledge that China, like other Asian countries, suffered from the encroachments of colonial powers. But it is a fact that as an empire China had used its power to subjugate its neighbours. The rulers of the Ching Empire had considered the colonial countries' attack on Indochina, Burma and other neighbouring countries as an encroachment on their own rights and interests and vied with the colonialists for power in these lands. We shall cite only one example of this.

A few years ago I was translating Hsu Huai-chung's *We Sow Love* (published in Peking), a book about Tibet. The author writes of the British colonialists' invasions of Tibet in 1887 and 1904 and of the steps taken by the rulers of the Ching Empire to forestall the British. Chao Erh-feng, a military leader who was then vicegerent of the Szechwan-Sikang-Yunnan district, was appointed ruler of Tibet. In 1905 his troops stormed into Tibet where, to quote the author, they "dealt with the Tibetans in a most brutal way."

Wherever Chao Erh-feng's army passed, writes Hsu Huai-chung, "the earth was drenched in blood, mountains of corpses rose everywhere, and there was a dead silence except for the croaking of carrion-crows."

This aggressive policy was later continued by the leaders of the right-wing Kuomintang. In his book

China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in connection with imperialist expansion in Asia in the late 19th and early 20th century: "The memory of the disastrous loss of Ryukyu (Liu-chiu Islands), Hong Kong, Formosa, the Pescadores, Indochina, Burma, and Korea was still fresh while the final calamity of the partitioning of the whole country was impending."

The reader may say that such was the policy conducted by the emperors and the bourgeois rulers of China. But the point is that the present Peking rulers are treading in the footsteps of China's former rulers and are trying to justify their seizures. Here is an excerpt from Mao Tse-tung's writings: "Having defeated China in war, they not only occupied many states bordering on China that were under her protection, but seized or 'leased' part of her territory. For example, Japan occupied Taiwan and the Pescadores and 'leased' Port Arthur, Britain seized Hong Kong, and France 'leased' Kwangchow Wan."

It is obvious that the seizure of Hong Kong and Macao from China was an act of colonial robbery. But when the Peking rulers equate such states as Burma and Nepal with Hong Kong and Macao, this is no longer a matter of condemning colonial seizures but one of Peking's claims to foreign territories.

These claims are confirmed by the recent publication of atlases and maps in Peking which are modified versions of maps of China under the Ching dynasty. How far the Maoists go in their claims can be judged by the *Atlas of PRC Provinces* published in Shanghai, where not only vast areas of South-East Asia are marked as Chinese territory, but the entire South China Sea is included in China's inland waters, and the Chinese borders are extended to Indonesia and the Philippines. It is noteworthy that in their claims to neighbouring territories the Maoists have

made use of a list of "China's lost territories" compiled in the 20's and 30's by Kuomintang politicians. This is also confirmed by Liu Pei-hua's *Short History of Contemporary China* published in 1953 in Peking with maps prepared by the Kuomintang. Such claims are called "cartographic aggression" in Asian countries. In the last few years Peking has time and again laid claims to neighbouring territories, saying that they were "disputed areas," which mean, according to Peking's logic, areas that had been taken away from China. Thus in 1956 Peking laid claim to 170 thousand square kilometres of Burmese territory, and in 1969, to 130 thousand square kilometres of Indian territory. The Maoists have repeatedly resorted to the use of force against their Asian neighbours as a means of backing up their claims.

Pointing to these facts *Utusan Malaysia*, published in Kuala Lumpur, has noted that the present Peking leadership borders territorial claims practically to all countries bordering on China, and that the publication of maps of China confirming Peking's territorial claims to the neighbouring countries has aroused the concern of the governments of Asian developing countries, which regard this as further evidence of Peking's attempt to expand China's territory at the expense of its neighbours.

All these facts show that Peking's new model of the world is a product of its dangerous ambitions. In substituting the actually existing contradictions between the forces of socialism and national liberation on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other, with their stillborn schemes, the Maoists pursue definite practical aims. They would like to drive a wedge into the relations between the socialist and developing countries in order to isolate the latter and sacrifice them to Peking's expansionist ambitions, and form a bloc of states headed by China under the banner of struggle

against the "two superpowers" that would help Peking carry out its hegemonic plans in the world arena. All this is also aimed at preventing an improvement of Soviet-American relations and thus hindering the process of détente now under way.

On the whole one can say that the Maoists' model of the world is designed to justify their "special" course in the world arena. Two interconnected trends can be seen in their foreign policy and they are continuing to develop. On the one hand, Peking is definitely going over from a passive stand in the struggle against imperialism to a search for dubious compromises with imperialist forces. On the other, and this is particularly obvious against the background of the first tendency, Peking's policy is drawing ever closer to anti-Sovietism, to attempts to undermine the socialist community and the anti-imperialist front as a whole.

Expansion Southwards

There is hardly a country in South or South-East Asia that has not suffered in one form or another from the duplicity of Peking's foreign policy. Promises of friendship and provocation of border incidents, "diplomacy of smiles" and use of Chinese emigrants as the "fifth column"—such are the diplomatic means used by Peking to promote its expansionist aims in this part of the world. When in the mid-fifties Peking took part in the Bandung Conference, which was convened for the purpose of strengthening Afro-Asian solidarity, it used the occasion to establish contacts with India and to sign with the latter documents proclaiming the principles of peaceful coexistence (Panch Shila) in order to enhance its prestige in Asia. At that time the Maoists were trying to ingratiate themselves with India. But as soon as Peking became aware that India's non-alignment policy was a hindrance to its

hegemonic course, it provoked armed conflicts on the Chinese-Indian frontier. As noted by the Indian journalist Dharamvir Singh Tyagi in his book *Chinese Mandarinism*, "China's aim in provoking a conflict with India over the border was not merely a desire for territorial gains. It also wanted to expose India's weakness and undermine the latter's positions in the Third World by making it abandon non-alignment."

Showing open hostility towards India the Maoists attempted to set against India its nearest neighbours—Burma and Pakistan—in utter disregard of the fact that imperialism had drawn Pakistan into military blocs. In 1967, when the "cultural revolution" was at its height, the Maoists' gross interference led to a break with Burma although earlier Peking's relations with Burma had served as a "model" of its good-neighbourly policy in Asia.

It has long been noted that whenever conflicts of any kind take place in Asia Peking does its best to aggravate them. Such was its position in the Hindo-Pakistani conflicts. Peking's actions were provocative with respect to the foundation of the independent Republic of Bangladesh. The Maoists did everything to exacerbate the situation in Asia, to instigate "staggering events" which were to pass for a "revolutionary situation" and which Peking used for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

The Chinese leaders tried to prevent a further normalization of the situation in the Hindustan sub-continent. Their continuing attacks against India and against the policy of progressive changes conducted by the government of Indira Gandhi are evidence of this.

As for the Maoists' attitude to India, they are out to hinder all socio-economic changes that are being implemented in the country, disrupt its internal stability and hinder Soviet-Indian cooperation based on

the treaty on friendship signed between the two countries.

The Maoists openly encouraged acts of terrorism by Yahya Khan's military regime in Bangladesh and the anti-Indian policy conducted by the Pakistani government at that time.

During the "two-week" war the PRC leaders poured out torrents of lies concerning India in the UN and the Chinese press. The Chinese delegate in the Security Council went so far as to warn the government of India that it would "reap the bitter fruit that it had sown." Today it is obvious that the "bitter fruit" was reaped, not by India, but by the Pakistani military regime and its patrons in Peking.

In seeking to undermine stability and security in the Hindustani subcontinent Peking hopes to perpetuate the discords between the states in this area and weaken India's foreign policy position and national unity. According to the schemes of Peking's political strategists this would open the way for China's penetration into the area.

The Hsinhua News Agency's sharp attacks against India with regard to the agreement on the Kashmir question signed in Delhi came as no surprise to Indian observers. This can be seen in the reaction of the Indian press. *Times of India* of March 18, 1975, said: "The New China News Agency's commentary on the accord between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah is no mere reiteration of the Chinese government's known views on the Kashmir question: it is an unrestrained anti-Indian outburst. As such it is sharply at variance with the recent hints given by Chinese spokesmen including the vice-premier Mr. Chen Hsi-lien about the improved climate for Sino-Indian relations."

In this connection one may recall the Sino-American communique on the results of the US President's

visit to the PRC, signed on February 28, 1972. In it the Chinese asserted that China was the sole champion of the Kashmir people's interests. India's stand on this question was ignored. In the countries of the South Asian subcontinent this was regarded as a gross attempt to complicate relations between the neighbouring countries in the area.

Peking persists in its attempts to aggravate the situation in South Asia. It continues to supply arms to different separatist groups engaged in undermining stability in several Asian countries. Among these groups are the insurgents in the Indian states of Nagaland and Mizoram (U.T.).

As reported by *Times of India*, detachments of soldiers recruited from the Naga and Mizo tribes are being trained at military bases in the Chinese province of Yunan. They are equipped with Chinese arms and smuggled by way of the Andaman Mountains into the eastern states of India where they make ambushes and commit acts of arson and terrorize the peaceful population. New evidence of Peking's interference in Indian affairs came to light at a press conference held in Delhi in February 1974, at which insurgent leaders Skato Swu and Zuheto from the Naga tribe who had gone over to the side of the Indian government spoke of their former activities. *Hindustan Standard* said on April 25, 1975, that India's security forces had in the course of recent operations seized Chinese arms and ammunition together with several documents and publications including copies of red books with Mao's quotations.

Taking into consideration Peking's subversive activities, at the beginning of 1975 India's Parliament passed a resolution on setting up a presidential government in the Nagaland State. The political situation in Nagaland was discussed in detail at a meeting of the committee for political affairs of the Indian gov-

ernment. Its members heard a report which pointed out that the political instability in the area was among other things caused by the "interference of Chinese agents in Nagaland's domestic affairs."

Speaking in Parliament on April 21, 1975, Swaran Singh, the Indian Minister of Defence, noted that Peking was strengthening its military position along India's northern frontier and supporting hostile elements in the north-eastern states of Mizoram and Nagaland not only politically but with concrete actions, by training separatists and supplying them with arms. In India the PRC government statement of April 29, 1975, on the events in Sikkim, a small territory in the Himalayas, formerly an associated territory of the Union of India, was regarded as the Maoists' new attempt to interfere in India's domestic affairs. In a nationwide referendum held on April 14, 1975, the majority of Sikkim's population voted for Sikkim's entering the Union of India as an equal state and the abolition of the power of Sikkim's hereditary ruler.

On April 23, the House of the People of the Indian Parliament voted for Sikkim's entry into the Union of India and made the necessary amendment to the Constitution. Following approval of the bill by the Council of States Sikkim became India's twenty-second state.

This event inscribed a new page in the history of the Sikkim people. Its new status opens up broad opportunities for introducing democratic changes and overcoming feudal survivals.

But this development obviously was not to the taste of the Peking leaders who display a special interest in Sikkim and assign it a special place in their strategic plans. These far-reaching aims were given away in the PRC government statement of April 29, 1975 in which India was accused of "annexion" and "colonialism." The declaration of PRC's Deputy Pre-

mier that China would render "support" to the Sikkim people was regarded by official quarters in Delhi as overt interference in the affairs of the Sikkim and Indian peoples who wanted to maintain relations of friendship and cooperation with each other.

A few years ago the Indian press carried reports of secret CIA plans to set up in the area bordering on India, Bangladesh and Burma, a puppet state to be called Bengsam, which would be made up of parts of territories of these countries and populated by national minorities. The latest events show that Peking is using the plans worked out by an imperialist intelligence service. Peking's intentions are confirmed by Dharamvir Singh Tyagi who said in his *Chinese Mandarinism* that Peking hoped to see the breaking up of India and other neighbouring countries as this would make it easier for China to establish its hegemony over Asia and the Indian Ocean area. As noted by the press of South Asian countries, the realization of these aims would open the way to the expansion of Maoism to the south, providing it with a strategic springboard in the Indian Ocean. The matter is not confined to Peking's support of different separatist groups.

People in South Asian countries regard China's military buildup in Tibet as a threat to peace in Asia. The buildup was described in detail by the Hong Kong magazine *Far Eastern Economic Review* in its issue of March 18, 1974. As reported by the press, China is building launching sites for medium-range missiles in this high plateau. Peking also intends to test Chinese ballistic missiles in the Indian Ocean zone, whose trajectories will inevitably pass over India. In this connection, in February 1975 several deputies in India's Parliament called for an investigation of reports on the construction by the Chinese of missile launching sites in Tibet.

In neighbouring Burma the Maoists not only support the separatist movements headed by Kachin, Karen and Shan feudals, but organize invasions of the country by Chinese troops in an attempt to set up "liberated areas." The Bangkok correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that the number of Chinese soldiers in Burma had reached 9,000. At a press conference held in Kengtung on December 16, 1973, Burmese authorities displayed arms, documents and other incriminating evidence of the Maoists' armed interference in Burma's domestic affairs, captured during the "Yeyanaung" and "Aung So Mo" operations. Journalists were also shown fresh graves with Chinese inscriptions in places of armed clashes.

The magazine *Lanzing Thading* published in Rangoon carried a photo in one of its issues of a monument to independence in one of the towns in northern Burma which had been nearly destroyed by Chinese troops. The monument was covered with Chinese inscriptions calling for the liberation of Burma. The way the hieroglyphs were drawn shows that they were the work of the Chinese who had had their schooling in China, and not of the local *huatsiao*. It is logical to ask: from whom are the self-appointed saviours going to "free Burma"? The answer is: from its lawful government elected by the Burmese people. The same slogans are regularly broadcast in Burmese by the underground radio station operating in China. And the Maoists are not in the least troubled by the fact that they signed in 1960 a border agreement and a treaty on friendship and mutual non-aggression with Burma. Peking's subversive activities are particularly odious since the Burmese government has proclaimed the country's socialist orientation in developing its socio-economic system and has confirmed its intentions with practical measures.

The third session of Burma's People's Assembly

held in March 1975 devoted considerable attention to the events on the Sino-Burmese frontier, where in January-February fierce clashes took place between government troops and the anti-government pro-Peking forces aided by China. As reported at the session, the Burmese army, with the help of the civilian population, routed the main forces of the insurgents. The remaining detachments fled from the Shan National District to China where they are once again building up a base in preparation for new attacks.

This is one of many examples showing that the existence of diplomatic relations, to say nothing of treaties, between the PRC and any Asian country is by no means a guarantee against the Maoists' encroachment on its sovereignty. In fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and several Asian countries is regarded in Asia as a ruse for increasing the Maoists' influence in these countries.

Thus, for instance, after China established diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 1974 it has continued to interfere in the country's domestic affairs through its secret service. Recently the Maoists have laid claims to the Sengmu Archipelago which is Malaysian territory. Despite its assurances to Malaysia Peking continues to encourage and support terrorist groups operating in the country. In June 1975 the government of Malaysia said in an official protest to the PRC that if the latter wished to maintain diplomatic relations with Malaysia it would have to put an end to these activities.

The Maoists' secret service has intensified its activities in Nepal, which also has a common border with China. In Peking they pretend that it is China's fervent desire to "support the just struggle of the government and people of Nepal against foreign interference." But as has been the case with many other

countries, such unsolicited patronage on the part of Peking only shows its intentions to aggravate relations between India and Nepal thereby setting the stage for greater interference in Nepal's affairs.

In confirmation of these suspicions the Nepal press has reported the illegal transportation of fire arms and ammunition into Nepal from China together with Maoist publications intended for pro-Peking groups engaged in plotting against the local government. It is also no secret that Peking has set up a coordinating centre in Nepal for guiding the activities of subversive groups in India and Bangladesh.

To spread their influence to China's neighbouring countries the Maoists make use of the *huatsiao*-local Chinese who have long emigrated from China but who have retained their national traits owing to their isolation from the local population and their ethnic integrity.

In Asian countries *huatsiao* form a large ethnic stratum, and in some ways exert a considerable influence in those countries. There are four million Chinese in Thailand, over three million in Malaysia, 1.5 million in Singapore, three million in Indonesia, and several hundred thousand in Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Altogether there are more than 18 million Chinese in the countries of South-East Asia. Moreover, the *huatsiao* also hold strong economic positions in these countries, where they have control over a large part of trade, particularly retail trade. Many specialists, and among them the US historian George Kahin, the author of *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, have noted that most of the big Chinese capital was formed mainly through *huatsiao*'s active collaboration with colonialists.

Seeking to make the more wealthy Chinese emigrants serve their interests the Maoists regard all *huatsiao* as Chinese citizens. They have in effect adopt-

ed the precept of Chinese feudal rulers that all Chinese, whatever their place of residence, must regard China as their native country, and have added to this the Kuomintang slogan: "Where there are Chinese, there is China." Playing the role of guardian of all Chinese emigrants Peking declared it its duty to protect "the respective rights and interests of the Chinese living abroad." Chinese emigrants are considered part of the population of the PRC.

At the session of the National People's Congress held in January 1975 a number of seats were reserved for *huatsiao* residing in South-East Asian countries. Of late Peking has been facilitating the emigration via Hong Kong of a considerable number of Chinese who had not long ago lived in Malaysia and other South-East Asian countries. They are now called upon to resume their former citizenship, and penetrate the countries' state apparatus and social and political spheres. As noted by the press in South-East Asia, the methods used by the Maoists to persuade wealthy *huatsiao* to cooperate amount to a political racket. The *huatsiao* are forced to subsidize the Maoists' diverse undertakings which grossly violate the norms of international law. It is no secret that before Indonesia and China broke off diplomatic relations with each other the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta had for many years been financed by the Chinese exploiter minority residing in Indonesia. It is not surprising that when the Indonesian authorities introduced measures to curb the activities of the Chinese bourgeoisie Peking reacted with ultimatums and threats. Chinese bourgeoisie residing in the countries of South-East Asia accounts for more than half of their domestic trade and the greater part of foreign trade operations; it holds key positions in banking, several domestic industries and the plantation economy. According to estimates of foreign experts capital investments of Chi-

nese emigrants amount to nearly 5,000 million dollars, that is, the amount of capital invested by Chinese bourgeoisie in the economy of South-East Asia is not less than the investments made by all the imperialist powers in that part of the world. This capital is the main source of Peking's income from Chinese emigrants which is used to finance its military budget. In the last twenty years the countries of South-East Asia have suffered considerable losses owing to the pumping of the wealth of the Chinese bourgeoisie into China where more favourable conditions of investment have been established—with dividends at 7-8 percent. Peking in effect takes a hand in exploiting the people of the countries inhabited by Chinese bourgeoisie. According to an estimate given by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* Chinese emigrants yearly remit approximately 80 million dollars to Peking.

Huatsiao have been repeatedly used by Peking as a means of putting pressure on the governments of South-East Asia, and this has often led to sharp conflicts. For instance, when in 1967 U Ne Win's government introduced measures for nationalization in Burma which affected the interests of Chinese trade and banking circles the Maoist intelligence instigated clashes in Rangoon, Mandalay and other cities between local Chinese residents and the Burmese. When the organizers of these excesses were given a rebuff Peking bombarded Burma with more than twenty notes containing "warnings" and threats of every kind.

The Indonesian newspaper *Angkatan Bersenjata* reported that subversive elements smuggled into the country by Peking had been arrested in Semarang and several other cities. Caches of small arms transported illegally from China were also discovered. The newspaper *New Standard* published a photo showing Chinese rifles discovered in a cache in Western Kalimantan.

While aggravating the situation in Asia and interfering in the domestic affairs of China's neighbours the Peking leadership justifies these actions by referring to its alleged solicitude for the interests of the international revolutionary movement. It is not likely that anyone will be deceived by these tactics. All communist parties in the countries of South-East Asia that have fallen under the ideological influence of Maoism have suffered substantial losses. The Maoists have foisted upon them an adventurist, sectarian course which completely disregards the historical situation in South-East Asia and which has led to their isolation from the masses. Seeking to turn several countries in this region into "testing grounds" for Mao's ideas the Peking politicians incited a number of representatives of Indonesia's left-wing forces to join in a conspiracy of a group of officers headed by Untung which became known as "the September 30 movement." Nothing was gained by this attempt except the knowledge that such Maoist methods were doomed to failure. But the price for this mistake had to be paid by all progressive leaders of Indonesia. The reaction used the occasion to launch a campaign of repressions against hundreds of thousands of people who had nothing to do with the conspiracy or its instigators in Peking. The Maoist leadership must be held responsible for the losses suffered by revolutionary forces in Malaysia, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines.

When the Revolutionary Council came to power in Burma it became possible to put an end to the protracted civil conflict and to legalize the Communist Party through the conclusion of an agreement on cooperation between the Communist Party and the revolutionary democrats. This opportunity was lost, however, owing to the interference of the Peking leaders. The talks were wrecked. Further events showed that Peking's sectarian aims and its attempts to export

"cultural revolution" did harm to the interests of Burma's working people and hampered efforts to achieve unity of all the anti-imperialist forces in the country.

Similar incidents have convinced progressive forces in South-East Asian countries of the danger inherent in the policy foisted upon them by Peking, and have prompted them to take the necessary steps to overcome their dependence on the latter. The Maoists have been quick to react in a manner typical of all their doings. Officials from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other countries of South-East Asia have been assured by Peking that it is no longer interested in the fate of Communists in those countries and that their authorities "may deal with them as they see fit."

Thus recent events have shown that Maoism is intensely hostile to the revolutionary liberation movement in Asia. Peking is trying to set up an artificial opposition between the tasks of progressive Asian countries and the general tasks of the socialist forces fighting against imperialism and reaction.

"Balance of Forces", Peking Style

Of late the Hsinhua News Agency, Radio Peking and other Maoist propaganda organs have often spoken of the necessity of maintaining "balance of forces" in Asia. An analysis of international events shows, however, that in setting forth this idea Peking is trying to justify its diplomatic moves and the sharp changes in its foreign policy, particularly in Asia.

But whatever the changes, the final aim of Peking's manoeuvres remains the same. The Chinese

leaders look upon the vast Asian region bordering on the Pacific and Indian oceans as the immediate object of their expansionist aims.

Here is what the Sri Lanka weekly *Tribune* says on the subject: "On the pretext of 'responsibility for the destinies of nations' in South-East and South Asia, as well as on the whole Asian continent, Peking interferes in the internal affairs of a whole number of countries. No wonder that such activities can't be overlooked by the countries of this region and cause their natural anxiety." All these actions are the direct result of the great-power ambitions and hegemonic plans nurtured in Peking.

And one must not overlook the following fact. Peking can hardly claim to be the author of the dubious conception of "balance of forces." The Maoists have simply adopted it from Western bourgeois circles. Representatives of these circles use this conception to justify foreign "presence" in Asia which is usually understood as the retaining of foreign military bases and garrisons and the undertaking of commitments of the military blocs formed in this region.

What kind of "balance of forces" does Peking have in mind? What accounts for its eagerness to extend the arms race to the South Seas region? Peking explains this by the need to balance "Soviet presence" there. Such arguments are obviously ridiculous, for the Soviet Union has always been opposed to the setting up of military blocs and bases in Asia. As noted by India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Soviet Union had never established military bases in this region and had "none other than peaceful intentions" there. Judging by the way things stand, all the talk of "Soviet presence" in Asia is merely a ruse used by Peking to justify the continued existence of foreign military bases and troops in the area and also its own

actions that are a threat to the security of this part of the world.

When the Pentagon announced its intention to build a big military complex in Diego Garcia Island lying in the centre of the Indian Ocean, a wave of protests swept the Asian countries. Even Thailand and Australia, both members of military blocs, criticized the Pentagon plan. Peking alone had maintained silence on the subject.

In fact, as reported by the magazine *Newsweek*, before adopting a decision to set up the new military complex the Pentagon had secured Peking's "tacit agreement." If any additional evidence of the Maoists' stand on this matter was required, it had been presented at a US Congress subcommittee meeting held to discuss questions concerning the Indian Ocean. At this meeting a representative of the State Department made it clear that China had reacted favourably to the idea of setting up a US military base in Diego Garcia.

Of late Chinese leaders have repeatedly come out in favour of preserving US military bases and garrisons in Asia. The same idea was expressed by Premier Chou En-lai during a meeting with US Congressmen in Peking.

According to H. D. Malavia, a prominent Indian public figure, it was becoming obvious that Peking's ruling quarters, far from being interested in consolidating peace and progress in Asia, were seeking the constant presence of imperialism in the Asian continent, coming out in support of CENTO, and welcoming the plan for establishing a foreign military base in Diego Garcia. This accounts for the profound difference of opinion now existing between the majority of Asian countries and the Peking leaders.

Why do the Maoist circles favour the escalation of the imperialist military presence in Asia? Here one

may recall that at its 10th Congress in 1973 the Communist Party of China set forth the thesis "on the necessity of compromises with imperialist states," which Peking regards as a means of achieving its hegemonic aims. The Maoists are well aware that the present world situation, in which socialism is gaining strength and scoring successes in the struggle for international détente and the consolidation of principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, precludes all possibilities for the foisting of one's rule upon other countries. This fact and China's extreme technological and economic backwardness encourage the Maoists to build their Asian policy on the basis of diverse unscrupulous deals and attempts to change the "poles of forces." They choose their partners from among the oldest and most rabid enemies of the national liberation movement. In forming blocs with reactionary forces Peking diplomacy deliberately sacrifices the interests of security of other Asian countries. This is why Peking abstains from criticism of military blocs and agreements.

In a recent interview given to the *U.S. News and World Report* US State Secretary Henry Kissinger said, in answer to the question of why the Chinese leadership was interested in the presence of the United States in Asia whereas formerly it had repeatedly demanded its withdrawal, that the Chinese regarded the USA as an important element for maintaining balance in that part of the world.

Thus, for instance, strange as it may seem at first, the decision of the new Thailand government to have the US military bases in Thailand dismantled and the US troops stationed there withdrawn, has caused anxiety not only in SEATO Headquarters but also among the Peking leaders. This is not surprising, however, for with the withdrawal of US troops from Thailand there may appear real prospects for improving the

country's relations with its neighbours and for consolidating peace in the entire area, prospects which are far from being desirable to Peking politicians. As reported by the *Bangkok Post*, a few days after the aforementioned decision was adopted by the Thailand government Peking began to smuggle sabotage groups equipped with Chinese arms into Thailand. This is not only gross interference in the domestic affairs of Thailand, although this is not the first time Peking has resorted to such actions, but also one more plot to undermine peace in this area. For Peking's action objectively provides the Pentagon with a much needed pretext for maintaining its troops and bases in Thailand.

Whereas during the "cultural revolution" Peking made no secret of its attempts to export it into neighbouring countries in South and South-East Asia, in their new foreign-policy offensive the Maoists employ more subtle and flexible means by achieving the same expansionist aims. Of late Peking has been making an effort to "eradicate from the minds" of Asian people all the foreign-policy excesses it had committed in spreading the "cultural revolution." By making a show of their friendly disposition Mao's adherents hope to convince the people of other Asian countries that their earlier attempts to "export Maoism" were but a brief episode in China's contemporary history.

At present the Peking leaders do not proclaim their aim of foisting Maoism upon the people of Asian countries. Instead, at international conferences and diplomatic meetings Chinese representatives speak of China's being part of the "third world" and assure their interlocutors from Asian countries of China's friendly intentions. It is common knowledge that by the "third world" is meant a large community of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that have won independence in a struggle against imperialism. They

have much in common and are united by a desire to conduct a policy of neutrality and non-alignment which they regard as an important means of fighting for the further consolidation of their hard-won independence.

It is obvious that a country can be said to belong to the "third world" which not only shares the historical destinies of most Asian and African countries, but also adheres to the principles that form the basis of the policy of these countries. However, recent events have shown that the attitude of the Maoist leadership to the policy of non-alignment remains ambiguous.

But nevertheless Peking spares no efforts to demonstrate its allegedly favourable attitude to the non-alignment policy and the "third world" generally. What is the explanation for this? First of all, as noted by the press in Asian countries, Peking is trying to persuade the people of the developing countries to accept its "new" interpretation of this policy, which is based on the false conception of the "two superpowers." This is done, first, to deprive the non-alignment policy of its anti-imperialist content, and secondly, to impede the development of effective cooperation between the non-aligned states and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Pointing to Peking's selfish aims the Indian historian Ishwer C.Ojha writes in his book *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair*: "The Third World has had to learn that it is primarily a tool to be used in a larger international context."

As noted by the press in many Asian countries Peking's new tricks are a smokescreen for concealing its ambitious plans for spreading Chinese influence in Asia. In this connection the Indian weekly *New Wave* commented: "The change in Peking's policy is a sad event in the modern history. But the fact—no matter how unpleasant it is—remains the fact—for many years

the Asian policy of the People's Republic of China is shaping more and more in accordance with the great-power ambitions of Peking's leaders."

A touchstone of the sincerity of Peking's "peace-loving assurances" is its attitude to the question of ensuring security in Asia by the joint efforts of all countries. It is highly significant that alongside of Europe Asia is beginning to make an active contribution to the process of détente now under way. Many developments attest to this. An end has been put to US military intervention in Vietnam. The national liberation movement in Asia has entered a new and more mature stage. The sovereign states of Asia are now coping with the major tasks of ensuring their full economic independence and improving the life of their peoples through rapid economic growth. A lasting peace is a prime requisite for this.

The Soviet conception of collective security opens up real possibilities for achieving a lasting peace in Asia. It is based on renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for their sovereignty and inviolability of their borders, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. The Soviet Union also calls for the development of large-scale economic cooperation and cultural exchange. It proposes that the system of collective security should be built on the basis of recognition of the right of each nation to exercise control over its natural resources and to develop and use them, and to carry out socio-economic changes.

•This well-thought-out and realistic approach to guaranteeing peace in Asia has met with understanding and support on the part of both the governments and the peoples of Asian countries. It would be unwise, however, to ignore the existence of adversaries of collective security in Asia who make no secret of their views.

It is not surprising when one encounters such adversaries among imperialist quarters whose policy in Asia has always involved the formation of military blocs and the setting of countries against one another. The system of collective security is designed to protect the interests of Asian countries from all threats on the part of imperialism. But when this constructive proposal is given a hostile reception by the Peking leaders who not only pose as friends and allies of the developing countries but even claim to be the self-appointed leader of the "third world," the situation calls for analysis and explanation. The more so since the stand of the PRC in these matters had been quite different at one time.

It is common knowledge that at the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Countries (1955) the Chinese delegates voted for the principles of "Panch Shila" which had much in common with the underlying principles of the system of collective security for Asia as proposed by the Soviet Union. At that time it was proposed in Peking to conclude a "pact of collective peace" for Asia and the Pacific Ocean region. Moreover, the Joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration of January 18, 1957, contains the following statement: "The parties consider that all exclusive military alignments should be replaced by a collective peace and security system." Why then have the Peking leaders abandoned their former views and commitments and gone over to a diametrically opposite position?

A careful analysis of this long and complex evolution of the political and ideological views of the Peking leaders reveals the peculiar logic of their behavior. One has only to recall that when they had supported the idea of ensuring collective peace and security in Asia they had included China in the socialist community of nations and had assured the Chinese people that they would cultivate friendship with the So-

viet Union and be loyal to the cause of internationalism. Now Peking is doing its best to forget all this.

Maoism has taken a stand that is openly hostile to proletarian internationalism, and this has brought about sharp changes in China's foreign policy. In the years of the "cultural revolution," which marked the final degeneration of the Peking leadership, the principles of peaceful coexistence which Peking had once endorsed were denounced as "revisionist heresy." Sometime later, however, Peking declared that it had not rejected these principles in general but would apply them discriminately.

The Peking leaders said that while these principles were inapplicable in relations with imperialist powers they would play an important role in China's relations with its Asian neighbours. As events have shown, this was one of Peking's usual tricks. At the height of US aggression in Vietnam the Maoists tried to export their "cultural revolution" to the neighbouring countries including India, Burma, and Sri Lanka. This turned out to be nothing less than gross interference in the internal affairs of these countries.

At a most crucial period in the struggle against US aggression in Vietnam the Maoists dealt a stab in the back to the countries that had openly declared their anti-imperialist stand and solidarity with the just struggle waged by the peoples of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina. Thus Peking had played a subversive role with regard to the anti-imperialist solidarity movement of Asian peoples. Subsequent events showed that Peking's actions were no accidental deviation from former positions but a logical outcome of "Mao's line."

It is well known that Mao's followers often speak of the permanent character of the "cultural revolution," which supposedly will repeat itself every

7-8 years. By comparing this "theory" with what is taking place in China observers in Asian countries are now talking about a relapse of the "cultural revolution" due to a sharpening of the struggle for power in Peking. It is logical that these events should lead to extremist positions in the sphere of foreign policy. All indications are that the Maoists cannot accept the idea of strengthening peace and security in Asia on a collective basis because they want to aggravate the situation in this region and create "big disorders" which allegedly are in keeping with the revolutionary demands of the masses.

All this sheds light on the motives behind the Maoists' opposition to the system of collective security in Asia. The question is not that the establishment of such a system will lead to "China's encirclement," as Peking alleges, since the system envisages the equal participation of all states, including China. Peking's talk of "encirclement" is only a subterfuge by which it seeks to avoid undertaking any commitments with regard to other Asian peoples as this would hinder it from interfering in their internal affairs.

However, despite Peking's obstructive tactics, the idea of creating a collective security system in Asia is gaining ground. Asia is becoming increasingly aware that as a means of ensuring a lasting peace and security such a system corresponds to the national interests of all countries without exception and will promote good-neighbourly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation on an equal basis. "We believe," said L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, in his speech before the Indian Parliament, "that the establishment of relations of peace, security and cooperation in Asia, a continent where over a half of mankind lives, would be an epoch-making step towards ensuring peace and security of the peoples throughout the world."

Peking is well aware that the present correlation of forces in the world which is in favour of socialism, an ally of the national liberation movement, has ruled out all possibility of overt abuse of power by any one country. That is why of late the Maoists have adopted the tactics of speculating on international contradictions, and have been trying to alter the balance of forces in Asia by playing up to representatives of imperialism. Observers in Asia have long noted that while Peking often displays unfriendliness to its southern neighbours, it not only refrains from any criticism of imperialist military blocs and alliances but has begun to openly justify their existence and even encourage their activities. Mao's closest adherents, for example, far from denouncing SEATO, CENTO and other military blocs, have come out in favour of the presence of US garrisons in military bases in Asia set up under the auspices of these blocs, declaring that they no longer present a threat to China. Peking has also ceased all criticism of the US-Japanese "security treaty" which is a means of drawing Japan into military activities and complicates the situation in the Far East.

Taking note of this fact the press in Asian countries raises the following question: is Peking seeking collusion with imperialist quarters as regards spheres of influence in Asia with utter disregard for the interests of other Asian countries? Recent developments show that the Asian countries were justified in their apprehensions. Observers have noted coincidence of the following two events.

When the Pentagon declared that it was going to build a big military complex in Diego Garcia Peking undertook an armed attack on Paracel Islands to back up its disputable claims to this territory. According to reports from Singapore a formation of Chinese naval forces comprising five destroyers, two submarines and

a squadron of guided missile boats was sent to the archipelago. Such a synchronization of events was obviously not accidental. And this is confirmed by the position of official non-interference taken by US military and diplomatic quarters on the Chinese action.

All these changes in Peking's foreign policy have not passed unnoticed by policy-making circles in the West. It is common knowledge that the "Chinese factor" was taken into consideration by Washington in elaborating the notorious Guam doctrine. Discussing the question of how certain US quarters can use the "Chinese factor" in their interests by making a few concessions to Peking, Hans J. Morgenthau writes in his book *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York, 1969): "If we do not want to set ourselves goals that cannot be attained with the means we are willing to employ, we must learn to accommodate ourselves to the political and cultural predominance of China on the Asian mainland."

Certain US quarters seem to think that by making concessions to Peking at the expense of other Asian countries it will be possible to promote US interests in Asia to a greater extent. This idea is expressed in the book *Remaking China Policy*, a Rand Corporation research study undertaken at the instance of the Pentagon and the Defence Department. An excerpt from the book reads: "...a successful policy towards China could contribute in a major way toward attaining such objectives as... minimizing the costs and risks of fulfilling our defence commitments in South-East and North-East Asia."

Drawing a parallel between these events and making a careful analysis of these developments observers in Asia note that a bargain has been struck between Peking and Washington. By making concessions to imperialist circles to the detriment of security of other Asian countries the Maoist leadership apparently hopes

to gain US recognition of China's interests in the South Seas area. All this raises further questions. The Indian magazine *Blitz* observed in this connection that Peking never even thought of sounding out the views of Asian countries before announcing its consent to US military presence in Asia. It said: "Washington and Peking prefer to use as a trump-card the thing that does not belong to them, namely—the interests of other countries." The Indonesian newspaper *Sinar Harapan* regards China's seizure of the Paracel Islands as an attempt to create a dangerous precedent for settling disputable territorial issues by use of arms.

Peking's policy was in line with that conducted by imperialist quarters in the days of the war in the South Asian subcontinent in late 1971, when it openly supported the military junta in Islamabad which tried to suppress the struggle for liberation waged by the people of Bangladesh. Evidence of this is found in the recently published *Documents of Anderson* by Vinod Gupta. The Maoists assured General Yahya Khan that China would attack India within 48 hours after the start of an armed conflict between Pakistan and India. According to Jack Anderson, a well-informed observer of *The Washington Post*, Peking informed not only the Headquarters of the Pakistani Generals then in power but also the CIA of its plans. Peking used its "special relations" with the junta headed by Yahya Khan to set up secret military camps in towns in the vicinity of Chittagong where Chinese officers trained sabotage groups. These subversive forces were sent into action in December 1971 at the exact time when the US Seventh Fleet headed by the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* entered the Bay of Bengal. Both sides pursued a single aim: to prevent the formation of the sovereign state of Bangladesh. Peking is still doing everything possible to prevent a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the subcontinent.

Taken together these facts show that Peking's growing diplomatic activity in South Asia and its attempts to meddle in the internal affairs of the countries in this area are due to its expansionist schemes embracing the entire Indian Ocean basin. This is confirmed by the landing of Chinese troops in the Paracel Islands, an important cross-roads linking the Pacific and Indian oceans, by the appearance of Chinese submarines and battle-ships off the coast of the Andaman Islands and in the Persian Gulf, and by Peking's attempts to aggravate contradictions in Hindustan. In connection with these events observers in Asia recall how in the early sixties the Maoists deliberately set Indonesia and Malaysia against each other: this confrontation was to help China establish its control over the Strait of Malacca, the main waterway between the Pacific and Indian oceans.

And in what light should one regard China's consent to the continued existence of British and US military bases in the Indian Ocean? The maintenance of military bases in this area is in full contradiction with the UN resolution which calls for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The resolution was supported by Peking's representative for purely demagogic reasons. The contradiction here between Peking's words and deeds is obvious. According to Asian observers, Peking's conciliatory attitude to the new demonstration of imperialist "gunboat policy" in the Indian Ocean, under which the US Seventh Fleet including several aircraft carriers patrols the Indian Ocean, will give Peking grounds for territorial claims of its own in the area. The Colombo newspaper *Satan maga* notes that in order to justify the expansion of US bases the Maoists have set forth the theory of "balance of forces" in Asia and are using this "game" to cover up their hegemonic aspirations

and their attempts to set themselves up as the leader of the "third world."

In pursuit of these ambitions Peking opposes all steps to improve the international climate, calling détente a "temporary and superficial" phenomenon that runs counter to the peoples' interests. But Peking has nothing to offer by way of an alternative besides irresponsible calls for "big disorders," that is, provocation of conflicts. As applied to Asia, this finds expression in Peking's opposition to efforts to ensure peace and cooperation in the continent and its call instead for the preservation of "balance of forces" in this part of the world. When these circumstances are taken into consideration Peking's negative attitude to the idea of ensuring security in Asia through the joint efforts of all interested states of the area becomes understandable. Of late Peking's diplomacy and propaganda have taken great pains to discredit and distort this idea. But despite Peking's schemes the idea of establishing a system of collective security in Asia is winning increasing support in Asian countries. During his friendship visit to India in 1973 Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, said: "Only a democratic peace, a just peace, can be a genuinely lasting peace. Such a peace must be based on respect for the rights, sovereignty, and legitimate interests of all countries without exception, be they big or small, be they members or non-members of political groupings—and not on some poles of strength and rivalry, about which it has become fashionable to speak in some quarters. It is not a matter of learning more subtle methods of manipulating the so-called balance of forces, but a matter of excluding the use of force from international relations. This requires the pooling of the constructive efforts of all countries." This approach to the matter has met with sympathy and understanding in many Asian countries. The idea of

creating a collective security system has been endorsed by government officials in India, the Mongolian People's Republic, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and other countries. In a recent interview given to a correspondent of the Pakistani *New Times* President of Afghanistan Sardar Mohammed Daud said that the idea of collective security for Asia put forth by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, contained a whole range of principles that were acceptable to all peace-loving countries, and that such ideas, regardless of their origin, would be considered favourably by Afghanistan. Such sentiments and views are becoming ever more widespread and this shows that peace and security can be achieved in Asia despite the opposition of those quarters which regard this idea as an obstacle to their expansionist schemes.

Ю. Луговской
ОПАСНОЕ СОСЕДСТВО
на английском языке

Цена 13 коп.

